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Abstract
In this master thesis we have performed an explorative study on the VC-entrepreneur relationship.
Paper 1 is a literature review of several frameworks describing the VC-entrepreneur rela-
tionship, how these frameworks take the VC and/or the entrepreneur’s perspective, and their
applicability and limitations to the pre- and post-investment stage. Our main findings in this
literature review show that little emphasis has been placed on the pre-investment stage and how
the VC-entrepreneur relationship is initiated and developed. In addition few scholars take a
demand-side view on equity finance which leads to an unbalanced understanding of the forces
affecting the market for venture capital. Two main findings from Paper 1 was that social embed-
dedness may help explain how external parties in the entrepreneur’s network may mediate the
relation to investors and there is a need to further investigate how the entrepreneur may initiate
and build relationships towards investors in an early venture stage. Thus the following papers
aim to explore these findings.
Paper 2 investigates how outside directors may strengthen entrepreneurial ventures in an early
stage by performing explorative case analyses. Our findings suggest that outside directors may
strengthen high-growth entrepreneurial ventures in an early stage by increasing the ventures
competitive advantage in terms of strategically combining and managing resources. In addition
they add legitimacy towards external stakeholders and increases the ventures interaction with its
surroundings. The implications from Paper 2 suggest that more qualitative research should be
performed on how the outside directors’ strengthening contribution to early stage ventures can be
related to stage theory.
Paper 3 explores how entrepreneurs may develop investment readiness to bridge the financing
gap and become seed level investor ready. This was done by conducting an explorative, theory
building case study. From exploring the investment readiness we build a model that are able
to relate investment readiness to the stages of development, and offers an explanation to how
entrepreneurs use social ties as an information transferring mechanism effectively developing the
investment readiness of the venture in order to overcome the high level of information asymmetry
and risk related to the early stages of venture development. The implications from paper 3 suggest
that the use of social ties could improve the entrepreneurs ability to become seed stage investor
ready and effectively bridge the gap in early stage venture capital.
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Sammendrag
Denne masteroppgaven ser på VC-entreprenør forholdet gjennom utforskende case studier.
Artikkel 1 er en litteraturgjennomgang av flere rammeverk som beskriver VC-entreprenør
forholdet, hvordan disse rammeverkene tar et VC- og/eller et entreprenørperspektiv, og deres
anvendbarhet og begrensninger til pre-og post-investeringfasen. Litteraturgjennomgangen tyder
på at få rammeverk som beskriver VC-entreprenørrelasjonen fokuserer på pre-investeringsfasen
og hvordan VC-entreprenørforholdet initieres og utvikles. I tillegg viser litteraturgjennomgangen
at få rammeverk tar entreprenørens synspunkt, noe som fører til en ubalansert forståelse av hvilke
krefter som påvirker markedet for risikovillig kapital. To hovedfunn fra Artikkel 1 er at sosial
nettverksteori kan bidra til å forklare hvordan eksterne parter i entreprenørens nettverk kan megle
forholdet til investorer, og det samtidig et behov for å undersøke nærmere hvordan entreprenøren
kan starte og bygge relasjoner opp mot investorer i en tidlig fase. Artikkel 2 og 3 tar derfor sikte
på å utforske disse funnene.
Artikkel 2 undersøker hvordan eksterne styremedlemmer kan styrke entreprenørbedrifter i en
tidlig fase ved å utføre utforskende case studier. Funnene fra Artikkel 2 tyder på at eksterne styre-
medlemmer kan styrke vekstbedrifter i en tidlig fase ved å øke bedriftenes konkurransefortrinn i
form av å strategisk kombinere og administrere ressurser. I tillegg kan eksterne styremedlemmer gi
legitimitet overfor eksterne interessenter og samtidig øke bedriftens interaksjon med omgivelsene.
Implikasjonene fra Artikkel 2 tyder på at mer kvalitativ forskning bør utføres på hvordan eksterne
styremedlemmer kan styrke entreprenørbedrifter i tidlig fase ved å se på teori som forklarer
hvordan bedrifter utvikler seg gjennom forskjellige faser.
Artikkel 3 utforsker hvordan entreprenøren kan utvikle seg til å bli nok investeringsklar
til å få investering i tidlig fase. Dette ble gjort ved å gjennomføre utforskende, teoribyggende
case studier. Fra å utforske hvordan entreprenører kan utvikle seg til å bli investeringsklare
så bygger vi en modell som er i stand til å relatere investeringsklarhet til utviklingsstadier, og
tilbyr en forklaring på hvordan entreprenører kan bruke sosiale relasjoner som en mekanisme
for informasjonsoverføring som effektivt utvikler investeringsklarheten til selskapet for å unngå
høy grad av informasjonsasymmetri og risiko knyttet til de tidlige stadiene av bedriftsutviklingen.
Implikasjonene fra Artikkel 3 tyder på at bruk av sosiale relasjoner kan forbedre entreprenørenes
mulighet til å bli investorklar i såkornstadiet og effektivt bygge bro over gapet til tidlig stadium
venture kapital.
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1. Introduction
Ventures at an early stage are often resource constrained, which leads to a high probability of of
failure in the early venture stage. As suggested by Kaiser et al. [2007] young companies often
suffer from the so-called ’liability of newness’. Entrepreneurs need to obtain financing, necessary
know-how and industry expertise, which they do not necessarily possess themselves. Because the
future cash flow is uncertain and because the ventures have few assets to serve as collateral, many
ventures cannot obtain bank loan financing [Kaiser et al., 2007], thus investor financing becomes
an alternative. An equity investment refers to the buying and holding of shares of a stock from
firms or individuals with the anticipation that the value of the stock will rise [BusinessDictionary].
Venture capital (VC) could be an important source of finance in the early stage of a venture
since VCs devote significant management resources to understand new technologies and markets.
They search for new promising ventures and provide them with financial resources and coaching
through the early part of their lives [Davila et al., 2003]. Therefore Timmons and Bygrave (1986, as
cited in Zacharakis et al. [2010]) suggest that the cooperative relationship between the VC and
entrepreneur could be more important to the success of the venture than the capital itself.
In order to give the reader a sufficient contextual background for the three papers we will first
give a general introduction to the phenomenon of the VC-entrepreneur relationship. Thereafter
we will move on to argue why a cooperative relationship between the VC and the entrepreneur is
important at a very early stage by highlighting elements from the investment process and the so
called ’liability of newness’. The next section will give an overall reflection on the methodologies
applied in this research project followed by summaries of the aims and main findings in each pa-
per. Finally, we offer a conclusion to the three papers and give the overall implications of this thesis.
The reader’s emphasis should be on the three papers appended. Paper 1 gives a thorough
literature comparison of the application and limitation of several VC-entrepreneur relationship
framework’s ability to describe areas in the pre- and post-investment stage and from the VC
and/or the entrepreneur’s perspective. Further, paper 2 gives an explorative multi-case analysis
of how outside directors may strengthen high-growth entrepreneurial firms at an early stage by
adding resources, legitimacy and monitoring and control. Finally, paper 3 gives an explorative
multi-case analysis of how entrepreneurs may develop investment readiness to bridge the financing
gap and become seed level investor ready.
An introduction to the VC-entrepreneur relationship
The advantage of having investors on board may be a huge benefit for entrerpreneurial ventures
[De Clercq et al., 2006] in terms of getting access to finance and other value adding resources.
However, according to Shepherd and Zacharakis [2001] the potential is contingent upon being
able to establish an open and trustfull relationship. Securing a good relationship implies finding
the right investor, where a foundation for a good match are contingent on complementary skills,
commitment and a potential for an open and trustfull relationship [De Clercq et al., 2006].
The VC-entrepreneur relationship has been depicted in many different perspectives. Several
scholars have tried to model the VC-entrepreneur dyad in established relationships in order to
explain antecedents and processes leading up to certain behaviors, but most of them differ in
their approach to the phenomenon and try to explain different aspects of the VC-entrepreneur
relationship. VCs may offer the entrepreneurs the resources they need in terms of finance, advice
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and industry expertise, but little is known about how the initial relationships between the VC and
the entrepreneur develop and there is little theory explaining the phenomenon in an early venture
stage.
One premise in most theories concerning the VC-entrepreneur relationship is the uncertainty
and information asymmetry governing the relationship between the VC and the entrepreneur
(Cumming and Johan [2008]; Davila et al. [2003]; Eisenhardt [1989b]). As the information asymme-
try is socially complex, tacit and path dependent it would be practically impossible to remove
it completely. Even if the entrepreneur and investor both recognized the same value of the
opportunity, they might differ in the confidence and cognitive perception of the entrepreneurs
ability to exploit the opportunity in the most profitable way [Lahti, 2012]. Interactions are argued
to have a cumulative affect on the relationship [Ford et al., 2010], thus the effect of sharing a
longer joint history might decrease this asymmetry. Hence, social complex knowledge in terms of
culture, reputation, and human capital (Alvarez and Busenitz [2001]) could be shared through
social interactions (Granovetter [78]; Sørheim [2003]). This implies that the more specialized the
two parties are, and the less shared history they have, the harder it would be for the entrepreneur
to get external funding. However, as the venture matures the information asymmetry is thought
to reduce as a function of increased reputation, track record, and the information and knowledge
becomes more explicit as it is developed with explicit proof of technology and market (De Clercq
et al. [2006]; Lahti [2012]). Thus the information asymmetry between the entrepreneur and investor
could be related to the ventures stage of development and since little is known of how the initial
relationship between the VC and entrepreneur develops it is interesting to examine how this
relationship is depicted in the pre-investment stage.
The VC-entrepreneur relationship during the investment process
In this article we define the pre-investment stage as the point where no investment in turns of
money, capital or a quantity of shares of stock has been invested in a business in order to gain
profitable results, interest, income or appreciation in value. It is at this stage the entrepreneurs are
said to suffer the most from ’the liability of newness’ due to high uncertainty [Davila et al., 2003]
and since they often lack the necessary resources for the venture to succeed [Brush et al., 2001].
Thus the VCs in this stage seem preoccupied with decreasing this uncertainty as well formulated
in the below statement.
“We have a strong belief that the companies ought to have external board members
with relevant industry experience within the segments that the company is about
to enter. This is because it takes time to get to know specific industries, at least 10
to 20 years until you fully understand how the industry operates and till you have
developed a strong network. If you are a company in an early stage founded by young
entrepreneurs, then they lack this experience, and we do not support such a high-risk
sport ... To us it is a big plus if an entrepreneur has managed to attract some extra
strong outside directors because this tells us that the entrepreneur is actively searching
for someone they believe has what it takes and who they believe might sit with all the
answers. This is an attitude that we highly appreciate”. - Managing partner, VC-company
In addition to the above statement’s acknowledgement of the facilitating role of outside direc-
tors, previous studies also suggest that business angels may serve a facilitating role in obtaining
venture capital as they may reduce the firms’ ’liability of newness’ (Madill et al. [2005]; Sørheim
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[2005]). As suggested by Levie and Lichtenstein [2010] growing businesses go through distin-
guishable stages at different times in their history, and according to the statement below it seems
as if the investor divide the relationship in the pre-investment process into the first, where the
entrepreneurs are not yet investor ready and, the second, as when the company is ready to seek
investments.
“We are very eager to meet a lot of companies although many of them might be in a
too early stage for investments, because this is a nice way for us to get to know the
team and listen to their plans. Then we can follow them on their way until they mature
and become ready for investments”. - Managing partner, VC-company
The above statement indicate that VCs are concerned with building relationships to en-
trepreneurs at a very early stage. Different investors have different preferences in terms financing
stage (De Clercq et al. [2006]), and lately there has been wide recognition of a financing gap in
the supply of early stage venture capital. This is argued to come as a consequence of information
asymmetry (Cable and Shane [1997]) and uncertainty due to unfamiliarity and tacit knowledge
(Sørheim et al. [2011]). However, several researchers (e.g. Mason and Kwok [2010] and Mason and
Harrison [2001]) argue that this is partly due to entrepreneurs not being able to become investor
ready.
2. Motivation for Study
The founding of new high growth businesses is often regarded to be important for both global
innovation and economic growth (Schoonhoven and Romanelli [2001]; Shane and Cable [2002])
and innovation is one of Norway’s main priorities [Stortinget, 2013]. However, in the European
Scoreboard 2013 Norway is listed as a moderate innovator with a below average performance
[Hollanders and Es-Sadki, 2013]. Some of the main observations since 2012 are a strong decline in
Venture Capital investments and in Finance and support. Both firm investments and innovators
are listed as well below average. Earlier studies have indicated that emergent growth ventures face
considerable challenges in the process of acquiring financing in the institutional capital market
(Binks and Ennew [1997], Cressy and Olofsson [1997],Osnabrugge [2000], Silver et al. [2010]). Since
the Norway Liberal Party recently launched a party program giving entrepreneurs better access
to capital [Programkomité, 2013], this indicates that there is a national focus on the problems
associated with investments and survival of new ventures. With this in mind our motivation
behind the focus of this master thesis is to explore how early stage ventures become investment
ready, develop cooperative relationship to investors and acquire scarce resources for success in an
early stage.
3. Methodology
This section gives an overview of the research process in this thesis. More academic and detailed
discussions on the research design and methods are included in the respective papers.
The Point of Departure
Two of the authors behind this paper are entrepreneurs and thus experience challenges associated
with relationship-building processes towards investors, making the problems discussed in this
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master thesis highly relevant. The basis for this master thesis was laid during January 2013
after which two of the authors had just finished individual project thesis with focus on how
entrepreneurs build relationships in an early venture stage and the third author behind this
master thesis had previously written a project thesis about the investment process from the VC
perspective. Because of the problems’ relevance to the entrepreneurs, the authors decided to
examine the VC-entrepreneur relationship from the entrepreneur’s perspective.
Litterature Screening
In order to figure out what had previously been written about the VC-entrepreneur relationship
the authors conducted a literature screening and analysis spring 2013 in order to examine the
phenomenon. Paper one included in this master thesis therefore gives an overview of the
applicability and limitations of the VC-entrepreneur relationship frameworks. The first paper have
analyzed the frameworks used to model the VC-entrepreneur relationship from the VC’s and/or
the entrepreneur’s perspective and also analyzed how the frameworks complement each other
and their applicabilities and limitations to the pre- and post-investment stage. The most striking
finding was that there was very little written about how the initial relationship between VCs and
entrepreneurs develop and, more interestingly, there was a lack of research on how elements in
the period before the entrepreneur and VC first meet influence the relationship. Thus the authors
decided to investigate further how outside directors might strengthen entrepreneurial ventures in
an early stage and, as mentioned above, how the entrepreneur may develop investment readiness
to bridge the financing gap and become seed level investor ready.
Research Design
Since very little was written about the entrepreneur’s perspective on the initial development
of investment readiness and we found no previous literature on how outside directors might
strengthen entrepreneurial ventures at an early stage from the entrepreneur’s perspective, we
decided to divide these research questions into two separate exploratory multi-case studies. Our
goal was to give a better insight to how factors in a very early venture stage might affect the
VC-entrepreneur relationship. This was done by exploring how the so-called ’liability of newness’
could be decreased by exploring how companies develop investment readiness and how outside
directors might strengthen entrepreneurial ventures at a very early stage. In order to explore
the phenomenon of investment readiness we decided to enter the process without any biased
presumptions and therefore we first performed an inductive study followed by a deductive study,
thus paper three is a theory-building article inspired by grounded theory using case studies. Paper
two was based on explorative research without any theoretic presumptions, making it a inductive
study.
Sampling
Paper 2 and paper 3 had a quite different approach to the phenomenon, thus sampling of cases
differed between the two papers.
Paper 2
Based on a strategic sampling of high-growth Norwegian entrepreneurial ventures that had
acquired outside directors at an early stage we identified several interesting case companies. We
contacted CEOs and outside directors that was already in our network and ended up with three
case companies where we conducted interviews with the CEO and an outside director in each
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company. The outside director in case company A was the very same person as the outside
director in case company B. An overview of the cases included in paper 2 is listed in Table 3.1
below.
Table 3.1: Overview of cases paper 2
venture Entrepreneur Board member Industry Status of company
venture A
(Paper 2)
CEO A Outside chief of director A,B IT/telecom Expanding market horizon
venture B
(Paper 2)
CEO B Outside chief of director A,B Consumer Company sold
venture C
(Paper 2)
CEO C Outside director C IT/telecom Company seeking invest-
ment
Paper 3
The sampling of case companies in paper 3 was based on two entrepreneurial ventures in an
early stage that the authors knew were seeking for investments and which was located in close
proximity to the authors. In addition the authors performed interviews with one pre-seed investor
and one local VC. An overview of the cases included in paper 3 is listed in Table 3.2 below.
Table 3.2: Overview of cases paper 3
venture Interviewee 1 Interviewee 2 Workshop partici-
pants
Industry
Company A CEO CFO CFO Oil and gas
Company B CEO CFO CEO and CFO Maritime
Investor Pre-seed investor
(company B)
Local VC investor
Interviews and Workshops
During the spring 2013 we conducted a total of 10 interviews and two workshops, 5 interviews in
paper 2, and 6 interviews and two workshops in paper 3. In paper 2 we conducted 3 interviews
with CEOs and 2 interviews with outside directors since one of the outside directors was the
same in both company A and B. In paper 3 we conducted 3 mapping interviews of the case
companies and 2 workshops with each company. In addition we conducted two interviews with
investors. The interviewees were given a citation check, but no adjustments have been made to
the transcriptions. In total these interviews and workshops lasted 9 hours and 12 minutes and all
interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. The transcriptions totaled 142 single-spaced pages
and nearly 75 000 words.
In paper 2 interview guides were built in order to ensure consistency between interviews as to
compare them afterwards. Two separate guides were created, one fro the CEOs and one for the
outside directors. The interview guides were based on the authors’ knowledge from literature
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reviews and can be found in Appendix A. Adjustments to the interview guides were made as
the authors conducted the interviews and the informants contributed with new insights to topics.
It must be noted that all interviews were conducted in Norwegian and all transcriptions were
written in Norwegian. Thus all quotes used in this master thesis have been translated into English
by the authors.
Data Analysis
When the empirical data had been collected the transcriptions were coded in order to analyze the
content in a within analysis of each case followed by a cross-case analysis between the different
cases. This procedure was also followed in the literature review paper and in all three papers this
was a highly iterative process where the authors frequently stepped back and fourth between the
empirical data and the analysis.
In paper 3 the authors initially performed an inductive study which resulted in some new
interesting aspects of how a model of investment readiness would look like. These findings were
used to draw a proposed model of investment readiness which was further tested in workshops
with the case companies.
Limitations
The cases selected in paper 2 were based on a strategic sampling of high-growth entrepreneurial
ventures that had acquired outside directors at an early stage. The different industries, different
experiences and backgrounds and paths taken indicate that the study is somehow generalizable.
However, the number of cases is too low to to give the analysis statistical representativeness, thus
further studies should be conducted to increase knowledge in this area.
In paper three the geographic proximity, experience and background of the entrepreneurs make
these cases less generalizable. However, the generalizability is increased by the great variation
between the case industries.
4. Summary of Appended Papers
This section gives an overview of the main aims and findings in the three appended papers.
Paper 1: Applicability and limitations of frameworks describing the VC-entrepreneur
relationship
The aim of the Paper
The aim of this paper was to perform a literature review in order to explore how the VC-
entrepreneur relationship can be built and maintained in the pre- and post-investment stage by
examining the following research questions:
• Which existing frameworks are used for modelling the VC-entrepreneur relationship from
the VC’s and/or the entrepreneur’s perspective?
• How do these frameworks complement each other and what are their main areas of applica-
bility and limitations to the pre- and post-investment stage?
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Summary of Findings
By performing a thorough review of literature describing the VC-entrepreneur relationship
from the VC and/or the entrepreneur’s perspective the authors have given an overview of the
application and limitation of each framework’s ability to describe areas in the pre- and post-
investment stage and from the VC and the entrepreneur’s perspective. The authors found six
main frameworks used at describing the VC-entrepreneurial relationship and these could be
divided into contractual frameworks and dynamic frameworks. The contractual frameworks are
principal-agent theory, stewardship theory and the prisoner’s dilemma whereas the dynamic
frameworks are the procedural justice theory, social embeddedness theory and the organizational
learning theory. Our analysis show that contractual frameworks tend to be based on the VC’s
perspective and explain the relationship in the post-investment stage while there is a lack of
research explaining the early pre-investment stage and a lack of research taking the entrepreneur’s
perspective. The study suggests that the main limitation of contractual frameworks is that they
fail to consider entrepreneur’s perspective, the dynamic process and the fact that many concepts
are simultaneous and highly interrelated in an on-going relationship. Dynamic relationship
frameworks may help explain areas in the pre-investment stage where the contractual frameworks
are not applicable, but it must be noted that the frameworks differ in the way they relate to the
VC-entrepreneur relationship phenomenon, thus some areas that are highly interrelated may yield
a better understanding while others may not.
Paper 2: Investigating how outside directors may strengthen entrepreneurial
ventures in an early stage
The aim of the Paper
The aim of this paper was to perform an exploratory case study on high growth entrepreneurial
ventures in an early stage in order to answer the following research questions:
• How can outside directors add scarce resources to high-growth entrepreneurial ventures in
an early stage?
• How can outside directors add the needed legitimacy to high growth entrepreneurial
ventures in an early stage?
• How can outside directors help the board in high-growth entrepreneurial ventures to monitor
and control the use of resources in an early stage?
Our case study contribute to insights in the use of outside directors, an area where there
has been none, or limited, research up till now. Our findings show that the outside directors
may contribute to scarce resources by adding organizational, human and social resources consistent
with the resource based view, and also increase the ventures interaction with its surroundings by
co-optation and added legitimacy in accordance with the resource dependence view. However,
what enables the entrepreneur to take advantage of resources obtained from outside directors
seems to depend upon the outside director’s ability to convey knowledge into a language the
CEO understands. Our findings suggest that the outside directors may add legitimacy by their
reputation, CV, experience and trustworthy relationships and the legitimating role seemed to be
situational and vary with the stage of the company. Outside directors seem to help ventures with
their monitoring and control of resources by strategically combining internal and external resources
and fostering stewardship behavior and our findings indicate that the value-adding role of the outside
director to these high-growth ventures in the early-stage may depend upon the stage of the
company and of the extent of the outside director’s activity in the firm.
18
Paper 3: Exploring how to develop investment readiness to bridge the financ-
ing gap and become seed level investor ready
The aim of the Paper
The aim of this paper is to develop a more holistic and comprehensive model for investment
readiness, contributing with insights from the entrepreneurs perspective. This will be done by
conducting an explorative, theory building case study on seeking to answer the following research
questions:
• How do entrepreneur’s plan and develop in- vestment readiness to become investor ready?
• How do entrepreneurs cope with information asymmetry and uncertainty in the process of
becoming investor ready?
The study contribute by providing deeper understanding and a definition to the concept of
investment readiness, related to both investor ready and the development stages of the venture. In
this we provide a basis for better understanding the demand-side weakness argued to contribute
to a failure in the market for early stage venture capital. By utilizing the findings from preliminary
mapping interviews of early stage high-tech growth oriented ventures, we where able to build
on the concept of investment readiness, and relate in to information asymmetry and uncertainty,
by building a preliminary theoretical model that was used to analyze and discuss the companies’
status and plan for developing investment readiness into becoming investor ready in workshops
with each company. The findings lead to a better understanding how the entrepreneurs use direct
and indirect social ties as information transferring mechanisms in order to overcome information
asymmetry and the investors perceived uncertainty in the ’investability’ of the company in order
to become investor ready. Effectively, leading up to a new and empirically derived model for
investment readiness. This model is able to capture and explain how the social embedded
interactions in the direct, and indirect, ties between the entrepreneur and investors affect the
process of becoming investor ready. Findings suggest that the investors perceived uncertainty in
seed stage development could be reduced by using social ties to familiarize and build trust. Thus
helping the investor make a rational investment decision.
5. Conclusions and Implications
In this master thesis we have performed an explorative study on the VC-entrepreneur relationship.
To find out what was written about the VC-entrepreneur relationship we first performed a literature
review where we looked at several frameworks describing the VC-entrepreneur relationship, how
these frameworks take the VC and/or the entrepreneur’s perspective, and their applicability and
limitations to the pre- and post-investment stage. Our main findings in this literature review show
that little emphasis has been placed on the pre-investment stage and how the VC-entrepreneur
relationship is initiated and developed. In addition few scholars take a demand-side view on
equity finance which leads to an unbalanced understanding of the forces affecting the market for
venture capital. Two main findings from Paper 1 was that social embeddedness may help explain
how external parties in the entrepreneur’s network may mediate the relation to investors and there
is a need to further investigate how the entrepreneur may initiate and build relationships towards
investors in an early venture stage. Thus the following papers aim to explore these holes in theory.
The first by investigating how outside directors may strengthen entrepreneurial ventures in an
early stage and, the second, exploring how entrepreneurs may develop investment readiness to
bridge the financing gap and become seed level investor ready. Our findings suggest that outside
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directors may strengthen high-growth entrepreneurial ventures in an early stage by increasing the
ventures competitive advantage in terms of strategically combining and managing resources. In
addition they add legitimacy towards external stakeholders and increases the ventures interaction
with its surroundings. The implications from Paper 2 suggest that more qualitative research should
be performed on how the outside directors’ strengthening contribution to early stage ventures can
be related to stage theory. From exploring the investment readiness we build a model that are able
to relate investment readiness to the stages of development, and opposes an explanation to how
entrepreneurs use social ties as an information transferring mechanism effectively developing the
investment readiness of the venture in order to overcome the high level of information asymmetry
and risk related to the early stages of venture development. The implications from paper 3 suggest
that the use of social ties could improve the entrepreneurs ability to become seed stage investor
ready and effectively bridge the gap in early stage venture capital.
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Abstract
This article acknowledges the importance of cooperative relationship between the entrepreneur and
venture capitalist. Contractual frameworks have sought to structure the relationship by describing the
antecedents, content and consequences from a VC perspective. This study suggests that the main limitation
of contractual frameworks is that they fail to consider entrepreneur’s perspective, the dynamic process and
the fact that many concepts are simultaneous and highly interrelated in an on-going relationship. This
paper suggests that dynamic relationship frameworks may add to contractual relationship frameworks
by explaining process elements causing behaviors. These dynamic relationship frameworks may help the
entrepreneur understand how to build a good relationship to an investor in an early investment phase.
However, the frameworks differ in the way they relate to the VC-entrepreneur relationship phenomenon,
thus some areas that are highly interrelated may yield a better understanding while others may not. Our
analysis show that contractual frameworks explain the relationship in the post-investment stage, but
there is a lack of research explaining the early pre-investment stage and a lack of research taking the
entrepreneur’s perspective. Further this paper puts forward that the dyadic VC-entrepreneur relationship
is embedded in a wider business network, affected by inter- and intra-organizational relationships, and
that network effects may play a significant role in explaining aspects of trust, cooperation and commitment
in the VC-Entrepreneur dyad.
∗Thanks to Roger Sørheim for supervision and feedback.
†Thanks to Elsebeth Holmen for supplementary review and feedback.
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1. Introduction
Eentrepreneurs typically start their ven-ture with passion for an innovative ideaand with the anticipation that the firm
will become a long-term success, the venture
progresses through the initial start-up phase,
investments are often sought [Arthurs and
Busenitz, 2003]. In addition to financing, en-
trepreneurs also need the necessary know-how
and industry expertise, which they do not
necessarily possess themselves. Because the
future cash flow is uncertain and the ventures
have few assets to serve as collateral, many
ventures cannot obtain bank loan financing
[Kaiser et al., 2007], thus investor financing
becomes an alternative. Investors may offer
the entrepreneurs the resources they need in
terms of finance, advice and industry expertise.
Unfortunately earlier studies have indicated
that emergent growth ventures face consid-
erable challenges in the process of acquiring
financing in the institutional capital market
(Binks and Ennew [1997], Cressy and Olof-
sson [1997],Osnabrugge [2000]). Because of
the uncertain environment of entrepreneurial
firms, conflict within the investor-entrepreneur
dyad is expected (Landström [2004], as cited
in Zacharakis et al. [2010]), but conflict is not
necessarily negative as it may improve the deci-
sion quality as better alternatives may develop
when people are being challenged [Zacharakis
et al., 2010]. On the other hand it may also
damage consensus and lead to decreased confi-
dence in partner cooperation [Zacharakis et al.,
2010], something that might be detrimental to
venture success.
The institutional capital market consists
of both venture capital (VC) and angel capi-
tal (BA). According to Osnabrugge [2000] the
Venture Capitalists (VCs) take longer to in-
vest and spend more time in the early phase
to build a relationship with the entrepreneur
than Business Angels (BAs). Osnabrugge
[2000] also posits that VCs tend to document
their investment process more, take more in-
dependent references on the entrepreneur
and consult more people before investment.
Thus VCs are more rule-based than business
angels and more concerned with reducing
these risks in the pre-investment process as a
means of signaling competence to their fund
providers [Osnabrugge, 2000]. Most literature
examining the ongoing VC-entrepreneur rela-
tionship have examined the VC-entrepreneur
relationship from a VC perspective with a
focus on antecedents and consequences in
the post-investment stage, but little is known
about how the initial relationships between
entrepreneurs and investors develop and little
is known about the entrepreneur’s perspective
on the investment process. However, since
the entrepreneur’s challenge lies in the pro-
cess of obtaining external financing initially
(Binks and Ennew [1997], Cressy and Olofs-
son [1997], Osnabrugge [2000]), there is also
a need to consider how the VC-entrepreneur
relationship is built and maintained in the
pre-investment phase. The comprehensive
screening and relationship building among
VCs and entrepreneurs in the pre-investment
phase makes it very interesting to look at the
dyadic relationship, and according to Timmons
and Bygrave [1986, as cited in Zacharakis et al.
[2010]], the cooperative relationship between
the VC and entrepreneur is more important to
the success of the venture than the capital itself.
Since the cooperative relationship between
the VC and entrepreneur is said to be more
important to the success of the venture than
the money itself (Timmons and Bygrave [1986],
as cited in Zacharakis et al. [2010]), this arti-
cle aim to explore how the VC-entrepreneur
relationship can be built and maintained in the
pre- and post-investment stage. The research
questions are: which existing frameworks are used
for modelling the VC-entrepreneur relationship
from the VC’s and/or the entrepreneur’s perspec-
tive? How do they complement each other and what
are their main areas of applicability and limitations
to the pre- and post-investment stage?
In this article we present a literature review
of the relationship between the entrepreneur
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and the VC. First we present and compare
the existing frameworks, contractual and rela-
tional, and their contributions and limitations
in describing the VC-entrepreneur relation-
ship. The contractual models include principal
agency theory, stewardship theory and the prisoners
dilemma. The dynamic relationship frameworks
presented are the procedural justice theory, the
social embeddedness theory and the organizational
learning theory. Lastly, the theoretical gaps
in explaining the VC-entrepreneur relation-
ship are discussed and directions for further
research are offered. In viewing the shortcom-
ings of the existing frameworks explaining the
VC-entrepreneur relationship, the attention is
focused on how these theories tend to look at
the goals and motivations of the entrepreneur
and to what extent the frameworks are limited
by the type of relationship being examined.
1.1 Research method: Literature re-
view
In order to compare and analyze existing
frameworks describing the VC-entrepreneur
relationship, an initial literature screening
was conducted. The authors’ initial pre-
sumption was that research done within this
area was insufficient when looking upon
the pre-investment stage. This presumption
was based on the existing theory’s main fo-
cus on relationship-maintenance in the post-
investment stage, thus the purpose of the
litterature screening was to find literature
concerned with the following research areas:
VC-entrepreneur relations in the pre- and
post-investment stage, ongoing processes in
the VC-entrepreneur relationship and the en-
trepreneur’s view on relationship-building in
an early pre-investment phase. In advance of
this study the authors possessed some relevant
literature from former papers written in the
Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Specializa-
tion project (TIØ4530). In addition the authors
were guided towards some relevant literature
by supervisor Roger Sørheim.
In order to minimize bias the authors ini-
tially performed an iterative screening pro-
cess where results were based on individual
search results from each author’s chosen search
queries and databases, presuming three inde-
pendent authors would differ in heuristics and
thus end up with different results. After a
process of interposition a set of the most effec-
tive search queries were chosen. However, the
authors may have been biased in their choice of
key words due to mutual agreement in discus-
sions, their shared contextual environment and
former entrepreneurial experience. The combi-
nation of search queries was conclusive in what
gave the most relevant results in the databases,
but it must be said that there could be other
combinations of key words that could yield the
same result. The most relevant search queries
turned out to be: “pre-investment”, ‘investor”,
“entrepreneur”, “relationship”, “start-up” and
“VC”.
The combination of the search queries
“entrepreneur”, “investor” and “relationship”
gave 64800 search results, mostly non-relevant.
By exchanging “investor” with “VC” we nar-
rowed the search down to 18100 results, but
most of these articles discussed the relationship
from a post-investment view. “Entrepreneur”,
“investor”, “relationship” and “pre-investment”
gave 1200 search results and by exchanging
“investor” with “VC” one more time, the combi-
nation “pre-investment”, “entrepreneur”, “VC”
and “relationship”, with 679 search results,
yielded out to be the most effective combi-
nation of search queries in order of relevant
results. This set of articles was further screened
and narrowed down to the 40 most relevant
articles for the review reported in this paper.
The relevant literature was chosen based on
the frequency of citations, date of publication
and coherence with the most relevant key
words: pre-investment, entrepreneur, VC and
relationship. The most relevant articles were the
ones that discussed frameworks describing the
VC-entrepreneur relationship, compared differ-
ent frameworks or discussed the entrepreneur
or VC’s view of the relationship process in
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the pre- or post-investment stage. Although
“post-investment” was not one of the initial key
words, the combination of key words yielded
several articles with focus on and comparisons
in the post-investment stage, which supports
the authors’ presumption that little is written
about the VC-entrepreneur relationship in the
pre-investment phase.
The most used databases were JSTOR, Sci-
ence Direct, Harvard Business Review and
Sage Journals, and the most frequent journals
were The Academy of Management Review, En-
trepreneurship Theory and Practise and journals
in entrepreneurship and finance. The search
databases were chosen based on their academic
and credible literature within business and
management. In addition to search queries a
literature comparison and preliminary analysis
was done.
2. Comparison of contractual
frameworks describing the
VC-entrepreneur relationship
The VC-Entrepreneur relationship has been
studied using many different theoretical views.
The majority of the research has taken the VC
perspective and used the traditional agency
theory approach, focusing on how the VC
could control their portfolio of firms and
hence secure their investment (Shepherd and
Zacharakis [2001], Sapienza and Korsgaard
[1996]). However, this theoretical approach
has been criticized in many ways for not being
able to explain the complexity of the interac-
tion that gives rise to the dyadic relation in
focus. The added value from a VC goes be-
yond financial capital [Kaiser et al., 2007] and
the VC-entrepreneur relationship has a signifi-
cant impact on the performance of the venture
[Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001]. According to
Ehrlich et al. [1994], from an entrepreur’s per-
spective a VC may provide a wide array of of
benefits to the venture, such as involvement in
operations, networking and operational exper-
tise, management and personnel recruitment,
or financial and strategic management. Ehrlich
et al. [1994] posits that these skills constitute
a set of value-adding benefits that may evolve
through interactions between entrepreneurs
and their VCs. A number of studies suggest
that co-operative relationships between venture
capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs are neces-
sary for the success of VC backed ventures
(Arthurs and Busenitz [2003], Sapienza and
Korsgaard [1996], Cable and Shane [1997]). In
order to include the entrepreneur’s perspective,
we therefore sought literature that explains the
VC-entrepreneur relationship in the pre- and
post-investment period from an entrepreneur’s
perspective in addition to the relevant articles
giving the VC point of view. In this section of
the paper we identify the similarities and dif-
ferences between the contractual frameworks
describing the VC-entrepreneur relationship.
The frameworks are presented below with em-
phasis on their areas of application and limita-
tions.
2.1 Principal - agent theory
In an attempt to partly describe the relation
between entrepreneurs and VC firms in finan-
cial contracting, some researchers has used
principal- agent theory as a theoretical frame-
work for their research (Gompers [1995] and
Kaplan and Stromberg [2001]). “An agency
relationship has arisen between two (or more)
parties when one, designated as the agent, acts
for, on behalf of, or as a representative for the
other, designated as the principal, in a par-
ticular domain of decision problems” (Ross
[1973], p. 134). In the VC-entrepreneur rela-
tionship it is normal to view the VC as the
principal, and thus the entrepreneur as the con-
tracting agent (Gompers, 1995). The VC firm is
not given any private benefits of control, and
the entrepreneur receives non-pecuniary ben-
efits from building an independent company
(Gompers, 1995 and Kaplan and Stromberg
[2001]). Because the VC cannot directly moni-
tor the intensity of the entrepreneur’s efforts,
the relationship is influenced by asymmetri-
cal information, e.g. the entrepreneur is more
knowledgeable about the business than the VC.
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Consequently, two problems may arise: (1) ad-
verse selection, and (2) moral hazard [Kaiser
et al., 2007].
Adverse selection occurs because of asym-
metrical information [Kaiser et al., 2007]. For
example, in the relationship between the VC
and the entrepreneur, the VC cannot obtain the
same information as the entrepreneur without
entering into a binding agreement with the en-
trepreneur. Moral hazard is related to adverse
selection and occurs because of difficulties in
observing the entrepreneur’s effort. Thus the
VC cannot be sure that the entrepreneur is
serving in the best possible manner, and the en-
trepreneur may derive personal benefits from
actions that are unknown to the VC [Kaiser
et al., 2007]. These may adversely affect the VC
and the shared pay-off (Pratt and Arrow [1991],
as cited in Kaiser et al. [2007]). The VC can
be compared to an outside stakeholder who
carefully observes the firm to track its business
potential and monitor the entrepreneur’s be-
havior to protect against opportunism [Arthurs
and Busenitz, 2003].
In order for the VC to mitigate this con-
flict researchers has, through principal-agency
theory, been able to identify three main solu-
tions; through the structuring of financial con-
tracts, through pre-investment deal screening,
and through post- investment monitoring and
advising [Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001]. 2.1
shows the setting of the principal agent theory.
Figure 2.1 depicts the agency relationship in
venture capital finance and identifies three ma-
jor links: (a) the VC uses monitoring behavior
in an attempt to overcome the entrepreneur’s
information advantage, (b) the VC attempts
to guide the direction of the entrepreneur’s
actions, and (c) the VC constructs a reward
scheme to combat any tendency on the part of
the entrepreneur to fail to live up to his or her
responsibilities [Kaiser et al., 2007].
Contract
interface
Monitoring
behaviour
Direction of
activities
Reward
schemes
Information
advantage
Supply of
e!ort
Propensity
to shirk
Venture capital investor
Entrepreneur
Figure 2.1: The principal agent setting: the venture cap-
italist and the entrepreneur. Source: Reid
and Smith [2003]
The use of these methods as mitigation
tools has been confirmed by empirical stud-
ies. Kaplan and Stromberg [2001] showed that
the VC firms allow separately allocating cash
flow rights, liquidation rights, voting rights,
among other control rights as an instrumental
part of their financings. Furthermore, several
researchers have identified the extensive use
of deal screening in the pre-investment phase
(Clercq et al. [2006]; Fried and Hisrich [1994];
Tyebjee and Bruno [1984]). Finally, it has also
been confirmed that the VC plays an active role
in the post- investment monitoring and advis-
ing, often by taking a seat on the board (Kaplan
and Stromberg [2003]; Sahlman [1990]; Smith
[2005]; Williams et al. [2006]), or by staging
the invested capital (Gompers [1995]; Sahlman
[1990]; Schwienbacher [2005]).
While agency theory is able to describe a
good part of the VC-entrepreneur relationship,
it has also been criticized for several shortcom-
ings. Shepherd and Zacharakis [2001] criticize
the application of agency theory for only de-
scribing the VC- entrepreneur relationship from the
VC’s perspective. The research using agency the-
ory focuses on the entrepreneur’s ability to act
opportunistically, and thus fails to take the en-
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trepreneurs view on the relationship and fail to
consider that the VC may also act opportunisti-
cally for example in terms of shirking [Gifford,
1997], and perhaps more important with re-
gards to exit decisions (Gompers [1996]; Neus
and Walz [2005]). Arthurs and Busenitz [2003]
add another important critique to the use of
agency theory by indicating that the agency prob-
lem is not uniform throughout the life of the venture,
and suggests some boundaries to agency the-
ory as shown in Figure 2.2. Another critique
to agency theory is the research method used
by many scholars. Most agency problem litera-
ture relies on normative assumptions claiming
that the agency problem exists as a phenomena
and therefore focus on how the problem can be
overcome (Kaplan and Stromberg [2001];Terje-
sen et al. [2012]). Such an ontological point of
departure is able to explain why a principal-
agency relationship occurs instead of asking
how different external factors and individual
behaviors might influence the VC-entrepreneur
relationship. Arthurs and Busenitz [2003] have
used agency theory to focus on how the VC-
entrepreneur relationship develops as shown
in Figure 2.2 (Zacharakis et al. [2010]; Hernan-
dez [2012]).
Figure 2.2: Goal congruence/noncongruence and perceived congruence/noncongruence between the VC and en-
trepreneur. Source: Arthurs and Busenitz [2003]
In Figure 2.2 a distinction is made between
the perceived goals and the actual goals be-
tween the entrepreneur and investor. The vari-
ation in goal congruence/noncongruence may
differ in time and space, where space is the
context of the VC-entrepreneur relationship,
and Arthurs and Busenitz [2003] makes it clear
that a specification and boundary of theory in time
and space is important in order to avoid the iden-
tification of false relationships or non-significance
in true relationships. According to Arthurs and
Busenitz [2003] the actual and perceived goals
of the entrepreneur and investor are most
likely to differ immediately prior to the VC’s
investment, thus agency theory would be most
useful in the immediate pre-investment stage.
However, when the investment is made the
agency concerns rapidly decline due to goal
congruence between the entrepreneur and VC,
later followed by potential upswings [Arthurs
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and Busenitz, 2003]. The upper left quadrant
in Figure 2.2 shows goal alignment between
the entrepreneur and VC and in this case there
is no agency problem (Eisenhardt [1989b], as
cited in Arthurs and Busenitz [2003]). Agency
theory gives a framework for the VC to achieve
goal alignment with the entrepreneur in or-
der to protect the VC against or mitigate the
agency problem (Bohren (1998); Eisenhardt
[1989b]; Jensen (1983), as cited in Arthurs and
Busenitz [2003]), which means that agency
theory attempts to move the VC-entrepreneur
relationship into the upper left quadrant of
Figure 2.2 where there is no agency problem
[Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003]). The theory is
also limited in explaining the upper right quad-
rant in Figure 2.2, which Arthurs and Busenitz
[2003] calls the “blind spot for agency theory”
because in this case the goals of the VC and en-
trepreneur are the same, but the VC perceives
them as different. But in this situation there is
no agency problem which, in turn, mitigates
the relationship into the upper left quadrant.
The only two quadrants that agency theory
actually can explain are the two bottom ones,
because these are the two quadrants where
there is goal misalignment between the two
parties.
Agency theory’s normative assumption is
that the VC should invest in monitoring of the
entrepreneur in order to avoid or uncover any
agency problems, which will move the relation-
ship to the upper left quadrant in Figure 2.2
where there is no agency problem. As several
researchers have observed the extensive use
of deal screening in the pre-investment phase
(Clercq et al. [2006]; Fried and Hisrich [1994];
Tyebjee and Bruno [1984]), this enables the
VC to evaluate and monitor the entrepreneur
before employment and therefore the agency
problem can to a great extent be mitigated in
the pre-investment stage [Williamson, 1988]. A
priori to investment there is information asym-
metry between the VC and the entrepreneur.
The VC does not know the entrepreneur’s
motivation or implementation capacity and
must assume the worst in order to protect
the investment, so the main motivation of the
VC may to begin with be to screen the en-
trepreneur through proper due diligence. On
the other hand the entrepreneur does not know
the VC and most likely aim for venture success.
Thus there might be goal misalignment in the
pre-investment phase giving rise to potential
agency problems [Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003].
However, when the investment is made the
goal of the VC becomes venture success lead-
ing to goal congruence between the VC and
entrepreneur. Again this mitigates the relation-
ship to the upper left quadrant in Figure 2.2, where
agency theory is no longer is applicable. Table 2.1
shows the limitations of the principal-agent
theory in explaining the VC and entrepreneur
perspective in the pre- and post-investment
stage. So far agency theory has been a prescrip-
tion for principals to minimize their agency
costs in the pre- and post-invetsment stage
related to the agent’s self-serving behavior
by imposing internal controls [Davis et al.,
1997]. Thus there is only focus on the VC’s
perspective and the theory fails to take the
entrepreneur into perspective.
Table 2.1: Limitations to the principal-agent literature in
describing the pre- and post-investment stage
from both the entrepreneur and the VC’s point
of view.
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en
t
Bo
th
VC’s perspective X X X
Entrepreneur’s perspective 0 0 0
Both 0 0 0
*’Both’ indicates that the two keywords
have been described together in the same
article. X = Keyword described in frame-
work, 0 = No explanation of keyword in
framework.
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With these theoretical and empirical limita-
tions in mind, a new alternative view of man-
agerial motivation, namely the stewardship the-
ory, has been introduced in order to provide
better explanation of the VC-entrepreneur rela-
tionship [Davis et al., 1997].
2.2 Stewardship theory
In contrast to agency theory, stewardship the-
ory is based on elements from sociology and
psychology and offers an alternative view in
which organizational actors see greater long-
term profit in other-focused, prosocial behav-
ior rather than the self-serving and short-term
opportunistic behavior described in agency
theory [Hernandez, 2012]. Thus, stewardship
theory is to a greater extent able to describe
the relationship in the post-investment phase
where the goals of the VC and entrepreneur
are aligned. While agency theory models the
VC and entrepreneur as self-interested actors
rationally maximizing their own personal eco-
nomic gains, this model presumes the notion of
an in-built conflict of interest between the VC
and entrepreneur [Davis et al., 1997]. Hernan-
dez [2012] defines stewardship as “the extent
to which an individual willingly subjugates
his or her personal interests to act in protec-
tion of others’ long-term welfare” [Hernandez
[2012], p. 8], and describes the relationship
as a covenantal relationship in which a moral
commitment binds both parties to work toward
a common goal without taking advantage of
each other. In this model the entrepreneur es-
sentially wants to do a good job, thus being
a good steward of the corporate assets [Davis
et al., 1997].
Hernandez [2012] has created a model of
the suggested antecedents that drive steward-
ship behavior as shown in Figure 2.1.
Control systems
- Foster relationship-cen-
tered collaboration 
through shared leader-
ship practices.
- Promote employees’ 
collective responsibility 
for work outcomes.
Cognitive mechanisms
- Develop an other-re-
garding perspective.
- Generate a long-term 
orientation.
Affective mechanisms
- Build affective commit-
ment through mutual 
social exchange.
Psychological 
ownership
Stewardship
behaviours
Reward systems
- Enable employees to 
derive intrinsic benefits 
from working toward a 
valued end.
- Cultivate self-efficacy 
and self-determination 
through ongoing employ-
ee development.
Structural Factors Psychological Factors Mediating Variable Outcome
Figure 2.3: A model of stewardship antecedents. Source: Hernandez [2012]
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This model posits that the cognitive and
affective variables that drive stewardship be-
havior are affected by the structural factors
of stewardship governance. The stewardship
theory posits that there is no inherent, gen-
eral problem of executive motivation among
entrepreneurs [Davis et al., 1997], thus the
question is how far entrepreneurs can achieve
the good corporate performance. In such a
covenantal relationship both the VC and the
entrepreneur recognize their fiduciary obliga-
tions to protect the interests of stakeholders
and the entrepreneur also believes he is morally
obliged to pursue these interests [Caldwell et
al. [2002], as cited in Hernandez [2012]].
While principal-agency theory assumes
there is a clear separation of interests between
entrepreneurs and VCs at the objective level,
Silverman [1970] argues that organizational so-
ciologists would point out that what motivates
individual calculative action by entrepreneurs
is their personal perception and not financial
gain (Silverman [1970], as cited in Davis et al.
[1997]).
Arthurs and Busenitz [2003] suggest that
the likelihood of an agency problem may vary
with time and the discovery of new opportu-
nities as shown in Figure 3.6. Thus, Arthurs
and Busenitz [2003] suggest that the VC may
overcome potential agency problems already in
the pre-screening, pre-investment process and
that goal congruence between the entrepreneur
and VC is likely to take place the day the
VC chooses to invest, thus the probability of
an agency problem is smallest in the post-
investment stage. Thus Arthurs and Busenitz
[2003] propose stewardship as a more applica-
ble model to picture the VC-entrepreneur rela-
tionship in this stage where there is assumed
goal congruence.
Figure 2.4: Goal misalignment between the VC and entrepreneur over time. Built on the Agency Model drawn by
Arthurs and Busenitz [2003]. (a) = period before first encounter between the VC and entrepreneur, (b)
= pre-investment screening process, (c) = the post-investment period and (d) = possible in flexion points
leading to goal misalignment.
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According to Etzioni (1975, as cited in Dou-
glas and Sheapherd [2002]) a manager may
calculate a course of action as unrewarding
personally, but still carry it out from a sense
of duty. Douglas and Sheapherd [2002] sug-
gests that to the degree that executives feel
their future fortunes are bound to their current
corporate employers through an expectation
of future employment or pension rights, then
the individual executive may perceive their in-
terest as aligned with that of the corporation
and its owners, even in the absence of any
shareholding by that executive [Douglas and
Sheapherd, 2002]. While agency theory sug-
gests that shareholder interests will be safe-
guarded only when the chair of the board is
not held by the CEO or when the CEO and
shareholders have the same interests through
an appropriately designed compensation plan,
this excludes one critical factor for shareholder
returns, namely a correctly designed organiza-
tion structure which allows the CEO to take
effective action [Williamson, 1985]. Steward-
ship theory, in contrast to agency theory, de-
fines the VC-entrepreneur relationship based
upon other behavioral premises [Davis et al.,
1997]. The theory describes entrepreneurs as
stewards whose motives are aligned with the
objectives of their principals.
Furthermore, research on stewardship theory
has naturally taken the VC perspective since it
originally is derived fro principal-agent theory,
thus there is a need to further explore how the
stewardship phenomena evolves from the en-
trepreneur’s perspective. Stewardship theory
describes a condition in which the goals of the
entrepreneur and the VC are aligned and has so
far only been applied to the post-investment stage.
Table 2.2 shows the limitations of steward-
ship theory in describing the VC/entrepreneur
perspective in the pre- and post-investment
stage. Previous literature has focused on how
stewardship theory differs from agency theory
rather than exploring a deeper understanding
of the stewardship construct and why it evolves
[Davis et al., 1997].
Table 2.2: How stewardship theory has been described
in literature in the pre- and post-investment
stage from both the entrepreneur and the VC’s
point of view.
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VC’s perspective 0 X 0
Entrepreneur’s perspective 0 0 0
Both 0 0 0
*’Both’ indicates that the two keywords
have been described together in the same
article. X = Keyword described in frame-
work, x = Keyword described in framework
to some extent, 0 = No explanation of key-
word in framework.
Except from Hernandez [2012] there has
been little theoretical development of the psy-
chological dynamics that give rise to steward-
ship behaviour and there is a need to further
explore the antecedents that facilitate dynamics
of the agency problem, empirical knowledge of
how stewardship is created is to a great extent
absent from the theoretical development of this
construct. This is particularly interesting when
considering the VC-entrepreneur relationship:
the VC trains the entrepreneur who, in turn,
trains its employees and so on. Thus there is
a lack of empirical research backing the Stew-
ardship phenomena. While scholars struggle
to explain the emergence of stewardship phe-
nomena, Cable and Shane [1997] has tried to
explain what happens to the VC-entrepreneur
relationship if the goal misalignment should
occur in the post-investment phase.
2.3 Prisoners dilemma theory
Whereas agency theory focuses on how the VC
(principal) can control for moral hazard and ad-
verse selection in the contractual relationship to
the entrepreneur (agent) to ensure cooperative
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behavior [Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001], the
Prisoner’s Dilemma perspective draws from
game theory and assumes that both parties
could decide to act opportunistically and pur-
sue their own narrow self-interest even though
all actors are collectively better off if they coop-
erate [Cable and Shane, 1997]. Cable and Shane
[1997] have argued that the framework is capa-
ble of describing relationship dilemmas in the
VC and entrepreneur relationship. The pris-
oner’s dilemma gives each party two possible
choices: to cooperate or defect [Axelrod and
Dion, 1988], and according to Cable and Shane
[1997] the two actors have two main strategies;
(1) cooperation (forgo any short-term self-
interest to obtain mutual benefit), or
(2) defection (forgo any long-term mutual ben-
efit to obtain individual gain)
Cable and Shane [1997] argue that coopera-
tion is the best mechanism for managing the
relationship between the entrepreneur and the
venture capitalist in order to optimize the per-
formance of the venture in the post-investment
phase (after they have decided to cooperate).
Because both actors bring complementary as-
sets to the venture and since these assets are
specific to each individual actor, they are col-
lectively better off by cooperating as this is
critical for the success of the venture once
the relationship has started [Cable and Shane,
1997]. This can be recognized as the covenantal
relationship described by Hernandez [2012]
and Davis et al. [1997]; “individuals express
their mutual obligation to this relationship
through their willingness to sacrifice short-
term personal gain for longer-term, generally
beneficial, collective ends” (Hernandez [2012],
p. 8). As such, the collective collaboration is
consistent with the aim of stewardship theory
which describes the assumed goal alignment
in the post-investment phase.
The pay-off each actor could obtain from
a chosen strategy is, in opposite to agency
theory, dictated by the strategy adopted by
the other actor in the relationship [Cable and
Shane, 1997], and follows the pay-off structure
of:
T > R > P > S (1)
where T = temptation of extra pay-off from
defection, R = reward for mutual coopera-
tion, P = penalty for mutual defection and S =
suckers pay-off (or penalty for when the sucker
cooperated and the other party defected)(Cable
and Shane [1997]; Shepherd and Zacharakis
[2001]; Axelrod and Dion [1988]). Given that
the individuals involved are rational and do
not know the other actors’ strategy, defection
is the optimal choice of each individual actor,
even though cooperation is collectively opti-
mal for both parties [Cable and Shane, 1997].
This type of conflict could damage the venture
even if both parties are acting in good faith
[Zacharakis et al., 2010]. Axelrod and Dion
[1988] states that if the dilemma is repeated,
e.g. if there is iterative interaction in the re-
lation which causes the actors to chose either
a cooperation og defection strategy, there is a
greater room for cooperation, which may lead
to higher confidence in partner cooperation.
Since the Prisonner’s Dilemma ’game’ usually
is repeated, the interactions leave a chain of
decisions, where both actors could observe the
actions taken by the other, making reciprocity
and trust critical parts in the game [Cable and
Shane, 1997]. The possible defection and co-
operation decisions between the entrepreneur
and VC are shown in Figure 2.5.
Cable and Shane [1997] argue that the
Prisoner’s Dilemma framework extends the
principle agent theory explanation of the VC-
entrepreneur relationship, as it incorporates
the issues of uncertainty and goal conflict with-
out the restriction of a hierarchical relationship
between the unequal parties. For example, the
entrepreneur may view the VC’s short-term
strategy as detrimental to the venture’s long-
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term performance and may not implement
the VC’s approach [Zacharakis et al., 2010]
or the VC may not trust the entrepreneur’s
management skills and under-invest. Accord-
ing to Zacharakis et al. [2010] opportunistic
disagreements due to good faith may lead to
lower overall performance, but such a “soft
violence” may simultaneously lead to more
constructive responses from the other party
if the entrepreneur and VC can both see a
resolution to the conflict where they are both
better off. Furthermore, the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
with trust and reciprocity extending the mere con-
tractual nature of the relation, addresses the social
context of the relationship the actors are embedded
in (Håkansson and Snehota [1995]; Cable and
Shane [1997]). The reason for this is that the
prisoner’s dilemma framework acknowledges
that other social relations in the network may
influence either parties, thus contributing to a
prisoner’s dilemma.
In the conceptual model developed by Ca-
ble and Shane [1997] the antecedents of co-
operation between the parties in the VC-
entrepreneur dyad are examined, i.e. time pres-
sure, the pay-off from cooperation, information
(communication and social relationship), per-
sonal similarity (relational demography, work
value congruence, and relative power), and
transaction procedures (bonding mechanisms,
staging capital payouts, generosity, and penal-
ties for non-cooperative behavior).
According to Shephard & Zacharakis,
(2001), the model of Cable and Shane [1997]
makes a contribution over and above agency
theory by including the development of a so-
cial relationship between the actors in the VC-
entrepreneur dyad over time. The social re-
lationships that is developed over time due
to repeated interactions in the dyad increases
the likelihood of cooperation and mutual gain
(Cable & Shane, 1997; Sapienza & Korsgaard,
1996).
Figure 2.5: VC-entrepreneur relationship from a prisoner’s dilemma perspective. Adapted from Cable and Shane [1997].
As argued by Arthurs and Busenitz [2003]
the prisoner’s dilemma typically appears when
there is an eventual inflexion point in the
post-investment phase. An argument for this
could be that the entrepreneur and VC does
not know each other well enough in the pre-
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investment phase to evaluate the possible defec-
tion/cooperation strategies that may be chosen
and therefore there it is uncertain whether
cooperation will be as mutually beneficial as
described in the prisoner’s dilemma. If this is
the case the prisoner’s dilemma will appear
after mutual cooperation and goal alignment
has been experienced from both sides and
will therefore be a cause of goal misalignment
due to some sort of opportunity recognition
or choice in the post-investment phase. Still,
Zacharakis et al. [2010] has argued that trust is
relatively less predominant in the early stage of
the relationship and since the VC-entrepreneur
relationship from the VC’s point of view is
defined more by control than by trust, this
may lead to a conflict from the entrepreneur’s
perspective that could have negative impact
on confidence in the partner cooperation. This
may also lead to a prisoner’s dilemma where
the two parties may chose different defec-
tion strategies. Still it can be assumed that
the cognitive maps of the entrepreneur and
VC will differ from the pre-investment phase
to the post-investment phase, assuming that
both parties will increase their network and
knowledge base in the longitudinal run of the
relationship. In the pre-investment phase the
entrepreneur and VC will have different cogni-
tive maps and it is hard for one of the parties
to analyze the consequences of the possible
defection or cooperation strategies in a new-
born relationship. Thus one can argue that the
possible defection and cooperation strategies
that may be chosen in a prisoner’s dilemma
situation in the post-investment stage will be
more favorable in terms of cooperation due to
increased trust, overlapping cognitive maps
and a focus on mutual gain. Still, the frame-
work is solely situational and can not be used
to analyze the dynamic relationship-building
in the process. Thus it may be more applicable
as a mapping tool if a conflict should occur in
the post-investment phase. Then both parties
could evaluate pros and cons with the sharing
of information as described in organizational
learning theory.
While the model of Cable and Shane [1997]
is acknowledged as a valuable contribution to
the theoretical development of an explanatory
model for the VC-entrepreneur relationship,
Shepherd and Zacharakis [2001] argues that
there is a need for theory to further explore the so-
cial relationship aspects of developing cooperative
behavior. While the model acknowledges that
personal similarity is an important factor for
cooperative behavior due to reduced cognitive
dissonance, improved communication and in-
creased predictability in social interactions [Ca-
ble and Shane, 1997], it does not offer an expla-
nation of how potential differences affect each
actors perception of the other parts decisions,
as e.g. cognitive dissonance could lead to a
misconception of the strategies taken. In addi-
tion, Axelrod and Dion [1988] argues that one
limitation of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
model is the assumption of only two possible
strategies, chosen simultaneously by the play-
ers. So the proposed existence of a Prisoner’s
Dilemma for both the entrepreneur and the VC
negotiating the ongoing business relationship
[Cable and Shane, 1997] have some limitations
as the cooperation and defection decisions are
not necessarily made simultaneously. The be-
havior and actions of the actors might not be
possible to model as choosing either coopera-
tion or defection, because before the decisions
are known, the decision-making experiment
will take on the Schrödinger’s cat model where
each party may choose to either cooperate or
defect, but the decision is not known until the
other party reveals its decision. Another note-
worthy comment by Axelrod and Dion [1988]
is that increasing the actors’ interacting and
taking part in the dilemma makes defection
more difficult. Table 2.3 shows the limitations
of the prisoner’s dilemma theory in describing
the VC/entrepreneur perspective in the pre-
and post-investment stage.
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Table 2.3: Limitations to the prisoner’s dilemma lit-
erature in describing the pre- and post-
investment stage from both the entrepreneur
and the VC’s point of view.
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VC’s perspective 0 X 0
Entrepreneur’s perspective 0 X 0
Both 0 X 0
*’Both’ indicates that the two keywords
have been described together in the same
article. X = Keyword described in frame-
work, x = Keyword described in framework
to some extent, 0 = No explanation of key-
word in framework.
Although the prisoner’s dilemma frame-
work focuses on a situational dilemma sce-
nario and its consequences from both the
entrepreneur’s and VC’s perspective, its use
has not been frequently described in the pre-
investment stage and it is more situational than
dynamic, which means it does not consider the
ongoing relationship-building process. As the
typical prisoner’s dilemma will arise to both
the entrepreneur and the VC in both the pre-
and post-investment stage, it is applicable to
both parties with no limitations to the stage
of the relationship. However, since relation-
ship conflicts as described by the prisoner’s
dilemma framework may occur in series as
unexpected difficulties or bumps in the road
appear, scholars have developed a conceptual
framework to be used in the ongoing process
conflict, namely procedural justice theory. The
procedural justice theory is one of the dynamic
relationship frameworks: procedural justice the-
ory, social embeddedness theory and organizational
learning theory.
2.4 A comparison of the three con-
tractual VC-entrepreneur rela-
tionship frameworks
A comparison of the three discussed contrac-
tual VC-entrepreneur relationships are given
in Table 6.15. The table shows how each frame-
work addresses factors such as contract, control,
use in the pre-investment phase, limitation, area
of use and actor’s motivation. These factors are
chosen because they are essential in describing
the VC-entrepreneur relationship and will also
give an indication to what extent each frame-
work is applicable in the pre-investment stage.
The table also shows the emphasis of each
framework and whether previous research has
been empirically or theoretically tested. This is
done to see whether the frameworks are suffi-
ciently supported by empirical evidence and to
sort out which models are based on each other.
3. Dynamic relationship theories
While the previously described frameworks fo-
cus on the situational contract relationship in
the entrepreneur and VC dyad, research has
offered an alternative to the explanation of the
VC-entrepreneur relationship by introducing
more general relationship and network theo-
ries such as procedural justice theory, social
embeddedness and organizational learning.
3.1 Procedural justice theory
Originally, procedural justice was developed
as an extension of equity theory. This theory
focused on the outcome of decisions made
in an exchange relationship by considering
the fairness perceived when distributing re-
sources among the parties (Adams [1965], as
cited in Sapienza and Korsgaard [1996]). Pro-
cedural justice theory considers, on the other
hand, how the quality of exchange relation-
ships affects the decision-making process and
vice versa (Lind and Tyler [1988], as cited in
Sapienza and Korsgaard [1996]).
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Table 2.4: Summary of VC-entrepreneur situational contract relationship frameworks
Relationship Principal agency theory Stewardship theory Prisoners dilemma
Emphasis on Overemphasis on the
principal (VC)
Overemphasis on the
principal (VC)
Game
Contract The contract is the cen-
trepiece in the relation-
ship.
The VC’s investment
contract is in essence a
“buy-in” to an idea and
vision established by the
entrepreneur, resulting
in goal congruence be-
tween the two.
Extends the mere con-
tractual nature of the
relation, addressing the
social context of the re-
lationship.
Control The VC is in control.
Staging of investments
The entrepreneur will
remain and act like an
owner after the VC in-
vest.
Both parties are in con-
trol and mutually de-
pendent.
Use in the pre-
investment and post-
investment phase
Applicable in the
screening process of the
pre-investment phase.
Agency theory has
mostly been applied
to the post-investment
stage with the as-
sumption that there
is goal incongruence
between the VC and
entrepreneur.
Applied in the post-
investment stage where
there is goal congruence
between the VC and en-
trepreneur.
Applied in both the pre-
and post-investment
stage when there is
a goal misalignment
between the VC and
the entrepreneur, and
possible outcomes for
different strategies may
be examined.
Limitation Insensitive to tempo-
ral boundaries. Re-
searchers may draw in-
defensible conclusions
unless the timing for the
use of agency theory is
appropriate.
Implicitly assumes
the subordination
of the steward’s (en-
trepreneur’s) goals
Assumes only two pos-
sible strategies chosen
simultaneously by both
players. Does not offer
explanation on how po-
tential differences affect
each actor’s perception
of the other part’s deci-
sion.
Area of use When there is goal in-
congruence between the
two parties.
When the goals of the
steward (entrepreneur)
and principal (VC) are
aligned.
Where there are uncer-
tainties or goal conflicts
Actors’ motivation Self-interested Stewards’ motives are
aligned with those of
the principals.
Self-interested, but col-
lectively better off with
cooperation.
Research Empirically tested,
mostly normative
assumptions.
Based on agency the-
ory, lack of empirical re-
search.
Theoretically based on
game theory. Predomi-
nant study by Cable and
Shane [1997]
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In contrast to the previous frameworks that
focuses on the antecedents and outcome of
decisions, procedural justice examines the im-
pact of the process of the decision-making
on the quality of the relationship between en-
trepreneur and investor.
Opportunistic behavior holds the poten-
tial for conflicting goals between the VC and
the entrepreneur, thus making it difficult to
maintain a trusting and cooperative relation-
ship [Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996]. However,
most entrepreneurs manage to maintain the
relationship with their investors even during
demanding periods with conflicting goals. Pro-
cedural justice theory holds a possible explana-
tion by indicating that the reaction of individ-
uals to the decision process tends to be more
important than the decision outcome itself (Ko-
rsgaard et al., 1995; Thibaut and Walker, 1975).
For instance, the entrepreneur may believe that
it is the VC’s responsibility to attain relevant
advisors on the board whereas the VC might
feel that this is the entrepreneur’s responsi-
bility. In this example the procedural justice
framework would suggest that as long as the
conflict solving procedure seems right to both
parties, the problem could be solved in a fair
manner.
Entrepreneurs have been found to willingly
accept decisions, even though they do not pre-
fer the outcome, as long as the procedure of
this decision was found to be fair [Sapienza
and Korsgaard, 1996]. Since procedural jus-
tice can only be applied to situations where
there is a possible unfavorable outcome for
one of the parties, it must be assumed that the
relationship is at a stage where decisions are
being made. From a VC’s perspective no decisions
are done together before the first investment has
been made, making procedural justice theory less
applicable in the pre-investment stage. In addi-
tion, an assumed boundary condition is that
the relationship must lead to unfavorable dis-
tributive justice judgment on the part of the
entrepreneur or VC before either will engage
in making inferences about the fairness of the
decision procedure. Thus the procedural jus-
tice theory is applicable to both the VC and
the entrepreneur in both the pre- and post-
investment stage, though less frequently ap-
plied in the pre-investment stage. Table 3.2
gives the limitations of the procedural justice
theory in describing the VC/entrepreneur per-
spective in the pre- and post-investment stage.
As seen from Table 3.2 there are several arti-
cles that discusses the procedural justice theory
from both the entrepreneur’s and VC’s perspec-
tive without applying the theory to either the
pre- or post-investment stage.
Table 3.2: Limitations to the procedural justice literature
in describing the pre- and post-investment
stage from both the entrepreneur and the VC’s
point of view.
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VC’s perspective x X X
Entrepreneur’s perspective x x x
Both 0 0 X
*’Both’ indicates that the two keywords
have been described together in the same
article. X = Keyword described in frame-
work, x = Keyword described in framework
to some extent, 0 = No explanation of key-
word in framework.
3.2 Social embeddedness
According to Mair and Martí [2006] social
embeddedness means that it is impossible
to detach the entrepreneur (agent) from the
surrounding network structures [Burt, 1993],
which means that the social embeddedness
framework focuses on the entrepreneur in a
network of continuously evolving connected re-
lations. Earlier research has examined the eco-
nomic affect of social relations and social net-
works, thus social embeddedness can help ac-
count for how social structure affects financial
markets and business relationships (Granovet-
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ter [1985]; Portes and Sensenbrenner [1993];
Romo and Schwartz [1995], Uzzi [1996], as
cited in [Uzzi, 1999]).
Research on interfirm networks has sug-
gested that economic exchanges embedded in
social relations can both create unique value
and motivate parties in the network to share
value for their mutual benefit [Uzzi, 1999], con-
sistent with the prisoner’s dilemma frame-
work. Thus social embeddedness is an inter-
esting phenomenon when examining the VC-
entrepreneur relationship. In this case the em-
bedded ties promote shared and unique value
through the exchange of private resources and
information [Uzzi, 1999], because both private
resources and private information can help
identify each actor’s dependency and exper-
tise.
The relationship between the entrepreneur
and VC is intense and simultaneously embed-
ded in high uncertainty Clercq et al. [2006],
thus being able to transfer private knowledge
in exchanges may be a competitive advantage
because it promotes value creation, which re-
veals unique possibilities for matching compe-
tences and resources with exchange partners
[Uzzi, 1999]. Thus private knowledge is not
only a distinctive resource, but it is hard to
imitate for competitors that do not possess this
knowledge. Eccles and Crane [1988], as cited
in Uzzi [1999], found that VCs were able to
customize deals and create innovative finan-
cial instruments for their clients in order to
reduce risk when they obtained private infor-
mation that the firms did not make publicly
available. If turned the other way around, en-
trepreneurs who obtain private information
about VCs are better off to choose the right
investor. This means that embedded ties can
give the entrepreneur and VC access to private
information benefits that can channel resources
and encourage solutions to investment prob-
lems that are not available through market ties.
This implies that the entrepreneur’s network of
ties is essential to the financing process in the
pre-investment phase, but it does not explain
how being socially embedded affect the quality
of the VC-entrepreneur relationship.
Table 3.3 shows the ability of the so-
cial embeddedness theory to describe the
VC/entrepreneur perspective in the pre- and
post-investment stage.
Table 3.3: Limitations to the social embeddedness liter-
ature’s ability to describe the pre- and post-
investment stage from both the entrepreneur
and the VC’s point of view.
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VC’s perspective 0 x 0
Entrepreneur’s perspective 0 x 0
Both 0 0 0
*’Both’ indicates that the two keywords
have been described together in the same
article. X = Keyword described in frame-
work, x = Keyword described in framework
to some extent, 0 = No explanation of key-
word in framework.
Uzzi [1999] suggests that social embedded-
ness will have a positive affect on the VC-
entrepreneur relationship as long as the parties
will obtain positive reviews from shared third
parties in their network. However, Zacharakis
et al. [2010] also found negative correlations
between the socially embedded entrepreneur
and the entrepreneur-VC relationship. For in-
stance, high levels of conflict within the en-
trepreneurial team may lead to conflict be-
tween the entrepreneur and VC. Mair and
Martí [2006] have also suggested that being
socially embedded may constrain as well as
enable the entrepreneur. This is because the en-
trepreneur embedded in a wide social network
will gain resources and liability within the net-
work, but on the other hand it may also lock the
entrepreneur into the existing structure, which
constrains the entrepreneur from seeking con-
tact with other ventures that may challenge the
existing rules and norms. Ford et al. [2010]
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calls this the network paradox. Thus as long as
both parties will receive positive review from
their surroundings and internal processes are
not determined by conflict, social embedded-
ness may have a positive effect and possibly
strengthen the VC-entrepreneur relationship.
However, in a pre-investment phase the social
embeddedness may constrain the entrepreneur
from seeking contact with financial alternatives
that are not bound in the existing structure.
As social embeddedness theory is applica-
ble to both the VC and the entrepreneur in the
pre- and post-investment stage, it is able to
help explain the VC’s and the entrepreneur’s
perspective on the VC-entrepreneur relation-
ship. However, although social embeddedness
explain how the network facilitates the transfer
of private information, it is merely a structural
framework and does not help explain the dy-
namic learning relationship between the VC
and the entrepreneur. This could be better
understood by introducing the organizational
learning framework.
3.3 Organisational learning
Organizational learning, often referred to as
knowledge-based theory [Grant, 1996], has
been defined as “systematic problem solving
and ongoing experimentation and the process
within an organization or its capacity to main-
tain or to improve performance on the basis of
experience” ([Garvin, 1993] and [Nevis et al.,
1995], as cited in Crossan et al. [1999]). Clercq
and Sapienza [2005] has defined organizational
learning by the venture capital firm as “the
extent to which a principal in a VCF believes
he or she (or the VC as a whole) has gained
new insights or broader understanding via in-
teraction with a particular portfolio company”
(Clercq and Sapienza [2005], p. 518), but this
does not explain how organizational learning
takes place by the entrepreneur. Crossan et al.
[1999] has earlier drawn a definition of organi-
zational learning based on previous literature
as “the process by which management teams re-
shape their shared cognitive maps of the firm, its
markets and competitors, and through which the
organization detects and corrects errors or improves
its actions on the basis of increased knowledge and
understanding” (Crossan et al. [1999], p. 433).
This definition could be applicable to the en-
trepreneurial team as well as the VC team,
but according to Clercq and Sapienza [2005]
this definition implies that learning only takes
place within individuals in an organization,
e.g. either the entrepreneurial team or the
VC team, whilst organizational learning could
involve both individual learning and dyadic
sharing between the VC and entrepreneur
(Grant [1996], as cited in Clercq and Sapienza
[2005]). In order to recognize the complexities
associated with the process of entrepreneurial
opportunities Crossan et al. [1999] has devel-
oped the 4I organzational learning framework
as shown in Figure 3.6.
Crossan et al. [1999] points out that there
exists different “schools of thought” in orga-
nizational learning. These range from the
economic perspective to the developmental,
the managerial learning and the process, where
learning is “socially constructed” and tied to
the cognitive and behavioral capability of in-
dividuals. However, in Crossan et al. [1999]’s
framework the organizational learning is de-
scribed as a dynamic process. Crossan et al.
[1999](p. 433-434) defines the 4I learning pro-
cess as follows:
“Intuiting is the preconscious recognition of
the pattern and/or possibilities inherent
in a personal stream of experience.
Interpreting is the explaining of an insight, or
idea to one’s self and to others.
Integrating is the process of developing
shared understanding amongst individu-
als and the taking of coordinated action
through mutual adjustment.
Institutionalizing is the process of ensuring
that routinized actions occur.”
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Figure 3.6: Model based on the dynamic process of organizational learning. Source: Crossan et al. [1999].
In contrast to the contractual relationship
frameworks previously described, Crossan
et al. [1999]’s framework depicts a dynamic
process applicable to the entrepreneur-VC re-
lationship. This framework does not exploit
the contractual relationship, but rather the on-
going learning in the relationship acts as a
recipe that could be applicable to both the en-
trepreneur and VC. As intuition may affect the
intuitive entrepreneur’s behavior, it will only
affect the VC once the VC tries to interact with
the entrepreneur and vice versa. Thus the feed-
back loop described by the 4I Organizational
Learning framework will be applicable once
contact has been established and from a VC-
entrepreneur perspective this will typically be
at the first meeting.
Due to the great focus on learning on behalf
of both the entrepreneur and VC, the organiza-
tional learning framework is highly applicable in
both the pre- and post-investment phase, and it
may be especially useful to both parties in the
pre-investment stage since both parties know
very little about each other in this period. Like
procedural justice, the organizational learning
framework addresses the ongoing dynamic process
in the VC-entrepreneur dyad. Although greater
knowledge and cognitive sharing may lead to
a shared understanding and a better relation-
ship, the framework is mostly used as a tool for
obtaining knowledge and does not explicitly
discuss how organizational learning may af-
fect the entrepreneur-VC relationship. Neither
does it consider how increased cognitive shar-
ing may affect diversification in individuals
and challenging points of view that may alter
new and potentially better decisions. The 4I
Organizational Learning framework consults
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the shared cognitive maps of the entrepreneur
and VC and how these maps overlap, but it
says very little of how these cognitive maps
are depicted and shared. Table 3.4 shows the
ability of the organizational learning theory to
describe the VC/entrepreneur perspective in
the pre- and post-investment stage.
Table 3.4: Limitations to the organizational learning lit-
erature’s ability to describe the pre- and post-
investment stage from both the entrepreneur
and the VC’s point of view.
Pr
e-
in
ve
st
m
en
t
Po
st
-i
nv
es
tm
en
t
Bo
th
VC’s perspective x x 0
Entrepreneur’s perspective x x 0
Both x 0 0
*’Both’ indicates that the two keywords
have been described together in the same
article. X = Keyword described in frame-
work, x = Keyword described in framework
to some extent, 0 = No explanation of key-
word in framework.
As seen from Table 3.4 the organizational
learning theory is applicable to both the pre-
and post-investment stage from from both the
VC’s and the entrepreneur’s perspective, but
the lower letter ’x’s indicate the theory’s insuf-
ficient ability to describe the VC-entrepreneur
relationship. Researchers have found that the
organizational learning is most effective when
the knowledge base of the venture is exten-
sive and when new assimilated knowledge is
related to the existing knowledge structure (Co-
hen and Levinthal [1990] and Bower and Hil-
gard [1981], as cited in Clercq and Sapienza
[2005]). Thus for the entrepreneur the pre-
investment learning process will be most ef-
fective if the VC can contribute with rele-
vant knowledge to the entrepreneur’s existing
knowledge base. Because of the dynamic va-
lidity of the model it is applicable in, but not
limited to, the pre-investment phase.
3.4 A comparison of the three dy-
namic relationship frameworks
A comparison of the three dynamic VC-
entrepreneur relationships are given in Table
6.15. The table shows how each framework
addresses factors such as contract, control, use
in the pre-investment phase, limitation, area of use
and actor’s motivation.
4. Analysis and discussion
In this paper the literature written about the
VC-entrepreneur relationship has been divided
into two categories; a) contractual relationship
frameworks and b) dynamic relationship frame-
works. The reason for this is that the agency
theory, stewardship theory and prisoner’s
dilemma all discuss the VC-entrepreneur re-
lationship in a contractual context. Agency
theory depicts the monitoring of the contract-
ing agent (entrepreneur) by the principal (VC)
in the way that the VC puts forward a con-
tract that ensures the VCs control to overcome
agency problems. Stewardship theory builds
on agency theory and sees the VC-entrepreneur
relationship as a tacit contract where both par-
ties work to obtain mutual benefits and the
prisoner’s dilemma discuss possible defection
strategies from a presumed cooperation con-
tract.
The procedural justice theory, social em-
beddedness theory and organizational learn-
ing theory on the other hand describes more
dynamic processes in the relationship. The pro-
cedural justice theory describes how contract
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Table 4.1: Summary of VC-entrepreneur dynamic relationship frameworks
Relationship Procedural justice the-
ory
Social embeddedness
theory
Organizational learning
theory
Emphasis on Individuals’ reactions to
decisions in which they
are personally invested
but cannot directly or
fully control.
The ability of social
structure to affect finan-
cial markets and busi-
ness relationships.
Individuals ability to de-
scribe and share their
cognitive maps.
Contract The process leading to-
wards a contract is more
important than the con-
tract itself.
Contracts may act as a
safeguard to prevent ac-
tors from sharing knowl-
edge or switching to
more valuable partners
in the network.
Does not depend upon
contracts since the learn-
ing process is continuos
and changing.
Control Entrepreneurs maintain
control by yielding a
level of control to the in-
vestors.
Does not affect the
control in the VC-
entrepreneur relation-
ship.
Does not affect the
control in the VC-
entrepreneur relation-
ship.
Use in the pre-
investment and post-
investment phase
Applicable in both
the pre- and post-
investment stage
Applicable in both
the pre- and post-
investment stage
Applicable in both
the pre- and post-
investment stage
Limitation The theory only par-
tially mediates relation-
ships in situations in-
volving high outcome
uncertainty and ambigu-
ous or nonhierarchical
relationships.
Does not explain how
being embedded affects
the quality of the rela-
tionship.
Does not explain how
cognitive maps are de-
picted and shared.
Area of use When one party in the
relationship does not
have direct control over
decisions.
Might give access to in-
formation benefits that
may channel resources
and encourage solutions
to investment problems.
When there is infor-
mation asymmetry be-
tween the parties.
Actors’ motivation The reaction of individu-
als to decision processes
is more important than
the decision outcome it-
self, as long as the pro-
cedure of this decision
is found to be fair.
A party’s positive rep-
utation in the network
may have a positive af-
fect and strengthen the
relationship.
Better information trans-
fer minimizes informa-
tion asymmetry and
leads to increased trust
between the parties.
Research Empirical studies, pre-
dominantly in larger or-
ganizations.
Theoretically derived,
lack of empirical
research.
Empirical studies, pre-
dominantly in larger or-
ganizations.
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ual decision-making processes affects the
relationship, which places the procedural jus-
tice theory close to the contractual relationship
frameworks and makes it an appropriate cross-
ing to the dynamic relationship frameworks.
Social embeddedness explains how social ties
in the VC and the entrepreneur’s embedded
network affect the VC-entrepreneur relation-
ship and the organizational learning theory
may explain how effective knowledge and cog-
nitive sharing influence the VC-entrepreneur
relationship. Thus it is interesting to see how
the contractual and dynamic relationship frame-
works differ.
4.1 Litterature analysis
In order to analyze the literature base in this
paper, chronological tables of articles versus
topics and key words were first made. Table
4.2 and Table 4.3 show the distribution of top-
ics and key words in the literature from 1973-
2012 examined in this paper. The upper six
rows to the left give the relationship frame-
works presented in this paper and the seven
bottom rows give some relevant key words in
the analysis. First we examine the key words
in relation to the key words in the articles cho-
sen for literature review. Then we proceed
by comparing each framework’s applicability
to different stages in the investment period
followed by a discussion of limitations to the
relationship frameworks. Finally, we discuss
how the different relationship frameworks may
complement each other. In Table 4.2 and Table
4.3 distribution of frameworks or key words in
articles is mapped with either a capital X or a
lower letter x. The capital X indicates that the
specific framework or key word is frequently
described in the literature, whereas the lower
letter x indicates that the specific framework
or key word is mentioned in the literature, but
not the main topic of the corresponding article.
The framework that has been given most
attention up till now is the principal-agency
theory framework, and as Table 4.2 and Table
4.3 show most literature examined in this pa-
per is based on agency theory and has taken
the VC’s point of view.
Column comparison
From observing the columns in Table 4.2 and
Table 4.3 it can bee seen that only 5 authors
have made a comparison of three or more
frameworks describing the VC-entrepreneur
relationships. This literature include Davis
et al. [1997], de Clercq and Sapienza [2001],
Shepherd and Zacharakis [2001], Weber and
Weber [2007] and Hernandez [2012]. It is
interesting to observe that of the literature
examined, agency theory has been the predom-
inant contractual framework describing the
VC-entrepreneur relationship until Cable and
Shane [1997] put the prisoner’s dilemma into a
VC-entrepreneur context. Another observation
from the columns in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 is
that the number of frameworks describing the
pre- and post-investment period and which
takes the entrepreneur’s perspective has in-
creased with time. Another topic that has been
discussed more lately is the procedural justice
framework as observed in Table 4.3, and this
is an example of a topic which in particular
focuses on the entrepreneur’s perspective in
contrast to agency theory, which mostly takes
the VC’s point of view.
Row comparison
It is interesting to see that even though pre-
investment was one of the key words in the
search for articles, only four articles discuss
the VC-entrepreneur relationship merely in
the pre-investment stage, whilst four of the
most relevant articles discussed the relation-
ship with emphasis on the post-investment
stage even though post-investment had not been
a key word in the search query.
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4.2 Comparison of frameworks with
key words
A comparison of frameworks with the key
words pre-investment, post-investment, VC per-
spective, entrepreneur’s perspective, empirical
study, dynamic, control and VC-entrepreneur rela-
tionship is shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Comparison of frameworks and key words in literature when examining the VC-entrepreneur relationship.
Pr
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V
C
pe
rs
pe
ct
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e
En
tr
ep
re
ne
ur
’s
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rs
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D
yn
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C
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ol
Agency theory X X X X
Stewardship theory x X X X
Prisoners dilemma x x x X
Procedural justice theory x X x x X x
Social embeddedness X X x x X
Organizational learning x x x x X
*Contractual relationship frameworks are written in italic
bold. X = Great correlation between framework and topic,
x = Little correlation between framework and topic.
The VC/entrepreneur perspective
The size of the capital X and the lower case x
in Table 4.4 indicates the extent to which litera-
ture written about the frameworks in question
focus on the particular key words. As for the
prisoner’s dilemma framework there has been
written very little about the prisoner’s dilemma
in the VC-entrepreneur context. This is because
the prisoner’s dilemma originally was devel-
oped as a game theory and Cable and Shane
[1997] were the first to apply the dilemma to
the VC-entrepreneur relationship. The VC’s
perspective seems to have been discussed most
together with agency theory and stewardship
theory. When looking at the dynamic relation-
ship frameworks the main emphasis has not
been on the VC or entrepreneur, but rather
on larger organizations, inter-organizational
groups and business networks. However, the
frameworks have been applied to both the
VC and the entrepreneur’s perspective, but
more often as a theoretical extension to other
main frameworks than as to describe the VC-
entrepreneur relationship. Table 4.4 also shows
that the VC’s perspective has gained more at-
tention in literature than the entrepreneur’s
perspective. This is mainly due to the initial
development of agency theory that became the
building block of monitoring and control in
the VC-entrepreneur relationship. It is also
interesting to note that the frameworks have
been more refined in the post-investment stage
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rather than the pre-investment stage, an obser-
vation that might be a result from observed
conflicts in established relationships. The pre-
investment stage is more diffuse when looking
at the VC-entrepreneur relationship because no
contracts have been made, thus research can
only build on the experienced tacit contracts
formed in the dyadic relationship.
Contractual and dynamic frameworks
As seen in Table 4.4 there seems to be a clear
distinction between the key words in literature
about the contractual relationship frameworks
from the dynamic relationship frameworks.
The contractual relationship frameworks are
better at describing the parties’ situational
control in the VC-entrepreneur relationship
whereas the dynamic relationship frameworks
are better at describing dynamic change pro-
cesses. Procedural justice theory seems to
lie very close to the contractual relationship
frameworks since it is originally a framework
describing contractual decision-making pro-
cesses. Still, procedural justice theory is able
to explain change processes and dynamic rela-
tionship mechanisms, which places it among
the dynamic relationship frameworks. Nei-
ther agency theory, stewardship theory or the
prisoner’s dilemma describe dynamic changes
in the relationship, thus these frameworks
are merely static in the sense that they de-
scribe the antecedents of and consequences
in the VC-entrepreneur dyad. From Table 4.4
it might seem as if the prisoner’s dilemma
framework is insufficient in describing the
pre-investment period of the VC-entrepreneur
relationship. This is not because it does not
apply to the pre-investment phase, but rather
because present literature does not explain
the prisoner’s dilemma from a pre-investment
perspective. As with stewardship theory, the
prisoner’s dilemma lacks empirical testing.
These two frameworks are both built on previ-
ous frameworks with the aim of describing new
aspects of the VC-entrepreneur relationship
and they both offer theoretical contributions,
but their lack in empirical research contributes
to questions such as: How do stewardship re-
lationships evolve? How do the cognitive maps
of the entrepreneur and VC affect how the parties
experience a potential prisoner’s dilemma?
4.3 A comparison of each frame-
work’s applicability to different
stages in the investment period
In order to discuss the applicability of the
different frameworks to different stages of
the investment period, Table 4.5 gives each
frameworks applicability in each stage of the
investment period. In Table 4.5 the stages
of the investment period follows the steps
suggested by Arthurs and Busenitz [2003] in
Figure 3.6. Thus in Table 4.5 the pre-investment
period is divided into the period before first en-
counter between the VC and entrepreneur and
the pre-investment screening process, and the
post-investment period is divided into the post-
investment period and possible inflection points
leading to goal misalignment. Thus the time
dimension has now been expanded to three pe-
riods: Period before first encounter, pre-investment
screening period and the post-investment period.
Limitations
As Figure 3.6 and Table 4.5 show, some frame-
works are more applicable than others in
the different phases of the VC-entrepreneur
relationship, indicating that one framework
alone can only partially describe the VC-
entrepreneur relationship. When looking at
the upper three rows, the principal agency
theory, stewardship theory and the prisoner’s
dilemma all focus on the antecedents and con-
sequences of chosen decisions or different ways
to monitor control. Thus procedural justice,
social embeddedness and organizational learn-
ing theory in the bottom three rows may add
a dynamic perspective to the VC-entrepreneur
relationship models.
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The limitation of the dynamic frameworks
is that they are based on organizational theory
and business networks and have not explic-
itly been derived from or developed based on
studies of the VC-entrepreneur relationships,
thus they do not explain how social embedded-
ness and organizational learning is depicted
from the VC-entrepreneur perspective. Only
procedural justice and the prisoner’s dilemma
partially attempt to take the entrepreneur’s
view on the relational decision-making pro-
cess, as seen in Table 4.4. Thus there is still a
need to capture how the entrepreneur looks
upon the relationship-building context and
what processes and factors affect how fairness,
trust and commitment is being perceived in
the relationship. When observing columns, an
interesting observation is that neither agency
theory, stewardship theory, prisoner’s dilemma
or procedural justice theory is applicable in the
early pre-investment period, before the first
encounter between the VC and entrepreneur,
but social embeddedness is. Thus the social
embeddness could help the entrepreneur and
VC with getting a better understanding of
how these initial relationships develop.The
previously described frameworks have been
shown to be more applicable in some time
intervals than others, thus it is necessary to
see how these overlap and complement each
other in order to describe how the dynamic
VC-entrepreneur relationship evolve.
4.4 How relationship frameworks
may complement each other
The previously described frameworks have all
discussed the opportunistic behavior inher-
ent in agency theory, how it could be over-
come and antecedents and consequences of
dilemmas that might occur. By withholding
information, the entrepreneurs could loose
the trust and support they enjoy from their
investors if they do not feel that both parties
work towards a mutual gain, thus inducing
enhanced monitoring which, in turn, hampers
their future timely need of funding [Sapienza
and Korsgaard, 1996]. Such an opportunistic
behavior could also lead the entrepreneur or
VC to choose a defection strategy in accor-
dance with the prisoner’s dilemma, which
may lead to short-term gains. This might be
overcome by using organizational learning theory
and procedural justice theory. On the other hand,
sharing all information could also lead to a loss
of leverage, and shake investors’ confidence at
an early stage [Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996].
However, this focus on opportunistic behavior
does not take into account the found effects
of cooperation [Ehrlich et al., 1994], which
could be modeled with the stewardship model
and the procedural justice theory, which sev-
eral scholars have pointed out as a means of
understanding the aspects of the relationship
between the entrepreneur and the VC (Arthurs
and Busenitz [2003]; Sapienza and Korsgaard
[1996]; Cable and Shane [1997]; Fried and
Hisrich [1994]). As VCs may be considered
more concerned about problems associated
with moral hazard and adverse selection than
the entrepreneurs, it can be assumed that more
VCs will choose the principal-agent model.
Entrepreneurs on the other hand could be con-
sidered likely to follow process elements, in
terms of dynamic frameworks, that would lead
to a good relationship to their investor.
According to Davis et al. [1997] the pris-
oner’s dilemma can model the choice between
a principal-agent relationship and a steward-
ship relationship due to the psychological char-
acteristics of each individual in the party that
predisposes that individual to make a choice,
but these three frameworks are still situational
and merely focus on the effects of given situa-
tions. In a typical prisoner’s dilemma the deci-
sion is taken simultaneously by both parties and
each party’s expectation towards the other will
influence the choice between stressing agency
or stewardship elements in the relationship.
Many factors may influence the chosen relation-
ship model, such as trust, management philos-
ophy, cultural background, network effects, in-
formation and cognitive maps, but these factors
are all part of a process leading up to the given
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situation. Cable and Shane [1997] examined
only two persons, namely the entrepreneur and
VC in the prisoner’s dilemma model, but as
Cable and Shane [1997] pointed out in their
article, the two-person prisoner’s dilemma be-
tween the entrepreneur and VC is embedded
in a wider network of n-persons prisoner’s
dilemma that consists of all entrepreneurs and
VCs. Cable and Shane [1997] also suggest that
other actors may be incorporated in the model.
Thus the VC and entrepreneur are both embed-
ded in a wider network of relations that could
potentially influence the relationship between
the two, thus introducing social embeddedness
can help extend the prisoner’s dilemma frame-
work. Organizational learning and procedural
justice may, in this case, effectuate informa-
tion sharing and increase the fairness of the
decision which, in turn, may lead to mutual
cooperation (prisoner’s dilemma), goal congru-
ence (stewardship theory) or adverse selection
and moral hazard (principal-agency theory).
Principal-agent theory is based on adverse se-
lection and moral hazard, a consequence of
information asymmetry which organizational
learning and social embeddedness may help
explain. Hernandez [2012] suggests that stew-
ardship behavior may be a consequence of
control/reward systems and cognitive mech-
anisms, where procedural justice theory and
social embeddedness theory is part of the pro-
cess resulting in stewardship behavior. While
procedural justice focus on dynamic decision-
making processes in the relationship it differs
from the other dynamic relationship frame-
works in the way it focus on how precautions
can be made to mediate the relationship be-
tween the VC and entrepreneur. It is therefore
a preventive framework used to avoid conflict-
ing goals and unfair decisions between the two
parties, thus it is somewhat close to the contrac-
tual relationship frameworks in the way they
discuss how antecedents may result in positive
outcomes, but even closer to the dynamic re-
lationship frameworks due to its focus on the
dynamic process. Figure 4.7 shows how the
different frameworks capture antecedents, pro-
cess and consequences of the VC-entrepreneur
relationship.
Antecedents ConsequencesProcess
Organizational 
learning
Principal-agent theory
Stewardship theory
Prisoner’s dilemma theory
Procedural justice
Social 
embeddedness
Figure 4.7: How the frameworks capture antecedents,
process and consequences of the VC-
entrepreneur relationship.
As seen from Figure 4.7 the frameworks
differ in their approach to explain the VC-
entrepreneur relationship although they still
overlap in some areas. However, as shown
in Table 6.15 and Table 4.1 these frameworks
relate differently to the VC-entrepreneur rela-
tionship phenomenon. Thus some areas that
are highly interrelated between different frame-
works may together help gain a better under-
standing of the VC-entrepreneur relationship
whilst in other frameworks that differ greatly
in their approach to the phenomenon such ad-
ditive theory building may not yield a better ex-
planation. By integrating all 6 frameworks into
a single, but more comprehensive model we
might be able to confine some factors discussed
in the literature and give insight to antecedents
and processes elements leading up to certain
behaviors of the VC and the entrepreneur de-
picted by the contractual relationship frame-
works. However, such a model aiming to in-
clude all aspects of the VC-entrepreneur rela-
tionship would not be useful as it would be
impossible to map all aspects of the relation-
ship as this would result in a mere replica of
reality, and as expressed by ?(p. 37-38) “models
are abstraction of reality. They are not replicas
of it.”
51
Such a comprehensive model would be able
to picture both the VC’s and the entrepreneur’s
point of view and would contain dynamic rela-
tionship processes making such a model highly
applicable to both the pre- and post-investment
stage, but it would be impossible to map such a
model in full scale and detail. However, this pa-
per does not aim to develop a comprehensive
model of all complementary frameworks, but
rather to give an overview of the application
and limitation of each framework’s ability to
describe areas in the pre- and post-investment
stage and from the VC and the entrepreneur’s
perspective.
5. Conclusion
Frameworks such as stewardship theory and pris-
oner’s dilemma build on agency theory and ac-
knowledges that relationship dilemmas can be
seen from both the VC’s and the entrepreneur’s
perspective while the principal-agent theory
solely focuses on the VC perspective. These
contractual frameworks are situational and
more, or less, applicable to different phases of
the VC-entrepreneur relationship. Thus other
more dynamic frameworks can add an expla-
nation to the process and how the many con-
cepts are simultaneously present, and highly
interrelated, in an on-going relationship. Pro-
cedural justice, social embeddedness and organi-
zational learning are such frameworks that ex-
plain the ever-changing evolving relationship,
and in the pre- and post-investment period
these frameworks are applicable to some ex-
tent, thus these theoretical foundations may
complement the situational frameworks. These
dynamic frameworks can be seen from both
the VC and the entrepreneur’s perspective and
thus enable the entrepreneur’s point of view.
While the contractual frameworks acknowl-
edges the consequences of cooperative behav-
ior between the VC and entrepreneur, social em-
beddedness and organizational learning suggest
that the VC-entrepreneur relationship is em-
bedded in a wider business network, affected
by inter- and intra-organizational relationships,
and that network effects may play a significant
role in explaining how trust, cooperation and
commitment aspects of the VC-Entrepreneur
dyad evolves. Much research is confined to the
post-investment process and although some
frameworks are able to explain areas of the pre-
investment process there is a lack of research in
the early pre-investment period where the first en-
counter between the VC and the entrepreneur
has not taken place.
6. Implications for the VC and
entrepreneur
Our analysis and discussion indicate that the
VC-entrepreneur relationship is highly influ-
enced by psychological understandings such as
trust, confidence and cognitive sharing. A conse-
quence of this is that the VC-entrepreneur rela-
tionship is not only determined by contractual
monitoring models, but also individual cog-
nitive maps due to different perceptions and
interpretations, since a shared understanding
is important for both parties to obtain a mutual
understanding. Our analysis and discussion
indicate that although agency theory has been
the main focus in the VC perspective, other
frameworks may be able to explain areas where
agency-theory has seemed insufficient. Thus
VCs should focus on carrying out fair decision-
making processes in order to obtain a trustful
relationship to the entrepreneurs and should
seek to develop decent tools for sharing knowl-
edge with the entrepreneur in order to over-
come the potential information asymmetry.The
entrepreneur should be aware of methods used
to obtain knowledge, reputation, fair decision-
making processes and cognitive sharing that
might influence and lead to a good relation-
ship to the investor. The entrepreneur should
also understand the consequences of different
approaches in the relationship-process in order
to fully understand how elements may affect
the future dynamic relationship to the investor.
Furthermore both the VC and the entrepreneur
need to be aware of how they might inspire
action and understand their own behavior as
well as the behavior of others.
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7. Implications for further
research
Further research should focus on the initial
development of the VC-entrepreneur relation-
ships and add to existing theories by explain-
ing the relationship-building process, not only
from the VC’s point of view, but from the en-
trepreneurs perspective. Much theory has been
written about the screening and pre-investment
period from the VC’s point of view, but there
is still a lack of explaining actions as to how
the entrepreneur develop relationships to in-
vestors even before the two parties first meet.
Thus possible research questions could be: How
does the entrepreneur initiate relationships to in-
vestors in an very early phase? How do inexpe-
rienced entrepreneurs build a successful relation-
ship to investors? As such processes are com-
prehensive and complex such research areas
could be empirically tested with qualitative re-
search methods in terms of explorative case
studies. More emphasis should also be put on
testing theoretical models such as stewardship
theory and the prisoner’s dilemma empirically. As
these contractual frameworks describe situa-
tional relationships these research areas are
highly suitable for quantitative research meth-
ods. To see how dynamic and complex relation-
ship frameworks, such as social embeddedness
and organizational learning, may affect the VC-
entrepreneur relationship, this could be quali-
tatively measured by addressing contacts in the
network of the VC or entrepreneur that directly
or indirectly influence the relationship. From
the entrepreneur’s perspective an interesting
area of research would be to examine how the
use of external relations may influence the VC-
entrepreneur relationship. Possible research
questions could be How can outside directors
add legitimacy to the entrepreneur team when seek-
ing investor funding? How can external relations
mediate the relationship between entrepreneurial
ventures and equity investors?. Another interest-
ing topic would be to perform a longitudinal
case study by following a VC in meetings with
several entrepreneurs. Since there has been
little quantitative research on the role of so-
cial embeddedness and organizational learn-
ing from the entrepreneur’s perspective in the
early pre-investment period we suggest that
further research should focus on explorative
case analysis on entrepreneurial ventures and
their process of building relationships to in-
vestors. This could be done by performing
explorative case studies on process elements in
early-stage entrepreneurial ventures seeking or
about to seek investments.
8. Limitations
The authors have been limited to perform the
literature screening through databases that
NTNU has permission to download from,
which may have led to a blind spot to relevant
articles in unavailable databases. Although
some articles may have been excluded from
the databases used by NTNU, this number is
limited since extensive effort has been devoted
to acquire articles that are frequently cited in
relevant literature, but not available through
the NTNU databases. Some articles have also
been acquired by the use of snowballing, thus
the results may be biased by the academic back-
ground and cognitive maps of our references.
The authors are also working entrepreneurs
themselves, something that cause bias in the
choice of key words in the literature search
due to the authors’ own understanding of the
problem.
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Abstract
This article uses the case study method to explore how outside directors in Norwegian high growth
ventures may strengthen entrepreneurial ventures in an early stage. Our case study contribute to insights
in the use of outside directors, an area where there has been none, or limited, research up till now. Our
findings show that the outside directors may contribute to scarce resources by adding organizational,
human and social resources consistent with the resource based view, and also increase the ventures
interaction with its surroundings by co-optation and added legitimacy in accordance with the resource
dependence view. However, what enables the entrepreneur to take advantage of resources obtained from
outside directors seems to depend upon the outside director’s ability to convey knowledge into a language
the CEO understands. Our findings suggest that the outside directors may add legitimacy by their
reputation, CV, experience and trustworthy relationships and the legitimating role seemed to be situational
and vary with the stage of the company. Outside directors seem to help ventures with their monitoring and
control of resources by strategically combining internal and external resources and fostering stewardship
behavior and our findings indicate that the value-adding role of the outside director to these high-growth
ventures in the early-stage may depend upon the stage of the company and of the extent of the outside
director’s activity in the firm.
∗A thank you to Roger Sørheim for supervision, feedback, and motivation.
†A thank you to Elsebeth Holmen for supplementing feedback and inspiration.
1. Introduction
The founding of new high growth busi-
nesses is often regarded to be important for
both global innovation and economic growth
(Schoonhoven and Romanelli [2001]; Shane and
Cable [2002]). However, the positive impact
of entrepreneurial ventures is dependent on
the successful realization of the founding idea,
and although it is fairly easy for just about
anyone with an idea to launch a new company,
building a sustainable, high growth business
is challenging. Entrepreneurial ventures in an
early stage are often characterized by having
few entrepreneurs, a business plan that is not
validated, and undeveloped technology and
business concept Clercq et al. [2006], moreover,
the technology, contacts, and industry knowl-
edge are commonly constricted to the founding
team [Brush et al., 2001]. Thus, at an early stage
the internal resources in entrepreneurial ven-
tures are often scarce or non-existing (Brush
et al. [2001]; Gabrielsson and Huse [2005]).
The challenges of building high growth
businesses is also associated with the ability to
attract new resources [Brush et al., 2001]. En-
trepreneurial ventures in an early stage often
lack the reputation associated with a record of
performance (i.e. administrative history, a loyal
customer base, and shared experience), and
thus potential external stakeholders increase
their perception of the risk involved with the
new venture (Brush et al. [2001]; Clercq et al.
[2006]; Huse [2011]). Brush et al. [2001] also
posits that seeking advice from your network,
assessing different decision criteria of equity
providers, delegation of responsibility, setting
policies and developing controls in the com-
pany are among the initial challenges the en-
trepreneurs face when constructing a resource
base. Thus, there is not only a challenge in ac-
cessing limited resources, but also a challenge
related to controlling and monitoring these re-
sources.
In order to increase the chances of a suc-
cessful realization of the founding idea the en-
trepreneurs needs access to the much-required
reputation, resources, and the ability to mon-
itor and control the use of these resources.
As high risk is associated with early stage
ventures’ so-called ’liability of newness’ [Kor
and Misangyi, 2008], help with monitoring
and control of scarce resources must be found.
Deakins et al. [2000] suggests that appointing
an outside director to the venture may be a
way to obtain such control over resources in
the company and share and deflect some of
the entrepreneur’s responsibility. Gabriels-
son and Huse [2005] argues that outside di-
rectors may be value adding contributors to
entrepreneurial firms by “helping to initiate
and maintain control over critical relationships,
assets and contacts in the external environ-
ment of the firm"[Gabrielsson and Huse, 2005,
p. 29]. Kor and Misangyi (2008) found that in
young entrepreneurial firms outside directors
with significant managerial industry experi-
ence were able to mitigate the same resource
lack among the top-management. Other re-
searchers propose that outside directors are
able to influence the entrepreneurial firms’
growth strategies, approaches to marketing,
strategic planning and other needed compe-
tences (Deakins et al., 2001). As Deakins (2000,
p. 115) suggest, the outside directors may
also “include bringing improved discipline to
board meetings, existing leadership skills and
improving the functioning of the board" (Pet-
tigrew [1992]; Mileham [1995]; McNulty and
Pettigrew [1996], as cited in Deakins [2000],
p. 15). Thus outside directors may not only
contribute with the monitoring and control of
resources, but may also add to scarce resources
and increase the ventures interactions with its
surroundings.
Huse (2000)’s review of research of board of
directors in SMEs shows that the literature on
the subject is still fragmented and in its infancy,
thus this paper aim to explore how outside direc-
tors may strengthen high-growth entrepreneurial
ventures in an early stage. Board composition
in large organizations have been the subject of
much research, however little research has been
performed on the board of directors in start-
ups, and there is even more lack in research of
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the use of outside directors in high technology
start-ups (Clarysse et al. 2007). Thus we will
base our research on the outside directors’ con-
tribution on the following research questions:
1. How can outside directors add scarce re-
sources to high-growth entrepreneurial ven-
tures in an early stage?
2. How can outside directors add the needed le-
gitimacy to high-growth entrepreneurial ven-
tures in an early stage?
3. How can outside directors help the board in
high-growth entrepreneurial ventures to mon-
itor and control the use of resources in an
early stage?
In this article we first present extant liter-
ature on the role of outside directors in en-
trepreneurial ventures in terms of value cre-
ation, monitoring and control. This review
gives a foundation for an explorative analysis
of three cases consisting of high-growth Nor-
wegian entrepreneurial ventures, all of which
have acquired outside directors at an early
stage. The findings in each case is presented
followed by a within-analysis of each case com-
pany. The three cases are then compared in
across-case analysis followed by a discussion
on how the case findings correspond with the-
ory in order to answer our three research ques-
tions. Finally we offer a conclusion and offer
some directions for future research.
2. Theoretical background
The resource-based view, resource dependence
view, agency theory and stewardship theory
have all been applied to describe the many dif-
ferent roles of outside directors. However, the
entrepreneurs reason for recruiting outside di-
rectors and their perceived contribution seem
to vary across theories [Gabrielsson and Huse,
2005]. Lynall et al. [2003] suggests that it is
”not a matter of choosing one theoretical per-
spective over another but, rather, of identifying
under which conditions each is more applica-
ble”[p. 419]. As a frame of reference we have
therefore chosen to divide the theory applied
to outside directors into value creation and mon-
itoring and control.
2.1 Value Creation
The value creation in a firm consists of devel-
oping and obtaining resources and strategies
needed for venture success [Hitt et al., 2001].
Two perspectives are often used to evaluate the
value creation in new ventures: the resource-
based view, providing an internal focus, and the
resource dependence view, providing an external
focus [Bjørnåli, 2009].
Resource-Based View argues that a firms
competitive advantage lies with the applica-
tion of its internal resources and capabilities
(Helfat and Peteraf [2003], Prahalad and Hamel
[1990]). Being able to further develop and main-
tain these resources will, hence, strengthen the
firms competitive position [Gabrielsson and
Huse, 2005]. From a resource-based view the
firm strategy should thus seek to leverage their
internal strengths and minimize their internal
weaknesses [Barney, 1991].
By sorting resources into six categories: hu-
man, social, financial, physical, technology, and
organizational, and further range their com-
plexity on a scale from simple (i.e. tangible,
discrete, and property-based) to complex (i.e.
intangible, systemic, and knowledge-based),
Brush et al. [2001] propose that the more com-
plex a resource is, the higher potential for fur-
ther transformation, combination and possible
unique advantage there is. To create a com-
petitive advantage, the resource- based view
focuses on the company’s capabilities in ad-
dition to its assets. Capabilities are defined
by Helfat and Peteraf [2003] as: ”the ability to
perform a coordinated set of tasks, utilizing
organizational resources, for the purpose of
achieving a particular end result”[p. 999].
However, entrepreneurial firms often lack
the strength of internal resources and some-
times in-house knowledge [Storey, 1994], thus
the entrepreneur team is pressured to depend
on their environment for the attraction of
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needed resources and knowledge [Clarysse
et al., 2007]. Brush et al. [2001] moreover ar-
gues that the entrepreneurial challenge is to
construct a resource base: ”identifying, speci-
fying, combining, and transforming personal
resources into a new venture”[p. 77]. Castaldi
and Wortman [1984] (Cited in Gabrielsson and
Huse [2005]) found that by bringing outside
directors into the board, the firm were able to
meet the internal need for resources in knowl-
edge, experience and skills. Hence, the relevant
outside directors could provide a competitive
advantage and strengthen the firms compet-
itive position through their competence and
personal qualifications [Gabrielsson and Huse,
2005]. By utilizing outside directors’ resources
and knowledge, firms have also been able to
increase their strategic flexibility [Zahra and Fi-
latotchev, 2004], and by taking a strategic role
outside directors have been found to affect the
firm’s competitive position, and achieve goal
congruence between the shareholders interest,
and the firms goals [Tricker, 1994].
Resource Dependence View argues that the
behavior of a company is influenced by ex-
ternal resources, and that the procurement of
these resources is a necessity to ensure a com-
petitive strategy of any company [Salancik and
Pfeffer, 1978]. Thus, the company is viewed as
an open system depending on external stake-
holders and environmental eventualities [Salan-
cik and Pfeffer, 1978]. As companies rely on the
interaction with its environment through pro-
curement and distribution, Salancik and Pfeffer
[1978] argues that in order to reduce environ-
mental uncertainty, companies must strive to
stabilize the flow of resources through environ-
mental control. However, entrepreneurial ven-
tures in an early stage often consists of a small
group of founders and lack the ability and net-
work to mobilize external resources needed
for further development [Clercq et al., 2006].
By utilizing the outside directors as a linking
mechanism between the organization and its
environment [Pfeffer, 1972], through connec-
tion, co-optation, and legitimacy (Pfeffer [1972];
Salancik and Pfeffer [1978]), the managers may
achieve various objectives concerning its re-
source dependencies (Zahra and Pearce [1989]
as cited in Gabrielsson and Huse [2005]). Thus
they effectively help reducing environmental
uncertainty [Pfeffer, 1972]. Outside directors’
extended network connects the company to
external organizations [Salancik and Pfeffer,
1978], and co-optation occurs when the outside
directors use their extended network to obtain
representatives of powerful stakeholders to the
board [Pfeffer, 1972]. The combination of out-
side directors’ extended network and ability
to co-opt new strategically important board
members, is associated with decreased firm
dependency [Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978].
The outside directors provides legitimacy,
when "the prestige and reputation of the di-
rectors in the stakeholder groups enable the
board to legitimize the firm’s actions, mobilize
external support and acquire critical external
resources” (Salancik and Pfeffer [1978], as cited
in Bjørnåli [2009][p. 12]). Young firms are asso-
ciated with lack of resources, and inability to
develop relations with potential stakeholders.
These factors correspond with their relatively
high rate of mortality, also refered to as ”the lia-
bility of newness” (Stinchcombe [1965] as cited
in (Deutsch and Ross [2003]; Kor and Misangyi
[2008])). Deutsch and Ross [2003] showed that
high- quality young firms could enhance their
chances of survival, and credibly signal their
superiority to other entrepreneurial firms, in
a market where stakeholders refuse to align
themselves with new ventures, by obtaining
reputable directors to their boards.
2.2 Monitoring and Control
Most research on the control function of exter-
nal directors has concerned larger companies
(Pfeffer [1972]; Lynall et al. [2003]; Huse [1998]).
However, Gabrielsson [2007] found that the use
of board empowerment in small companies is
a response aimed at satisfying the demands
from owners not directly involved in managing
the company. Agency theory is often used to
describe the investor-entrepreneur relationship
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and explains how outside directors, on behalf
of the shareholders (principal) can be used as
a method to control, monitor and influence
the top management (agent) [Keasey et al.,
1997], where there are agency costs involved
with the separation of ownership and con-
trol for the shareholders [Fama and Jensen,
1983]. However, in early stage ventures the
entrepreneur usually inherits a double role as
the entrepreneur often holds the position as
both owner and manager [Brockhaus, 1980],
thus there can be no agency problem since the
owner and manager is the very same person
[Deakins et al., 2000]. Thus Deakins et al. [2000]
suggests that outside directors may contribute
to monitoring and control in early-stage ven-
tures through contractual relationships, based
on the propositions within stewardship the-
ory, on behalf of the shareholders, even when
the shareholder and the manager is the same
person. Stewardship theory posits that there
is no inherent problem of executive motiva-
tion among entrepreneurs and Hernandez
[2012] describes this as a covenantal relation-
ship where there is goal congruence between
the two parties. Stewardship theory therefore
describe entrepreneurs as stewards whose mo-
tives are aligned with their principals.
While agency theory models the VC and
entrepreneur as self-interested actors ratio-
nally maximizing their own personal economic
gains, this model presumes the notion of an
in-built conflict of interest between the VC and
entrepreneur [Davis et al., 1997]. Hernandez
[2012] defines stewardship as “the extent to
which an individual willingly subjugates his or
her personal interests to act in protection of oth-
ers’ long-term welfare” [Hernandez [2012], p.
8], and describes the relationship as a covenan-
tal relationship in which a moral commitment
binds both parties to work toward a common
goal without taking advantage of each other. In
this model the entrepreneur essentially wants
to do a good job, thus being a good steward of
the corporate assets [Davis et al., 1997].
Hernandez [2012] has created a model of
the suggested antecedents that drive steward-
ship behavior as shown in Figure 2.1. This
model posits that the cognitive and affective
variables that drive stewardship behavior are
affected by the structural factors of stewardship
governance. The stewardship theory posits that
there is no inherent, general problem of exec-
utive motivation among entrepreneurs [Davis
et al., 1997]. In such a covenantal relationship
both the outside director and the entrepreneur
recognize their fiduciary obligations to pro-
tect the interests of stakeholders and the en-
trepreneur also believes he is morally obliged
to pursue these interests [Caldwell et al. [2002],
as cited in Hernandez [2012]]. For outside di-
rectors appointed by ventures at an early stage
where the entrepreneur holds the position as
both owner and manager there can be assumed
to be goal congruence, thus the question is how
far the entrepreneurs can achieve a good ven-
ture performance Donaldson and Davis [1991].
In contrast to agency theory, stewardship the-
ory is based on elements from sociology and
psychology and offers an alternative view in
which organizational actors see greater long-
term profit in other-focused, prosocial behavior
rather than the self-serving and short-term op-
portunistic behavior described in agency the-
ory [Hernandez, 2012]. Thus, stewardship the-
ory is to a greater extent able to describe the re-
lationship in the post-investment phase where
the goals between the parties are aligned.
Deakins et al. [2000] suggests that outside
directors in early-stage entrepreneurial ven-
tures may bring improved discipline to board
meetings, exercise leadership skills and im-
prove the functioning of the board (Pettigrew
1992; Mileham 1995; McNulty and Pettigrew
1996, as cited in Deakins et al. [2000]). However,
the relationship between the outside directors
and CEOs has received little attention in re-
search despite the high profile that comes with
the position as an external director (McNulty
and Pettigre (1996), as cited in Deakins et al.
[2000]) and most research on the control func-
tion of external directors have been appointed
to larger companies (Pfeffer [1972]; Lynall et al.
[2003]; Huse [1998]). Thus there is a need to
investigate further how outside directors may
help boards in high-growth ventures to mon-
itor and control their use of resources at an
early stage.
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Control systems
- Foster relationship-cen-
tered collaboration 
through shared leader-
ship practices.
- Promote employees’ 
collective responsibility 
for work outcomes.
Cognitive mechanisms
- Develop an other-re-
garding perspective.
- Generate a long-term 
orientation.
Affective mechanisms
- Build affective commit-
ment through mutual 
social exchange.
Psychological 
ownership
Stewardship
behaviours
Reward systems
- Enable employees to 
derive intrinsic benefits 
from working toward a 
valued end.
- Cultivate self-efficacy 
and self-determination 
through ongoing employ-
ee development.
Structural Factors Psychological Factors Mediating Variable Outcome
Figure 2.1: A model of stewardship antecedents. Source: Hernandez [2012]
3. Research method
This article uses the case study method to ex-
amine how outside directors strengthen high-
growth entrepreneurial ventures at an early
stage. Yin [1989] defines a case study as ‘an em-
pirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context when
the boundaries between phenomenon and con-
text are not clearly evident and in which multi-
ple sources of evidence are used” (Yin [1989],
p. 23).
3.1 Case study method used to ex-
amine the role of the outside di-
rectors
Because of the unique strategic composition
of boards in the start-up phase and the rapid
changes that takes place in new ventures, case
research enables a holistic description of each
case and offer depth in and comprehensive-
ness of situations in order to understand the
strengthening roles of the outside directors to
high-growth ventures at an early stage. Be-
cause little is written about the roles of outside
directors in the pre-investment phase, it is es-
pecially relevant to take a case study approach
since it may add insight into areas where
current theories seem inadequate ([Yin, 1989];
[Eisenhardt, 1989]). As the pre-investment pe-
riod for high-growth ventures may be complex,
case study research may capture the processes
and allow research on both contextual factors
and process elements in the same situation [Ha-
linen and Törnroos, 2005].
Yin [1989] separates between exploratory, de-
scriptive and explanatory case studies. In our
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study the factors contributing to the strengthen-
ing role of the outside directors to high-growth
entrepreneurial ventures at an early stage is un-
known, thus this article is based on exploratory
case research.
3.2 Case selection
Given our research questions, we sampled
CEO’s and outside directors from three Nor-
wegian high-growth entrepreneurial ventures.
Due to our area of research we narrowed the
search down to young entrepreneurial ven-
tures that had obtained an outside director
that did not have any connection to anyone
in the entrepreneurial team or the venture in
general. In order to be able to carry out an
explorative study of how the outside director
might strengthen the ventures at an early stage
we had to narrow our search down to ventures
where the outside director had been onboard
for more than 6 months. In this way we made
sure that the outside director and entrepreneur
would have had time to develop a relationship
between them that would make both parties
able to evaluate to what extent the outside di-
rector has contributed to strengthening the ven-
ture at an early stage. In this study we have
conducted case analyses of 3 high-growth Nor-
wegian ventures in their pre-investment phase.
The selected companies were of high relevance
because they had all initially searched for an
outside director to obtain help in a critical pe-
riod, and all three companies had reached im-
portant milestones during the period in which
the outside director was appointed. Thus it is
interesting to explore in which ways the out-
side directors might have strengthened the en-
trepreneurial ventures during this period.
3.3 Data collection
The data consists of in-depth interviews with
CEOs and outside directors in the three com-
panies. The sources of interviews are given
in Table 3.1, where the outside director A,B
was the same in both company A and in com-
pany B. Each interview lasted on average 1
hour and some informants were interviewed
more than once. An interview guide was pre-
pared in advance of the interviews to ensure
that we obtained relevant information related
to our research questions. As new relevant in-
formation was obtained during the interviews,
we performed stepwise iterations between the
informants and the interview guide, which re-
sulted in new aspects related to our research
questions as we went along. All interviewees
were tape recorded and the interviews were
conducted in the period April 2013 and June
2013. As tentative propositions and causal rela-
tionships emerged in the interviews we made
sure to follow-up by asking affirmative ques-
tions as a sanity check to ensure that we had
understood the accounts given correctly.
Table 3.1: Sources of the interview data
venture Entrepreneur Board member
venture A CEO A Outside chief of director A,B
venture B CEO B Outside chief of director A,B
venture C CEO C Outside director C
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3.4 Data coding
The data were first coded into a number of cat-
egories as suggested in the theoretical model
proposed by Yin [1989]. The categories were:
1. Relationship context factors.
2. The perception of the outside director’s
value-adding to the venture.
3. The venture’s management structure.
4. The outside director’s legitimating role.
5. The main task of the board.
6. Monitoring and control by the outside
director.
7. Changes that have occurred in each of
the above areas.
3.5 Case analysis method
After completing the initial interviews with the
CEOs and the outside directors, the data were
analyzed by first transcribing the recorded in-
terviews into written text. Since the intervie-
wees were Norwegian the interviews had also
been conducted in Norwegian which means
that all transcriptions were made in the Nor-
wegian language. First, quotes were extracted
and given keywords in order to compare the
two perspectives in each case, and then these
quotes were translated into English and tabu-
lated.
A key advantage of the inductive process
is that it allows constructs to emerge from the
data rather than being guided by hypotheses.
We therefore first performed within-analysis
of each company by looking for similarities
and differences between the CEO’s perception
and the outside director’s perception of each
research question. For the within-case analysis
of the embedded units (company A, company
B and company C) we used the standard cross-
case analysis technique Eisenhardt [1989b] by
looking for similarities and differences between
each interviewee. Through the logic of repli-
cation we were able to develop initial propo-
sitions of the outside director’s strengthening
role to high-growth entrepreneurial ventures
at an early stage. As the data were revisited
quite often constructs, causal relationships and
propositions emerged. Finally, the results from
the within-analysis in each company were com-
pared in a cross-case analysis between the three
cases.
4. Presentation of the cases
As proposed by Huse [2000] there is a need
to understand the contextual conditions under
which small companies adopt outside direc-
tors. Hence, Table 5.3 gives the context of each
company’s present situation.
Table 4.2: Context of company A, company B and company C
Company A Company B Company C
The entrepreneur has obtained
several propositions from in-
vestors who wish to buy the com-
pany, but contact has been very
situational and until now no in-
vestments has been made. In-
vestors is not really of interest to
the entrepreneur and the meet-
ings with investors have often
been initiated by the outside di-
rector.
Has obtained funding from busi-
ness angels obtained from the
local environment, friends and
acquaintances. These are close
relationships. The entrepreneur
has also presented to bigger in-
vestors and been declined be-
cause they applied for an insuffi-
cient amount of money. The en-
trepreneur has been advised by
the outside director to use the
bank in order to find new rele-
vant investors. Company B was
sold in 2010.
Company was funded in 2009
and today they have obtained sev-
eral crucial partners in order to
enter the market. The CEO has al-
ways had a lot to do since he has
been working alone with sales
and business development. The
CEO is currently working on ex-
panding the business in Nordic
countries.
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Table 4.3: Experience of CEO and outside director in company A, company B and company C
Coding
category
CEO Outside director
Case A Education and experience: MSc in engineer-
ing. Founded company A in 2001 and has
been working as CEO since then.
Education and experience: Has worked as
key account manager, chief financial officer
(CEO) and leader of innovation and growth
in several big Norwegian companies. Has
an education within management, economics
and trade-sales. Operation experience from
tenfolds of boards in early stage ventures.
Expectation to outside director: Someone
who could make the team better at their inter-
nal operations. Someone with the necessary
experience and competence to help them get a
better understanding of the ”bigger picture“.
Perception of expectation to self: Someone
who knew strategy and had experience in the
relevant industry.
Case B Education and experience: CEO has worked
with business development and entrepreneur-
ship for 22 years. Has an academic back-
ground within health and the Norwegian
Armed Forces.
Education and experience: Has worked as
key account manager, chief financial officer
(CEO) and leader of innovation and growth
in several big Norwegian companies. Has
an education within management, economics
and trade-sales.
Expectation to outside director: experience
from other boards, competence where the
management team had neither experience nor
competence and contribute both academic
and strategic with further development.
Perception of expectation to self: Someone
who could build long-term structure and cul-
ture in the management team on a daily basis.
Case C Education and experience: MSc in computer
science. Founded company in 2009 and has
been working as CEO since then.
Education and experience: Has studied a 2-
year program at the Norwegian officer can-
didate school and has a doctor degree from
NTNU. He has 27 years of industry experi-
ence as a leader and advisor in the IT and
telecommunications industry and has been
co-founder of two big IT companies.
Expectation to outside director: someone
who knew relevant people and would make
time to "open some doors". The outside di-
rector was appointed because of his industry-
relevant experience.
Perception of expectation to self: Someone
who is easily accessible and can contribute as
a sparring partner.
*The outside director of company A and company B is the same person.
In two of the case companies (A and C)
the outside director had an active role in the
company at the time when the interviews were
conducted whereas company B was sold in
2010. Further, Table 4.3 lists the education and
experience of the CEOs and outside directors
in company A, B and C, the expectations to the
outside directors before these were appointed
in the companies, and the outside directors’
perception of the CEOs expectations to them.
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5. Findings
In our findings we present each separate case
sequentially with the aim of answering the
three research questions. In order to compare
the three cases a within analysis is performed
on the CEO and the outside director of each
separate company, followed by a cross-case
analysis of the three companies using the re-
sults from the within analysis.
5.1 Company A
5.1.1 Resources
CEO
The CEO’s expressed that the main role of
the board of directors was to draw the long
lines, think strategically and implement struc-
ture. The CEO perceived the outside director
as open, honest and transparent and very re-
sponsive to signals from the entrepreneurs.
“He enabled the other party to get
to the point faster, made it easier for
me to understand what the offer im-
plied, and what was of interest to
our venture.”-CEO, company A
The CEO explained that the outside direc-
tor had the lead role in meetings with investors,
and the CEO would supplement with addi-
tional information. The reason was that the
outside director was familiar with the venture
capital industry, and had good at negotiation
skills from previous similar process. This was
also one of the reasons why the outside direc-
tor had been appointed as chief of director.
Outside director
The outside director emphasized that a profes-
sional board was very much related to the way
you built structure and culture between people
in the management team on a daily basis.In or-
der to build culture and structure the outside
director emphasizes the importance of filling
the necessary roles not only on the manage-
ment team, but also on the board. As it is the
chief of director’s responsibility to fill the po-
sitions on the board the outside director felt it
was necessary for him to search his network in
order to find persons with the right capabilities
and expertise. The outside director further ex-
plains that his network is not only used to find
competent and experienced people to fill the
board, but also in terms of getting in contact
with potential investors.
“When I take the lead role in
a meeting, it enables the en-
trepreneurs to have an objecting
function, and stop the process
when it strays from their objectives
and comfort zone.”-Outside director,
company A on investor meetings
According to the outside director it was
his job as chief of director to hold the chair at
investor meetings. The most important role
of the outside director in investor processes
was, according to himself, the extensive knowl-
edge about the important role play in these
situations. The outside director emphasize that
this knowledge has to do with his experience
and he expresses that he does not believe that
the management team would have come as far
without him. A small, but important part of
this situation was, according to the outside di-
rector, the knowledge of necessary documents,
such as non-disclosure agreements, and he be-
lieved the investors would probably have been
bored with the entrepreneurs pretty soon if he
had not been there to help them get through
the process.
5.1.2 Legitimacy
CEO
The CEO experiences that the outside direc-
tor’s investor relations has helped open some
doors and got the entrepreneur team in contact
with potential investors. The CEO believes
the outside director adds legitimacy to the
entrepreneur team since he has been a board
member in many other companies, and thus
holds a reputation and experience that stake-
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holders appreciates.
Outside director
The outside director explained that in some
cases, especially with foreign investors his CV
had a legitimating role, as it gave credibility
to the management team. However, the out-
side director specifies that he had to be care-
ful in the way he used his network, not to
burn any bridges for future cooperative rela-
tionships. The outside director emphasized
that it was to a great extent his interaction with
the surroundings, among them investor circles,
that made investors approach company A. His
steady contact with these relations, and his rep-
utation from earlier success gave credibility to
the management team in addition to increase
the number of approaches from investor cir-
cles.
“What gives the entrepreneur team
legitimacy in meetings with in-
vestors is my extensive knowl-
edge and experience with acqui-
sitions and exits of ventures, and
the knowledge of how the game
works.”-Outside director, company A,
on legitimating role
5.1.3 Monitoring and control
CEO
The outside director was used mostly as a spar-
ring partner in discussions and as an advisor
that might shed new light on tough situations,
and the CEO emphasized that it was always
the entrepreneurs that made the decisions af-
ter consulting the outside director. The CEO
did not perceive the outside director as a con-
trolling authority, but rather as a supervisor.
Further, the CEO did not feel that the outside
director would control strategic decisions, but
felt that they were coordinated and came to
term in an open process, as well described in
the below statement.
“I think we have a shared under-
standing of how to do business de-
velopment. We are not very differ-
ent” -CEO company A, on the outside
director’s control in the company
Outside director
The outside director explains that what enables
him to work strategically with the management
team is his ability to speak the entrepreneurs’
language which makes him able to speak strat-
egy without anyone understanding that they
are actually talking strategy. In this way he
keeps the entrepreneurs on track and talks
strategy without the use of theoretical mod-
els. The outside director explains that this is
because the board has a control function and a
strategy function.
“Some people believe that strategy
cannot be implemented very closely
in order to sustain the control func-
tion, but I do not feel this way my-
self. ” -Outside director, company A,
on control in company A
The outside director in company A would
preferred to work closely with the entrepreneur
team to ensure they implemented the strategy,
and fully understand his methods. He would
rather place an economist beside him to watch
carefully and hold the control function. This
also allowed the outside director to be less for-
mal. As he explained himself, larger boards
would have more power distance and formali-
ties, but this was not the case with company A,
which suited the outside director, since he did
not see himself as the outdistanced and formal
person.
The outside director explained his monitor-
ing of the entrepreneur with what he called a
typical Norwegian model where it is important
to reach agreements. In this model it was im-
portant to the outside director to not express
his opinion too quickly, but rather gather dif-
ferent opinions and try to mediate potential
conflicts to ensure they come to terms.
“Norwegian people are preoccu-
pied with being agreeable, but
agreeable tactics may not always be
applicable in the given situation. ”
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-Outside director, company A, on con-
trol in company A
Thus, in company A he would vary a bit.
Sometimes he would give direct orders, but it
always depended on the situation. The outside
director expressed that this was something he
appreciated with the Norwegian model since
Norwegian people were, in his eyes, situational.
An important monitoring technique to the out-
side director was, according to himself, his
rational and analytical questioning techniques
that could be used to make people under-
stand his point of view and agree with him.
The close relationship with the entrepreneurs
enabled the outside director to monitor the
entrepreneurs by asking tough questions, ex-
pecting timely deliveries.
5.1.4 Within analysis of company A
A comparison of the CEO and the outside di-
rector in company A is given in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Within analysis company A
Coding
category
CEO company A Outside director company A
1 Contributes with experience in the en-
trepreneur team’s lacking areas, such as
knowledge and advice in how to make a
long-term plan, negotiation skills and exten-
sive business experience, and also contributes
with knowledge and network within the VC-
industry.
Co-opt lacking roles in the management team
and on the board. Implements structure and
culture. Adds extensive network, especially
within investor circles. Knowledge of how to
play the investor role game. Provides specific
knowledge such as the use of non- disclosure
documents.
2 The outside director’s reputation in his in-
vestor network has helped open some doors
to get the entrepreneur team in contact with
potential investors, but these meetings is not
really of interest to the CEO. The outside di-
rector may add legitimacy to the entrepreneur
team since he has been a board member in
many other companies, and thus holds a rep-
utation and experience that stakeholders ap-
preciates.
His CV and experience gives legitimacy to
the entrepreneur team in investor evaluations,
especially with foreign investors. His reputa-
tion from earlier success gives credibility to
the entrepreneur team. His extensive knowl-
edge and experience with acquisitions and
exits of ventures gives legitimacy in meetings
with investors.
3 The entrepreneur have experienced that the
only demand from the outside director is that
they stay as an organized and capable busi-
ness. The entrepreneur feels that the outside
director acts more as a mentor or sparring
partner rather than as a decision-maker, a
supervisor more than a controlling authority,
and there has been no disagreements between
the two.
Implements structure in the company with-
out the entrepreneurs knowing that this is
what he is doing. Works closely with the
entrepreneurs and talks their language in or-
der to make a strategy without them knowing
this is actually strategy. Uses a typical Norwe-
gian situational model. Sometimes he gives
direct orders, other times he would go with
more agreeable tactics. Monitors by asking
tough questions and demanding timely deliv-
eries.
*Within analysis of CEO and outside director in company A. 1 = How can outside directors add scarce resources
to a high-growth venture in early stage? 2 = How can outside directors add the needed legitimacy to a high-growth
venture in an early stage? 3 = How can outside directors help the board in a high-growth venture to monitor and
control their use of resources in an early stage?
68
From the CEO’s perspective it seems as if
the contribution from the outside director that
is valued the most is his advice and knowledge
resource that has helped the entrepreneurs
manage their daily operations. Although the
CEO admits that the outside director’s reputa-
tion has opened some doors, this is not valued
as much by the CEO since they have not been
interested in investments yet. In terms of mon-
itoring and control, the CEO did not perceive
the outside director as controlling since de-
cisions were made together and they always
reached an agreement. Thus the perceived
value of the outside director from the CEO’s
point of view was more of a resource with his
knowledge and experience that led to focused
discussions.
From the outside director’s perspective he
added valuable resources to the entrepreneurs
by his knowledge, experience and network,
but these resources was meaningless if not
implemented strategically. Thus the outside
director thought his mechanisms of secretly
monitoring the entrepreneur was equally im-
portant in order to build structure and culture
in the company. However, the outside director
emphasized that in meetings with investors,
especially foreign investors, it was his CV and
reputation that was being evaluated, thus his
education and experience would play a vital
role once the entrepreneurs would go for in-
vestment financing.
When comparing the analysis of each row
of research questions there seems to be a gen-
eral mismatch between the outside director’s
contribution perceived from the CEO’s and
the outside director’s perspective. Whilst the
CEO valued the resources the outside director
brought to the table in terms of knowledge
and advice, the outside director emphasized
the importance of his underlying monitoring
of the entrepreneur team to ensure that these
resources were used strategically and to ensure
future growth. The legitimacy the outside
director gave the entrepreneur team in terms
of CV and reputation seemed to be far more
valued by the outside director than the en-
trepreneur team, but this seems to be because
the outside director was more future-oriented
than the entrepreneur.
5.2 Company B
5.2.1 Resources
CEO
“He asked questions, demanded
and challenged us which made us
understand that we were going to
learn plenty.’-CEO, company B
The CEO expressed that they needed some-
one with the necessary competence and net-
work, but in addition the outside director
needed to be a challenger. The CEO believes
this is why they chose the outside director also
as their chief of director.
“He would keep lectures on the dif-
ferent topics we were discussing in
order to ensure that we all had a
common understanding of things.’-
CEO, company B
The CEO expressed that the outside direc-
tor added skills complementary to the CEO,
not only in experience, knowledge and strate-
gic planning, but also within negotiations with
potential stakeholders and investors. The CEO
felt it was very valuable to have a chief of di-
rector that could argue with both facts and
numbers, not to mention negotiation skills and
communication skills at a far higher level than
what the CEO possessed at that stage. A great
value to the entrepreneur team was also the
coaching he gave them within important areas
such as sales and negotiation techniques. She
felt that he had an untraditional approach to
the outside director role.
“We had an agreement saying that
if I was faced with a challenging de-
cision in meetings with stakehold-
ers, I could always blame any un-
certainty on the fact that the control
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lied with the chief of director, and
he needed to be consulted before I
could give answer to the question.’-
CEO, company B, on negotiation tech-
niques
All though the outside director did not
have the industry specific experience he was
concerned with getting the needed competence
to the company, and through his network he
co-opted another outside director with indus-
try specific competence within marketing, that
also had a large relevant network.
Outside director
The outside director expressed that the en-
trepreneurs in company B was not very clear in
what contribution they expected from him, but
his main contribution was related to forming a
strategy with the objective of a trade sale exit.
Thus, a lot of his time was spent on creating
awareness of important factors, such as the rev-
enue, that increases the company value in an
acquisition.
“We used a simple strategy: In-
crease sales!’-Outside director, com-
pany B
The outside director did not have direct ex-
perience within the industry segment that com-
pany B was situated in, but he explained that
he had experience with forming those types of
strategies from other industries, and felt that
his competence in that area was highly trans-
ferrable. The outside director also emphasized
that he was of great help in meetings with po-
tential stakeholders and investors because of
his experience with negotiation techniques.
5.2.2 Legitimacy
CEO
The CEO had found the outside director
through her own network. It was an acquain-
tance of the CEO that knew the outside director
and recommended him to the CEO based on
the criteria the CEO was looking for, but the
outside director had a lacking relevant network
in the specific industry, thus the CEO usually
managed meetings on her own. However, the
outside directors were able to co-opt another
outside director into the board trough his net-
work, and a part to this successful co-optation
could be due to the outside director’s previous
reputation and success. The experience and
CV of the outside director was of value to
the entrepreneur team, but was never used in
meetings with partners.
Outside director
The outside director expressed that the CEO
had more contacts within the relevant industry
than himself, thus the outside director could
not help add legitimacy any more than the
CEO could herself.
5.2.3 Monitoring and control
CEO
In company B monitoring and control was
according to the CEO ensured through a very
close relationship between the CEO and the
outside director with very strict requirements
for weekly deliveries. As described by the CEO
the outside director kept weekly meetings and
the CEO was accountable for each number and
word spoken.
The CEO explained that the boards con-
trol over the management team was a premise
for the management team to begin with. Ac-
cording to the CEO the outside director would
not allow them to do as they pleased, but
take charge of important decisions. The CEO
expressed that it was important to the en-
trepreneurs’ that neither them nor any of the
owners was part of the board. Still, these prin-
ciples meant the CEO had to agree to some
tough decisions that she might view the same
way as the board. Different strategies were
discussed in board meetings and the chief of
director had the final say.
“We had an initial agreement say-
ing that should he, one day, no
longer think I as capable of doing
the job as general manager, then he
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would tell me, and I would quit.”-
CEO, company B
The CEO considers it a good thing to set
these rules when initiating a cooperation. The
CEO further describes her relationship to the
outside director as very close. They had more
board meetings than what was minimum re-
quired and according to the CEO the outside
director’s role was more of a co-owner. The
CEO explains that it was not only the involve-
ment from the outside director, but also some
humane similarities between the two of them
that made them cooperate so well.
“... It is probably because we share
common ethical principles. We
do not share the same experiences
or education, but we have a very
similar base - luminous and simi-
lar ethical principles. I appreciate
that. I believe it is easier for you
to cooperate with someone who
shares the same ethical principles
as yourself.”-CEO, company B
Outside director
The outside director emphasized that the CEO
in company B did not need to be monitored as
much as CEOs in previous companies where
he had been the chief of director. He explained
that the CEO was very competent and had an
extremely high implementation capacity. How-
ever, an extensive effort was put into monitor-
ing the two other entrepreneurs. He had to
keep them focused on, not logistics, but sales
in order to follow the strategy of increasing the
revenue, and hence the value of the company.
“Just tell me how much you have
sold since the last meeting, because
that is the only contribution I care
about.”-Outside director, company B
He emphasized how he monitored the en-
trepreneurs by using questioning techniques,
but explained that it was hard to figure out
if, or when the entrepreneurs actually dis-
agreed with him. After a while the value of
the company was much higher and they were
approached by another company that wanted
to acquire their business. At that time both
the management team and the board had dis-
cussed over a period of time that the stage
the company was reaching was to demanding
for the entrepreneurs in relation to their expe-
rience and capabilities, and thus the chief of
director decided to consider the offer.
‘... If the price is sufficient, we sell
the company.”-Outside director, com-
pany B
5.2.4 Within analysis company B
A comparison of the CEO and the outside di-
rector in company B is given in Table 5.5.
According to the CEO the outside direc-
tor’s contribution to obtain limited resources
and his monitoring role as a challenger was of
high value, but he had no legitimating role to
the business. The outside director’s resource-
adding role could be compared to the one of a
teacher where he trained the entrepreneurs and
made them become better at what they were
doing. The CEO expressed that the outside
director had added value in terms of network,
economic knowledge and knowledge within
sales and marketing. The CEO valued this
knowledge highly because she did not possess
this knowledge herself. The CEO considered
the controlling function of the board as very
important to the business, since it let the en-
trepreneurs execute the daily management op-
erations effectively while the competent board
could draw the long lines.
The outside director expressed that his con-
tribution to increasing the sales numbers was
his most valuable contribution in company
B. Since the CEO was extremely competent
his monitoring role became less important
and could rather be used at keeping the co-
entrepreneurs on track. The outside director
71
Table 5.5: Within analysis company B
Coding
category
CEO company B Outside director company B
1 Extended the team with competence in eco-
nomics, marketing and sales and an exten-
sive business network. Added guidance and
practice and could argue in investor meetings
with both facts and numbers. Experienced in
negotiation and communication techniques.
Coached the team, especially within sales.
Used his network to find a new outside direc-
tor with the needed experience and network.
The main contribution was to form a strat-
egy with the objective of a trade sale exit.
He also added negotiating skills to the team
in meetings with potential stakeholders and
investors.
2 It is questionable if the outside director added
legitimacy to the venture since he had a
lacking relevant network, however the co-
optation of another outside director could
have been partly due to his reputation and
previous success.
The outside director had no relations in the
relevant industry nor any relations to rele-
vant investors nor synergies with his former
experience, knowledge or business network.
3 The CEO and the outside director kept a close
relationship where the outside director acted
as a challenger asking tough questions and
with strict requirements for deliveries. The
outside director would not allow them to do
as they pleased, but took charge of important
decisions and ensured progress. Different
strategies were discussed in board meetings,
where the chief of director had the final say.
It was important to the CEO that the board
was in control in order to monitor the en-
trepreneurs since she did not want to keep a
two-faced role.
One of his main contributions was to keep
the entrepreneurs on track. However, the
CEO in company B need not be monitored as
much as other companies since the CEO was
very competent and had an extremely high
implementation capacity. However, extensive
effort was put into monitoring the two other
entrepreneurs and keep them focused on, not
logistics, but sales.
*Within analysis of CEO and outside director in company B. 1 = How can outside directors add scarce resources
to a high-growth venture in early stage? 2 = How can outside directors add the needed legitimacy to a high-growth
venture in an early stage? 3 = How can outside directors help the board in a high-growth venture to monitor and
control their use of resources in an early stage?
did not credit himself with any legitimating
role since his former business experience and
CV was of no relevance to this particular in-
dustry. Instead he pointed out that his real
value contribution to venture B was the way
he saw things the entrepreneurs were not able
to see. This had to do with his experience,
knowledge and network and it was the reason
the entrepreneurs managed the selling part so
well.
The perception of the contribution to lim-
ited resources, legitimacy and control appeared
very similar from the CEO’s and the outside
director’s perspective. However, there seemed
to be some perception asymmetry between the
two. First, the outside director did not think
the CEO perceived his contribution to sales as
his main contribution, but the findings indi-
cated that the CEO valued this contribution
equally much as the outside director. Secondly,
the CEO perceived a high level of control from
the outside director whilst the outside direc-
tor expressed that he did not need to monitor
the CEO because she was very competent in
what she was doing, instead he focused on
monitoring the co-entrepreneurs. Added to-
gether this indicates a shared understanding
of the value contribution, but some differences
72
in their perceptions of each other.
5.3 Case C
5.3.1 Resources
CEO
The CEO expressed that the outside director
was very passive in the idea/concept stage,
especially with regards to the development
of strategy. According to the CEO they had
worked a total of 5 hours on strategy over a
period of 4 years. However, the CEO explained
that the outside director’s network had been
to some help when getting in contact with rel-
evant and strategic people and the outside di-
rector has contributed even more in meetings
with potential partners.
“I think his restricted contribution
in the idea/concept stage is due to
a combination of his limited time,
and because the outside director
was still considering if the venture
was worth pursuing.”CEO, Com-
pany C
However, over the past two years the out-
side directors contribution to the venture has
increased, especially in meetings with partners,
but the CEO still wished he could have more
help with workshops and strategy develop-
ment. However, the CEO expressed that the
contact between the two had become more
frequent with more phone calls and even a
couple of face-to-face meetings per month. The
outside director has begun to use his network
more frequently and this is currently being
used to acquire a third outside director into
the venture.
The CEO perceived the outside director as
a supervisor, guiding decisions on choices of
direction. He coached the CEO on the invest-
ment process, appropriate timing of external
funding and the importance of increasing sales.
In meetings where the outside director was
present the CEO felt that the outside director
used his negotiation skills to ensure progress,
extract important information and reveal the
true intentions of the other party. In the process
of getting external funding, the CEO did not
perceive the outside director as value adding.
“I don’t think he has been of any
value in the process of getting fund-
ing to the company, as we have not
hooked any investors so far.’-CEO,
Company C
However, the CEO emphasized that the
outside director had helped with the screen-
ing of investors based on his experience from
relationships to investors, and thus saved the
entrepreneurs a lot of time.
Outside director
The outside director expressed that he would
give a helping hand when resources were
scarce, thus the level of contribution depended
a lot on the the activities initiated in the com-
pany. The activity level also determined the
frequency of contact between the outside direc-
tor and the CEO.
“On average I have had weekly con-
tact with the CEO.”-Outside director,
Company C
Further, the outside director contributed
with his relevant industry experience, where
the outside director’s most valuable experience
was previous initiations and development of
firms from the same innovation environment
as company C. The outside director also ex-
tended the ventures network and thus put
them in contact with new potential customers,
partners and to some degree investors . In
situations where the outside director and the
other party had a mutual trustworthy history
the lead on the contact was kept by the outside
director for ‘a long time”. The outside director
characterized the relations in the network as
businesslike and open.
The strategy was formed based on sparring
sessions at board meetings, and the outside
director helped the entrepreneur prioritize and
make decisions.
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“Together we formed the strategy
with an “outside-in” and “inside-
out” perspective on the venture.”-
Outside director, Company C
The outside director further inhibited time-
consuming pursuits of unrewarding opportu-
nities and, more specifically, expressed that
a valuable contribution to the CEO was hin-
dering the CEO from getting in contact with
relations whom the outside director did not
find trustworthy. The outside director also
coached the CEO on what type of information
he should, and should not, disclose.
In meetings with stakeholders the CEO
would hold the chair whilst the outside director
would take a secondary and complementing
role, adjusting the direction of the discussion
if needed (e.g. tried to determine if there was
a foundation for partnership early in the dis-
cussion, so the other party did not receive un-
necessary information about the technology).
The outside director further contributed with
experience from negotiations from tendering
projects and processes and merger and acquisi-
tion of companies.
5.3.2 Legitimacy
CEO
The CEO perceived the outside directors as
a “door opener” to strategically important
partners to whom the outside director had
close relations. Thus the outside director made
it easier to create connections to parties that
otherwise would not have considered the en-
trepreneur as credible. The CEO also noticed
that the reputation of the outside director
played an important role in investor meetings.
To begin with the CEO explained that the legit-
imating role of the outside director was more
on paper in order to embellish the company
and the more outside directors on the board,
the better.
”It is equally important to have sev-
eral external directors, especially in
order to brag a little.“ -CEO, Com-
pany C
Outside director
The outside director perceived that the profes-
sional perception of the venture was strength-
ened by his presence. In addition it increased
the perceived trustworthiness of company C
from other parties to whom the outside direc-
tor had a close relation. When asked what
his perception of a professional board was, the
outside director answered that a professional
board to him was a board able to understand
the framework by which the company is work-
ing (i.e. market, technology, funding and part-
ners), but also a board that can contribute to
govern the company in the right direction.
5.3.3 Monitoring and control
CEO
In situations where the board and the CEO dis-
agreed on directions, the CEO had so far been
allowed to try and see if it panned out. How-
ever, the board would give the CEO a limited
amount of time to pursue this direction and, if
it did not add any value, they would shut the
project down.
“Lets try, even if the board dis-
agrees. At worst it goes to hell.”-
CEO, Company C
Outside director
The role as an outside director was perceived
more as an ongoing sparring process than a
typical controlling role, and decisions among
the CEO and board of directors were mainly
based on consensus. The outside director also
found that frequent contact and sparring ses-
sions enabled insight to the entrepreneur’s
many and simultaneously run processes. Thus
the outside director was able to structure the
entrepreneurs’ many desired directions of ac-
tion. Still, the outside director felt there was a
need for increased structure in terms of more
frequent board meetings and increased mon-
itoring of the established strategy and objec-
tives.
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“Concerning strategy I believe the
CEO has full control. I believe that
the CEO... or the board... could
have become even more structured
by holding more frequent board
meetings and more reports. Thus
I believe structure is improvable in
terms of more rhythm in order to
define what should be presented at
board meetings and more frequent
follow-up on established plans.”-
Ouside director, Company C
5.3.4 Within analysis of company C
A comparison of the CEO and the outside di-
rector in company C is given in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Within analysis case C
Coding
category
CEO company C Outside director company C
1 Except from adding network, there was no
or limited contribution to scarce resources in
the idea/concept stage and little contact with
the outside director. Resource-adding has in-
creased over the past two years with added
industry knowledge and experience, partic-
ipation in meetings and network. The CEO
wish the outside director would contribute
more and perceives no value added from the
outside director in getting external funding.
The outside director’s contribution depends
on the activities initiated in the company and
he perceives the sparring activities between
him and the CEO to have been frequent and
steady since day one. Contributes with indus-
try experience, network extension, relevant
knowledge and advice, coaching, negotiation
experience and investor relevant knowledge.
2 The CEO believes the reputation of the out-
side director was the most important contri-
bution to the company to begin with. The
outside director has later acted as a “door
opener” towards strategic partners. His rela-
tionship to investors give credibility in meet-
ings.
The outside director’s relationship and rep-
utation in investor meetings give credibility
to the team and the venture appears more
professional.
3 The CEO influences the control of the board.
If there is a disagreement the CEO is given
a limited time period pursue the "project"
before it is shut down.
Decisions between the CEO and the board
are made with consensus. The outside direc-
tor sees his role more as a sparring partner.
There is a need for increased monitoring of
established strategy and objectives.
*Within analysis of CEO and outside director in company C. 1 = How can outside directors add scarce resources
to a high-growth venture in early stage? 2 = How can outside directors add the needed legitimacy to a high-growth
venture in an early stage? 3 = How can outside directors help the board in a high-growth venture to monitor and
control their use of resources in an early stage?
From the CEO’s perspective it seems as if
the most valuable role of the outside director
to begin with has been to boost the credibility
of the venture on paper, thus the CEO has
experienced that even though the outside di-
rector had a passive role to begin with, this
added legitimacy to the venture. The CEO has
perceived an increased contribution from the
outside director over the past years, mostly
within network, advice and knowledge from
his industry-experience, but also in terms of
participation in meetings with partners and
investors. The CEO perceives no added value
as to getting external funding since no fund-
ing has been obtained yet. When it comes
to monitoring and control the CEO does not
portray the outside director as controlling, but
emphasizes that it is he, the CEO, that is in
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charge of most decisions whilst the outside
director adds advice along the way.
From the outside director’s perspective
it seems as if he has contributed equally
much from day one, but in contrast to the
entrepreneur the outside director describes his
contributions as situational. While the outside
director values his contribution within network
and industry knowledge and experience, he
highly emphasized his own contribution to
investor and partner meetings and explains
that his value to these meetings is not only
the legitimacy he can provide, but also his
negotiation experience and investor relevant
knowledge. The outside director expressed
that his role is more of a sparring partner and
that decisions between the CEO and the board
are made with consensus. Still, the outside
director emphasizes a need for increased mon-
itoring of established strategy and objectives.
When comparing the two there seems to
be a general misperception of the outside di-
rectors longitudinal contribution. The legiti-
macy seems to be valued more on paper from
the CEO’s perspective while the outside direc-
tor’s emphasizes his active legitimating role in
strategic meetings. They both seem to have an
equal perception of the status of control and
monitoring in the venture, but they both ex-
presses a need for change. The CEO would
like more help from the outside director and
the outside director sees a need for more mon-
itoring and control of the strategic plans.
6. Cross-case comparison and
discussion
A cross-case comparison of the within analysis
of company A, B and C is given in Table 6.7.
When comparing the three cases it seems as
if there are both differences and equalities as
to the CEO’s and the outside director’s per-
ception of the contribution from the outside
director. Of the three companies the percep-
tions of the CEO and the outside director were
most aligned in company B. Company C seems
to be the company where the outside direc-
tor had contributed the least in the long run.
The perception of the outside director’s role
seemed to differ the most between the CEO and
outside director in company A. All CEOs ac-
knowledged the importance of obtaining scarce
resources, legitimacy and monitor and control
of these resources at an early stage, but the
CEOs differed as to what extent the outside
directors could contribute in these areas.
6.1 How can outside directors add
scarce resources to a high-
growth venture in early stage?
Our findings show that one of the contributions
from the outside directors that is emphasized
the most by the CEOs is their organizational
resources as suggested in the resource-based
theory. In our case organizational resources refer
to the outside director’s know-how related to
how ventures operate, board experience and
strategic management. These organizational re-
sources seemed to help leverage the case com-
panies internal strengths as well formulated in
the statements below.
“We tried to find an external person
who could help us see the bigger
picture, because you are not able to
see the big picture when you work
in the company with the daily man-
agement. It gets too close.” -CEO
company A
“When they come to me it is strat-
egy and structure they want. ... we
never use the word strategy, but it
is what they want.” -Outside direc-
tor, company A
The reason why the CEO in company A did
not use the words structure and strategy when
describing their needs may be due to several
causes. The CEO may not know the needs of
the business or otherwise, the CEO may not
share the academic language of the outside
director that enables him to talk in business
terms, or perhaps both reasons combined.
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Table 6.7: Cross-case analysis
Coding
category
Company A Company B Company C
1 Both perceives that the
outside director contributes
with knowledge and advice
within strategy, negotiation
skills, and business expe-
rience. However, outside
director also points to a
broadened network espe-
cially within investment
circles.
Both expressed that the out-
side director provided com-
petence and coaching within
economics, marketing, sales,
and negotiation skills. In ad-
dition the CEO highlighted
the importance of the co-
optation of a new outside di-
rector.
Both perceives the outside
directors to contribute with
industry knowledge and ex-
perience, negotiation tech-
niques and extended net-
work, however there is a gen-
eral mismatch in the scope
and value of the longitudinal
contribution.
2 Both express that stakehold-
ers appreciates the outside di-
rector’s reputation and expe-
rience. However the outside
director values his legitimat-
ing role far more than the
CEO and express that his ex-
tensive knowledge and expe-
rience with acquisitions and
exits increase the legitimacy.
Both have a shared under-
standing of the limited legit-
imacy provided by the out-
side director.
Legitimacy valued more on
paper from the CEO’s per-
spective whilst the outside di-
rector emphasizes his active
legitimating role.
3 Both perceives the outside di-
rector as a sparring partner,
and supervisor. However, the
outside director emphasized
the importance of his contri-
bution to underlying control,
implemented through a com-
mon language, close contact,
and using a typical Norwe-
gian situational model.
The CEO perceived a high
level of control from the out-
side director whilst the out-
side director expressed he
did not need to monitor
the CEO since she was ex-
tremely competent. How-
ever the outside director had
to keep track of the other
entrepreneurs and did so
by using question techniques
about deliverables.
Both agree that decisions are
made with consensus, and
perceives the outside direc-
tor’s role as more of a spar-
ring partner. However, the
outside director expresses a
need for increased monitor-
ing of established strategy
and objectives.
*Within analysis of CEO and outside director in company C. 1 = How can outside directors add scarce resources
to a high-growth venture in early stage? 2 = How can outside directors add the needed legitimacy to a high-growth
venture in an early stage? 3 = How can outside directors help the board in a high-growth venture to monitor and
control their use of resources in an early stage?
As the outside director explains, they both
share the same perception of needs, but they
need to use the entrepreneur’s language in or-
der to convey the message. This corresponds
to how the model, suggested by Hernandez
[2012], describes cognitive behavior as one im-
portant antecedent for stewardship behavior.
Thus the outside director may add to scarce
organizational resources, but it seems equally
important that these resources are conveyed
in a manner that enables the entrepreneur to
understand and manage the resources.
The ability to convey the academic lan-
guage into a language the CEO understands
can be seen as a was of using the outside direc-
tor’s human resources to convey organizational
resources into a language understood by the
CEO. The general finding in all cases was that
the outside directors had all contributed with
human resources consistent with a resource-
based view, in terms of how they coached
the entrepreneurs, contributed with industry-
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specific knowledge, negotiation experience
and education. Another human resource was
the outside directors’ knowledge of ’how the
investor game works’ in terms of how the dif-
ferent know-hows could be balanced and used
strategically together in investor meetings. In
company A and company B our findings imply
that the outside director worked very close to
the CEO. The frequent coaching, workshops
and facilitating indicates that the role of the
outside director took a more hands on ap-
proach. However, in company C the outside
director did not keep such a close relation-
ship with the CEO, but still contributed with
industry expertise and advice when needed.
Considering the outside director’s background
and competence in company C it might also
be that he has a better ability to contribute to
the scarce resources at a more mature level,
underscoring, from a resource-based view,
the importance of the outside directors rele-
vant competence and personal qualifications,
in order to provide a competitive advantage
[Gabrielsson and Huse, 2005]. As both the
CEO and outside director expresses a need for
change this might as well imply that company
C is moving into a new stage where the com-
pany needs a new strategy and other kinds
of resources. The CEO perceived the reason
for the lack in contribution to mainly concern
motivational issues:
“(about the outside director) ... it
was still a very early phase so he
probably didn’t know if he should
spend time on the business or not.
He didn’t know if we would suc-
ceed or not, how well things would
go and who we were...” -CEO, com-
pany C
This statement indicates that the contribu-
tion from the outside director might be situ-
ational and dependent upon the stage of the
company. As the outside director expresses:
“My contribution has depended on
the activities initiated in the com-
pany.” -Outside director, company C
In the beginning he had contributed with
advice through phone calls, but lately he had
participated more in investor and partner meet-
ings, thus it might be that company C had
reached a stage where the outside director felt
he could contribute more, while company A
and company B had already reached this stage
when their outside directors were initially ap-
pointed. In each case the outside director had
also contributed in acquiring resources to the
boards in order to mitigate the management
teams resource lack. This is consistent with
how the resource dependence view describes
the combination of the outside directors ex-
tended network and their ability to co-opt new
strategically important board members is asso-
ciated with decreasing the company’s depen-
dency on its surroundings.
It is interesting that both the CEO and out-
side director in company C express a need for
more cooperation, thus the remaining question
is why there has not been a change when both
parties feel a need for change. Seeing as the
CEO in company C has not exchanged his out-
side director with someone else, this implies
that he has received some valuable contribu-
tion from the outside director. Thus in this case
it might have been the outside director’s social
capital that created value in the company.
Our findings show that the outside direc-
tor contributed with social capital consistent
with the resource-based view in terms of how
the director’s network extensions may add a
wider network of relevant contacts to the en-
trepreneurs’ present network. The outside di-
rectors description of their interaction with
the surroundings in order to open doors and
to acquire relevant resources to the manage-
ment team are examples of how the outside
director connects the entrepreneur to its surround-
ings, co-opts from surroundings and gives cred-
ibility to the entrepreneur as consistent with a
resource-dependent view. As described by the
outside directors it is their job to open doors,
but it is the entrepreneur that needs to take
actions, thus emphasizing the importance of
how outside directors convey strategies to the
entrepreneur and make sure these strategies
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are understood.
The overall findings on scarce resources
added by the outside directors have led us to
suggest the following proposition:
Proposition I: What enables the entrepreneur
to take advantage of resources obtained from outside
directors depends upon the outside director’s ability
to convey knowledge into a language the CEO
understands.
6.2 How can outside directors add
the needed legitimacy to a high-
growth venture in an early
stage?
The CEOs in the three companies perceived
added legitimacy from the outside direc-
tors in terms of reputation and relationship
to investors consistent with the resource-
dependence view. To company A and company
C the outside director’s active legitimating role
became most apparent in investor meetings
where the bond and shared knowledge be-
tween the outside director and investor were
perceived as essential to the outcome of the
meeting. However, as expressed by the outside
director in company A and B, his education
and experience was very important when in
contact with foreign investors, thus the type
of legitimacy added may vary with different
types of investors.
In company C there also seemed to be a per-
ceptual incongruence between the two parties
that might have occurred for several reasons.
First, as previously described, the language be-
tween the CEO and the outside director may
not be compatible and thus lead to a misunder-
standing of the perceived contribution. Further,
it could be that the outside director was inten-
tionally holding back his network due to the
high level of uncertainty associated with the
firm considering that he came into the com-
pany at a concept/idea phase. Thus, from a re-
source dependence view, indicating the outside
directors awareness of the importance that he
not only establish relations, but also build trust-
worthy relations, through legitimacy, in order
to link the company to potential stakeholders,
and reduce environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer
[1972]; Salancik and Pfeffer [1978]; Gabrielsson
and Huse [2005]).
The CEO and outside director in company
B did not perceive any legitimacy from the
outside director since he had no relevant rela-
tionships to investors in the industry, which in-
dicates that the relationship towards investors
was seen as most important in terms of legit-
imacy. However, the outside director in com-
pany C also emphasized that his know-how
in investor meetings made the entrepreneurs
appear more professional, which may imply
that the outside director may be able to add
legitimacy through his ’hands-on’ role in the
venture even in situations where neither the
outside director nor the CEO had a direct rela-
tionship to the investor. The CEO in company
C expressed that in the initial phase of the ven-
ture it was most important to be able to show
to an outside director on the board in order to
brag in terms of eminent board members. This
could be a way for company C to signal its
superiority to other entrepreneurial firms and
may indicate that the outside director could
have different kinds of legitimating roles in
the companies and, as suggested by the CEO
in company C, the legitimating role may vary
with the stage of the company.
Proposition II: The outside director’s legiti-
mating role is situational and varies with the stage
of the company.
6.3 How can outside directors help
the board in a high-growth ven-
ture to monitor and control their
use of resources in an early
stage?
The degree of monitoring and control by the
outside director seemed to differ in the three
companies and it is interesting to observe that
company B, where the outside director is given
full control by the CEO, is the company where
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the outside director feels the least need for
control. As Davis et al. [1997] described the
problem is usually not entrepreneurial moti-
vation, but to what extent the entrepreneurs
can achieve a good venture performance and it
seems as if the outside director in company B
believes in the CEOs implementation capacity
and they seem to have a shared understanding
consistent with Stewardship theory as clearly
formulated in the below statement.
“... It is probably because we share
common ethical principles. We
do not share the same experiences
or education, but we have a very
similar base - luminous and simi-
lar ethical principles. I appreciate
that. I believe it is easier for you
to cooperate with someone who
shares the same ethical principles
as yourself.”-CEO company B
This is on accordance with Davis et al.
[1997] who suggest that there is no goal in-
congruence in early ventures where the en-
trepreneur holds the position as both manager
and owner. Thus the outside director’s contri-
bution in company B was to make the strategy,
but there was no need to monitor the extremely
competent CEO, thus he instead needed to
monitor the co-entrepreneurs of company B.
In this way the outside director seemed to take
on a more ’hands-on’ approach where he had
collective lessons teaching the entrepreneurs
how to perform sales. As this was a way for
the outside director to assure that they were
working towards a common goal to increase
sales it is very similar to how Hernandez [2012]
describes how promoting the ’employees’ col-
lective responsibilities for work outcomes as
a structural factor fostering stewardship be-
havior. The outside director expressed that he
enjoyed working closely to the entrepreneurs
and explained that it was not always enough to
give direct orders as indicated in the statement
below.
“I am good at making people agree
with me, but do they really agree?
I am not so sure...”it-Outside direc-
tor, company B
This indicates the presence of steward-
ship behavior where the entrepreneur believe
he/she is morally obliged to pursue the shared
interests with the outside director (Caldwell et
al. (2000), as cited in Hernandez [2012]). Thus
the close cooperation to the entrepreneurs may
be a way for the outside director to ensure that
there actually is goal congruence between them.
The CEOs in both company A and company B
picture their outside director as expecting high
demands and timely deliveries, and they both
indicate a goal congruence between themselves
and the outside director. This indicates that the
relationship between the CEOs and the outside
director in company A and B seem to follow
a stewardship model, where the CEOs act as
stewards who’s motives are aligned with the
outside director (Davis et al. [1997]; Hernandez
[2012]). However, the way the outside director
in company A and B expressed that he some-
times needed to give direct orders, demand
timely deliveries and keep control of finan-
cials suggested that his role sometimes took
on a more agency approach, thus the moni-
toring role of the outside director seemed to
vary somehow between agency and steward-
ship monitoring dependent on the situation
and stage in the company.
The outside director and the CEO in com-
pany A seem to have a good relationship where
the main focus was the development of the
company. The CEO did not feel that the out-
side director overruled in strategic decisions,
but that they were coordinated and came to
terms in an open process, as clearly illustrated
in the below statement.
“I think we have a shared under-
standing of how to do business de-
velopment. We are not very dif-
ferent” -CEO company A about the
outside director.
The outside director in company A ex-
plained that his way of monitoring used the
typical Norwegian agreeable model and he
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explained that by using the entrepreneur’s lan-
guage they usually managed to come to terms.
This emphasized the importance of the outside
director’s human capabilities to his monitoring
role. The outside director seemed very aware
of the negative implications of using academic
models to model strategy in company A and
expressed that this would not please the en-
trepreneurs. This is interesting considering
that the CEO both held the role as owner and
board member in company A. Thus the role of
the outside director was to please the owner
at the same time as he should monitor the
strategy for the company’s resources.
In company C the monitoring and control
by the outside director was somewhat different
from company A and B. This might be because
the CEO held the position as chief of director in
company C while the outside director held the
position as chief of director in company A and
B, thus according to an agency perspective the
entrepreneur in this case held the position as
both principal and agent. In company C both
the CEO and outside director expressed that
decisions were usually made with consensus
and the CEO is very clear about his need for
their opinions as stated below.
“... we agree on most things and
they (the board) believe I manage
very well without them, thus I in
reality I do a lot on my own.”-CEO
company C
Still, the CEO emphasized that he wished
he could have more help from the board in
dealing with strategy, which may indicate that
the CEO wanted the board to take on a more
monitoring role. However, a prerequisite for
more board control would probably imply that
the CEO would have to give up some control
and according to agency theory one of the most
important aspects when giving up control is
overcoming the potential information asymme-
try. There appeared to be some information
asymmetry between the CEO and the outside
director of company C as to how much time
the outside director has spent on helping the
CEO in the initial phase. This might be because
the activities in the company has changed or it
might be a consequence of the CEO becoming
better at listening to the opinions of the board.
As the outside director in company C expresses
a need for increased monitoring of established
strategy and objectives compared to before, it
seems as if the company is going through a
change that may set new requirements to how
the monitoring and control of the company is
being performed.
Our discussion indicates that the mon-
itoring and controlling role of the outside
directors might be situational and dependent
on the stage of the venture. The relationship
seems to be driven by frequent mutual social
exchanges between the outside directors and
the CEOs, long-term strategy planning and
affective relationship-centered collaboration,
which has led to the suggestion of the follow-
ing proposition:
Proposition III: Outside directors in early
stage entrepreneurial ventures monitor and control
the company by fostering stewardship behavior.
6.4 The correlation between
resource-adding, legitimacy and
monitoring and control
The outside directors contribution to resources
may be situational and dependent on the stage
of the venture. Our discussion suggests that
from a resource dependence view the out-
side directors may add scarce resources and
increase the competitive advantage by strength-
ening the venture’s internal resources. From
a resource dependence view the outside di-
rectors may procure external resources and
increase the competitive advantage through
co-optation and legitimacy. However, it seems
to be the outside director’s monitoring ability
to exploit opportunities and combine internal
and external resources by exercising leader-
ship, promote learning and increase synergies,
within the venture and between the venture
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and its surroundings, that creates an inimitable
competitive advantage.
7. Conclusion
Our findings show that the outside directors
may contribute to scarce resources by adding
organizational, human and social resources con-
sistent with the resource based view, and also
increase the ventures interaction with its sur-
roundings by co-optation and added legitimacy
in accordance with the resource dependence
view. However, what enables the entrepreneur
to take advantage of resources obtained from
outside directors seems to depend upon the
outside director’s ability to convey knowledge
into a language the CEO understands. Our
findings suggest that the outside directors may
add legitimacy by their reputation, CV, experi-
ence and trustworthy relationships and the legiti-
mating role seemed to be situational and vary
with the stage of the company. The outside di-
rectors seemed to help the ventures with their
monitoring and control of resources by strate-
gically combining internal and external resources
and fostering stewardship behavior. Our findings
indicate that the value-adding role of the out-
side director to these high-growth ventures in
the early-stage may depend upon the stage of
the company and of the extent of the outside
director’s activity in the firm.
8. Empirical contribution
Our case study contribute to insights in the use
of outside directors, an area where there has
been none, or limited, research up till now. The
authors facilitate a greater explanatory power
to how outside directors may strengthen high-
growth ventures at an early stage by fostering
stewardship behavior and strategically com-
bining internal and external resources in or-
der to obtain competitive advantage, and sug-
gest some interesting implications for future
research.
9. Implication for the
entrepreneur
Our findings suggest that the entrepreneur
should strategically seek to acquire outside
directors who possess a knowledge and com-
petence that is complementary to the manage-
ment team in order to strengthen internal re-
sources and leverage the competitive advan-
tage of the venture. As the outside director may
add legitimacy to the venture through his/hers
reputation, CV, former experience and trust-
worthy relationships, the entrepreneur ought
to perform a due diligence on the outside di-
rector in order to evaluate the potential for
obtaining legitimacy. As our findings suggest
that outside directors may foster stewardship
behavior through close cooperation with the
CEO, the entrepreneur should ensure that the
outside director’s expectation to contribution
is aligned with the entrepreneur’s own expec-
tations as to make sure that the outside direc-
tor actually takes his time to work with the
entrepreneur. Our findings suggest that the
resource advantage might depend upon the
outside director’s ability to convey his/hers re-
sources in a way that enables the entrepreneur
to understand. Thus the entrepreneur should
seek to acquire an outside director to whom
the entrepreneur experience a shared under-
standing.
10. Implication for further
research
Our findings suggest that more research
should be conducted on the value-adding
role of outside directors to high-growth en-
trepreneurial firms, as most literature written
about outside directors concern larger com-
panies and because the studies and implica-
tions of high-growth entrepreneurial firms may
differ significantly from other studies dealing
with SMEs. In addition there has been very lit-
tle qualitative research in this area, thus there is
a further need for explorative research within
this field. We further suggest that the outside
director’s value-adding role in high-growth
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ventures at an early stage should be further
investigated in terms of stage theory, since
this theory acknowledges the importance of
research within all stages in a venture due to
the different needs of of resources at different
stages. We further suggest that our three propo-
sitions should be further investigated in terms
of qualitative case studies that enables more
explorative research on the phenomenons.
11. Limitations
Despite the discussed benefits that come from
applying a case study method, this research
method also comes with several challenges.
There is a problem of complexity related to the
embeddedness of the different CEOs and out-
side directors in a wider network and each
actor’s relations and dependence on factors
such as political, technological, spatial, social
and market structures. Such a network depen-
dency can be hard to detect, especially because
it is very difficult to describe a network due to
the limited absorptive capacity of each party.
There is also a problem of time associated
with change. Easton ((1995), p. 419, as cited in
Halinen and Törnroos [2005]) posit that “the
unit of analysis is, by its very nature, dynamic
and susceptible to change”. As the potential
role of the outside directors can be considered
a change process, then the whole range of lon-
gitudinal methods and tools used for process
research should be considered. In order to pro-
vide sufficient descriptions and explanations
of the processes, the time concept should be in-
corporated consistently into the research. Time
in this case could also relate to the maturity
of the venture, and since this article considers
ventures in the early stage, the constraints of
cases have been high-growth entrepreneurial
ventures that have obtained outside directors
in the early stage. Because we have studied the
strengthening role of outside directors in this
paper, a social aspect, we have not considered
aspects such as political, technological and eco-
nomic factors. Thus our theoretical perspective
may have lost some of the complexity of the
outside directors in real-life situations.
In this article there is also a problem as-
sociated with each case’s unique history and
context. Besides, this study is based on sam-
pling of three Norwegian companies seeking
investments, thus the results are hardly statisti-
cally significant. Due to a small geographical
focus and a limited number of cases these re-
sults cannot be regarded as generalizable to
the general population of entrepreneurial ven-
tures and outside directors in the early stage.
Although we took steps to minimize bias from
informants, we cannot be sure that we were
fed subjective portrayals of accounts due to the
close relationships between the outside director
and entrepreneur that might have influenced
the data obtained.
In addition, all interviews and transcrip-
tions were conducted in Norwegian and have
later been translated into English, thus there
might be limitations to the reproduction of
data. However, the authors have ensured that
the meanings of quotes are as explicit in En-
glish as it is in Norwegian.
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Abstract
High growth technology based firms are important for economical development and in order to increase
the supply of these firms, the failure in the market for early stage equity supply need to be addressed.
Investment readiness have been developed as a concept for assessing whether a venture would be ready for
equity finance. However, the concept is poorly defined and lack the entrepreneur’s perspective, lacking a
foundation to explain how investment readiness could be developed, and how it relates to the life cycle of
the venture. In this paper we derive a holistic model giving a continuous and dynamic understanding of
investment readiness, containing investor ready levels, related to the venture’s life cycle. By exploring two
seed stage Norwegian ventures seeking finance we derived an empirical tested model that explain how
information asymmetry and uncertainty affect investment readiness, and how entrepreneurs use social
network ties in order overcome these challenges, effectively providing a ’social’ bridge to the financing gap
in the seed stage.
⇤Thanks to Roger Sørheum for supervision and feedback
†Thanks to Elsebeth Holmen for review and feedback
1. Introduction
High growth technology based firms is a ma-
jor contribution to economical development
and source of new employment (Shane [2009]
and Shane and Cable [2002]). As young
entrepreneurs often are whelth constrained
([Sætre, 2003]) it is recognized that while seek-
ing to exploit significant growth opportunities
these firms need to access appropriate forms
of finance in order to realize their potential
[Mason and Kwok, 2010]. These firms need to
invest heavily in the business in order to start
generating revenues, and positive returns are
expected only after a number of years. The
faster the growth and exploitation of the op-
portunity, the more voracious is the appetite
for cash [Mason and Kwok, 2010]. For ventures
seeking to exploit significant growth opportu-
nities without the ability to fund the growth
from internal generated sources, external eq-
uity funding might be the only source of capi-
tal. However, in order to acquire equity fund-
ing the entrepreneur need to find and convince
an investor to invest in the venture.
While it is widely known that it is impor-
tant for such ventures to get venture capital,
there is little knowledge of the challenges fac-
ing these entrepreneurs in acquiring it. In
addition there is a widely recognized market
failure in the supply of early stage venture
capital (e.g. [Mason and Kwok, 2010], Mason
and Harrison [2004], and Mason and Harrison
[2001]). Especially there is a shortage of ven-
ture capital supply in the seed, start-up and
early growth stages of venture development
(e.g. Aernoudt [2005] and Mason and Kwok
[2010]). There are several numbers of reasons
for this, e.g. inability to overcome informa-
tion asymmetries, investors perceive the risk
higher in the early stages because management
team is inexperienced and has gaps, and the
market and product is unproven [Mason and
Harrison, 2004]. However, according to Ma-
son and Harrison [2004] there is considerable
evidence suggesting that investors have consid-
erable funds available for investing, but decline
proposals because of two main demand-side
weaknesses, namely; 1) a high level of equity aver-
sion amongst the ventures and 2) a low degree of
investment readiness among the ventures seeking
capital. However, Mason and Kwok [2010] and
Mason and Harrison [2001] argues that invest-
ment readiness incorporates both aspects, in
addition to presentation failings. The concept
has mainly been studied from a supply side
perspective and lacks a holistic and compre-
hensive definition. Hence, while the demand
side weakness is argued to be caused by lack
of investment readiness, Mason and Harrison
[2000] argues that the concept in itself need
to be defined and understood in much more
detail.
One particular weakness of investment
readiness is that it lacks a entrepreneur’s per-
spective, which limits the understanding of
both the concept and why it leads to the mar-
ket failing. Mason and Harrison [2000] states
that entrepreneur’s need to identify and plan
for the most appropriate financial and owner-
ship structure for business early, as it is criti-
cal to the potential future success of the busi-
ness. Which essentially means identify and
plan for investment readiness. However, Mason
and Kwok [2010] argues that entrepreneur’s
lack information and advise on the advantages
of raising equity, what it means to be invest-
ment ready, and how to become investment ready.
Hence, they need advise and support in order
to be able to enable this strategy, as (HM Trea-
sury/Small Business Report Service, as cited
in Mason and Harrison [2000]) argues that lack
of knowledge, exacerbated by equity aversion
prevent ventures from reaching it’s potential.
It is apparent that both advisors and investors
would benefit from understanding investment
readiness from the entrepreneur’s perspective.
According to Sapienza and Korsgaard
[1996] some of the most difficult challenges
the entrepreneur has to face is financing the
on-going activities and anticipating the timing
in advance of when the infusion of capital is
needed [Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996]. An-
ticipating the right timing implies knowing
when the venture will be ready for external
equity investment (Sapienza and Korsgaard
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[1996]), effectively benchmarking investors’ cri-
teria against the future readiness of the venture
in assessing when the venture are eligible of
getting infusion of investor funding. External
investors understand the risk involved in fund-
ing such companies, and may add value by
bringing their experience to the team, and give
access to extensive network of buyers, suppli-
ers, and possible joint venture partners (Ma-
son [2005], Douglas and Sheapherd [2002] and
De Clercq et al. [2006]).
For an entrepreneurial CEO the issue of
knowing when the venture is ready for in-
vestment is a complex and multivariable prob-
lem to handle, where both internal and exter-
nal information asymmetry, uncertainty and
knowledge asymmetry increases the complex-
ity. It is apparent that growth seeking ventures
may have huge benefits from getting an in-
vestor on board in helping them reaching their
goals. Despite of information asymmetries
and uncertainty in seed stage of development
(Sørheim et al. [2011];Lahti [2012]), many ven-
tures successfully obtain funding even when
technology and business concept are undevel-
oped (Shane and Cable [2002]; De Clercq et al.
[2006]). Hence, there is a need to investigate
how entrepreneurs obtain funding to exploit
opportunities (Shane and Cable [2002]), essen-
tially exploring how they plan and execute,
effectively coping with information asymmetry
and uncertainty, in order to become investor
ready. More specifically, we take a demand side
perspective of investment readiness, and ex-
plore how entrepreneur’s develop investment
readiness in order to become investor ready
throughout the life cycle of the venture.
The aim of this paper is thus to develop a
more holistic and comprehensive model for in-
vestment readiness, contributing with insights
from the entrepreneur’s perspective, through-
out the venture’s stages of development. By
exploring investment readiness from the en-
trepreneur’s perspective our goal is to better
the understanding of the entrepreneur’s chal-
lenges. We believe that mutual understanding
is a basis for every successful relationship, and
hope that a more balanced perspective on in-
vestment readiness could contribute to this. We
will contribute by building on existing theory
and propose a holistic model of investment
readiness, where the challenges of information
asymmetry and uncertainty are presented and
related to the model, throughout the life cycle
of the venture. We will further suggest an ex-
planation on how the entrepreneur cope and
overcome these challenges in order to plan and
become investor ready when the infusion of
funding is needed.
Hence, the model will contribute on how
entrepreneurs can develop its investment readi-
ness to reach levels of investor readiness along
the venture’s stages of development. However,
focusing on the financing gap in early stage
of development, we will use a case study to
investigate how entrepreneur’s can develop
investor readiness to become investor ready
for early stage equity investment.This will be
done by conducting explorative case interviews
and workshops with two early stage high-
technology Norwegian start-ups seeking in-
vestment. We want to investigate the following
main questions;
1. How do entrepreneur’s plan and develop in-
vestment readiness to become investor ready?
2. How do entrepreneurs cope with information
asymmetry and uncertainty in the process of
becoming investor ready?
Crucial areas to cover will therefore be
how investment readiness relates to the
entrepreneur-Investor relationship, types of in-
vestors, and pre-investment activities. In addi-
tion develop an understanding of the relation
between investor ready and investment readi-
ness, challenges posed by information asymme-
try and uncertainty, and how social networks
could provide solutions to overcome these chal-
lenges.
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2. Research method
2.1 A theory-building case study re-
search design
In this paper our objective is not only to test
the explanatory power of investment readiness
in specific cases, but inductively explore build
on the theory, as it needs to be defined and
understood in much more detail (Mason and
Harrison [2000]). In order to build a theoreti-
cal model of investment readiness, that could
be able to describe the causal interrelations of
the different challenges the entrepreneur faces
when seeking to obtain equity finance, we have
employed a case study research design. Yin
[1989] defines a case study as ‘an empirical
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phe-
nomenon within its real-life context when the
boundaries between phenomenon and context
are not clearly evident and in which multiple
sources of evidence are used” (Yin [1989], p. 23)
and Eisenhardt [1989] has emphasized the po-
tential of case studies to capture the dynamics
of the studied phenomenon. Thus, it is a well-
known research method for exploratory and
theory-building research (Eisenhardt [1989]).
One could say that the author’s started out
inductively in what Eisenhardt [1989] calls the
’traditional’ approach, as the first definition of
the research questions and initial theory was
developed by combining observations from
previous literature, our common sense and ex-
perience as entrepreneurs. However, it had an
actual tie to empirical data as one of the au-
thors worked, both as a entrepreneurial CEO
of an early stage venture his co-founding and
as an informal advisor to another early stage
venture seeking to obtain the first round of
funding. Hence, the research was started with
a solid and intimate grounding in empirical
reality that according to Glaser and Strauss
(1967) (as cited in Eisenhardt [1989]) permits
the development of a testable, relevant, and
valid theory.
Through the initial stages we asked our-
selves how investment readiness was related
to being able to get the right investor at the
right time in the development of the venture.
Hence, we set out to build a model of invest-
ment readiness that would describe the causal
interrelations of the factors affecting the abil-
ity of the venture to become ready for equity
investor funding.
2.2 Developing a new model for in-
vestment readiness
In developing an holistic theoretical model our
approach was inspired by grounded theory, in
that the theory have been grounded in data
and evolved through a continuous interplay be-
tween data collection and analysis Strauss and
Corbin [1994]. After initially starting with the
direction as mentioned above, we used exist-
ing literature on investor readiness, investment
readiness, market failure in the supply of early
stage equity, the entrepreneurs challenges, and
pre-investment process to give direction of the
data collection. Keeping the concepts the ba-
sic unit of analysis we followed the procedure
proposed by Strauss and Corbin [1990], by cod-
ifying the collected data into suitable interre-
lated categories describing the challenges fac-
ing the entrepreneur in aquiring early stage
equity funding.
Throughout the iterative process of data col-
lection and analysis working hypothesis about
the relation between the categories where de-
veloped and verified. The process of invest-
ment readiness was the main concept of anal-
ysis in the cases, and was built into the the-
ory interrelated with other major concepts that
evolved through the process, and proposed as
a theoretical model for investment readiness
(as shown in Appendix B).
Further this model was presented in work-
shops, where all hypothesis of related cate-
gories where systematically tested and selec-
tively coded against investment readiness for
analysis. Hence, providing a basis for redefin-
ing the theoretical concept of investment readi-
ness, its relation to investor ready, development
of ventures, the challenges faced by informa-
tion asymmetry and uncertainty, and solutions
proposed by social network theory. Further,
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the selective coding and analysis of the work-
shops lead to a new empirically derived model
where the evolved important concepts are sys-
tematically related, as presented in section 4.
2.3 Theory-driven case selection
Consistent with Eisenhardt [1989]’s advise on
selecting cases for theory building, we have
strategically selected two cases in order to be
able to replicate and extend the theory of in-
vestment readiness, focusing on how to be-
come investor ready. Especially relevant since
both are in early stage of development, as con-
cepts of investor ready has been focused on
discussions on the failure in the supply of early
stage equity. Both case venture’s selected are
high-technology growth oriented start-ups that
can be categorized as being in the seed stage
of development (using e.g. De Clercq et al.
[2006]), and seeking to fund the development
of their ventures. As both face the challenges
of planning and executing in order to become
investor ready, we argue that they provide in-
valuable empirical data intimately connected
to the demand-side weaknesses proposed as a
reason for failure in the supply of early stage
equity finance.
The case ventures are similar in that they
where founded by first time entrepreneurs,
studying in the same graduating class at NT-
NUs School of Entrepreneurship, where both
started with a conceptual idea approximately
a 1.5 year ago. Both companies also have and
industrial market for their products, which put
some limitations on the study as consumer
market companies are not represented. One
difference may be that customer in for compa-
nies in B2B market may also be potential indus-
trial investors. Another limitation to the case
selection is that neither of the ventures have re-
ceived traditional investor funding, effectively
not providing us with two polarized cases in
terms of success [Eisenhardt, 1989]. However,
one case company have acquired a pre-seed
investor with extensive experience in raising
equity funding. The other has had meetings
with potential seed stage investors during our
research, which might be optimal in address-
ing the issues of investment readiness from the
entrepreneurs perspective.
2.4 Data collection
The data consists of in-depth mapping inter-
views the CEO and CFO in Company A, and
The CFO in Company B, and an in-depth in-
terviw/workshop with the seed-stage investor
of Company B. In addition a local VC was in-
terviewed, which are in the network of both
companies. Each interview lasted on aver-
age 45 minutes and some informants were
interviewed more than once. All intervie-
wees were tape recorded and the interviews
were conducted in the period April 2013 and
June 2013. In addition to interviews, business
plans, organizational charts and partnership
contracts were collected and analyzed. At the
end of the research period two workshops on
the same day with the same powerpoint (see
Appendix B), each lasting approximately1.10
hours was carried out. The interviewees and
participants of the workshops are summarized
and shown in table 2.1 below.
Table 2.1: Sources of the interview data
Startup Interviewee 1 Interviewee 2 Workshop participants
Company A CEO CFO CFO
Company B CEO CFO CEO and CFO
Investor Pre-seed investor (com-
pany B)
Local VC investor
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2.5 Data coding
Data from the first rounds of interview’s were
first coded into a number of categories sug-
gested by the theoretical model proposed by
Yin [1989].
To map the status and plans of the compa-
nies in terms of investment readiness, we used
the following categories.
1. Financial status
2. Attitude towards equity finance
3. Experience in presenting to investors
4. Attitude towards ownership and control
5. Management readiness - Status and plan
6. Market readiness - Status and plan
7. Technology readiness - Status and plan
In order to do cross case comparisons and
analyze the research questions, we used the
following categories.
1. Strategy
2. Process: Characteristics
3. Process: Timing
4. Process: interrelatedness
5. Familiarity and uncertainty
6. Information asymmetry
This also gives a basis for comparison be-
tween the VC and the Pre-Seed investor find-
ings against the case companies.
2.6 Measures to ensure rigor and re-
liability
In order to ensure rigor and reliability we have
used multiple data collection methods, where
we we have triangulated the evidence both in-
ternally casevice in each interview and across
interview and workshop. The use of workshop,
interviews, business plans we where able to
get a good grounding of the theory. The same
interview guide and workshop presentation
where used in both cases, to form a basis of
both within-case analysis as well as ability to
search for cross-case patterns.
It is apparent that the the method has
limitations as both case companies are pre-
investment and can only provide data on how
they perceive the process all the way to close
the deal with an investor. In addition the com-
panies are both early stage, which limits the
explanatory power of the research to the early
stage of development. However, these cases
was consciously chosen as described in section
2.3.
3. Theoretical Development
3.1 Maximizing the Entrepreneur-
Investor Relationship
The advantage of having investors on board
for a venture may be a huge benefit for an en-
trepreneur [De Clercq et al., 2006], both by hav-
ing access to finance and other value adding
resources. However, according to Shepherd
and Zacharakis [2001] the potential is contin-
gent upon being able to establish a open and
trustful relationship. According to De Clercq
et al. [2006] the entrepreneur’s first and most
difficult task in the pre-investment phase is
locating an investor that is willing to invest.
However, this might be a challenge as it is dif-
ficult for the entrepreneur to assess whether
they are investor ready, and time the need for
funding.
Further it is more than just getting capital,
as securing a good relationship implies find-
ing the right investor, where a foundation for a
good match are contingent on complementary
skills, commitment and a potential for a open
and trustful relationship [De Clercq et al., 2006].
The entrepreneur need to find an investor pre-
pared for new investments, complementary in-
dustry preference, a good track record, and
a preferred ’investability’ stage matching the
stage of development of the venture [De Clercq
et al., 2006]. In addition it is important to se-
cure the right amount of money, ideally just
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enough to get to the next development stage
as equity is priced higher the more mature
the venture becomes [De Clercq et al., 2006].
Pricing is difficult in the earlier stages of in-
vestment, which makes it harder for seed and
start-up stage ventures to arrive to a fair and
equitable deal structuring.
According to De Clercq et al. [2006] there
are three major sources of equity finance avail-
able to the entrepreneur, namely business angels
(BAs), classic or professional venture capitalists
(VCs) and corporate venture capitalists (CVCs).
These have important typological differences
in their assessment of the venture, and would
affect the entrepreneur in assessing, develop-
ing and time it’s investor readiness in advance
of when the infusion of funding is needed.
3.2 Types of equity investors
All investor types are generally motivated by
equity growth. However, investors are hetero-
geneous and part of becoming investor ready
is learning how to attract the right investor,
which starts with learning what different types
of equity investors look for [Mason and Kwok,
2010]. One major difference between BAs and
the other two types, VCs and CVCs, is the
fact that BAs are informal, i.e. individuals in-
vesting their own money, and the others are
institutionalized, i.e. incorporated funds, [Os-
nabrugge, 2000]. Hence, using the analogy of
B2C and B2B marketing, selling equity to BAs
could be compared to a B2C sale, when sell-
ing to VC and/or CVC are compared to a B2B
sale. In this lies the fact that BAs could invest
due to idiosyncratic criteria, whereas VCs and
CVCs have to follow strategic firm guidelines
[De Clercq et al., 2006]. According to Mason
[2005] BAs constitute the largest pool of eq-
uity capital available for start-up and emerging
companies in advanced economies. However,
they might be the hardest investor to find, as
the market is often characterized as "invisible".
Hence, regardless of BAs being prone to in-
vest earlier than VCs (De Clercq et al. [2006]),
attracting them might be challenging for the
entrepreneur.
Mason [2005] define BAs as "high net worth
individuals who invest their own money, along with
their time and expertise, directly in unquoted com-
panies in which they have no family connection,
in the hope of financial gain". Where the major-
ity according to Mason [2005] are successful,
cashed out entrepreneurs. Mason and Harri-
son [2000] argue that BAs play an important
role in filling the gap between family, or "proof
of concept" money, and VCs that normally
don’t make as early and small investments.
According to De Clercq et al. [2006] BAs of-
ten invest in Seed stage deals with a strategy of
attracting VCs financing of the Start-up stage.
VCs raise and manage venture capital funds,
from limited partners, that they typically have
available 10 years in order invest in a port-
folio of growth seeking ventures [De Clercq
et al., 2006]. A group of VCs constitute what is
called a Venture Capital Firm and as an indus-
try they invest in all stages (however most in
the start-up and growth stages) and lots of in-
dustries, where the goal is to maximize profits
by equity growth liquidated in a profitable exit
[De Clercq et al., 2006]. CVCs act as a finan-
cial intermediary of a non-financial company,
e.g. a technology company [De Clercq et al.,
2006]. They have both financial and strategical
incentives for investing (De Clercq et al. [2006])
and might be a viable RnD partner, customer,
market channel or supplier for the venture as
a value adding service. Table 3.2 present im-
portant characteristics and differences, that is
important for the entrepreneur’s searching and
targeting potential investors.
According to De Clercq et al. [2006] en-
trepreneurs should be aware that these in-
vestors types represent partly complimentary
and partly overlapping sources of finance, and
are often investing in syndicate deals.
92
Table 3.2: A characterization of the three types of equity finance (Adopted from De Clercq et al. [2006], adjusted with
insights from Mason and Stark [2004] and Denis [2004])
Business Angels (BA) Professional Venture Capi-
talist (VC)
Corporate Venture Capi-
talist (CVC)
Source of funds Investing their own
money
Investing funds of outside
limited partners
Investing corporate funds
Legal form General partnership Private individual Subsidiary (or part of) a
large firm
Typical size of in-
vestment
USD 50k-2M USD 2-10M USD 2-20M
Financing stages Seed and Start-up All stages, mostly Start-up
and later
All stages, later preferred
Geographic
proximity prefer-
ences
Very close proximity is
preferred
Close proximity is pre-
ferred
Proximity less important
Motive for in-
vesting
Equity growth and per-
sonal interest
Equity growth only Strategic value and Equity
growth
Investment crite-
ria
Growth, mentoring
prospect and personality
fit
Growth prospect and
great management
Strategic value and ’fit’
Finding in-
vestors
Easy to find, public avail-
able information
Hard to find, ’invisible
market’
Few, but easy to find
Time to reach
agreement
Lengthy and extensive
due diligence
Relative quick to reach
agreement when ’fit’
Hard to reach ’fit’ require-
ments
Involvement
post-investment
Low to extremely high, in-
formal and operational
Moderate, formal and di-
rect or indirect board par-
ticipation
Low to moderate, infor-
mal or board participation
However, despite the typological differ-
ences, according to De Clercq et al. [2006] the
process an entrepreneur need to carry out prior
to investment essentially consists of the same
six gereric steps; namely:
1. Learning about investors requirements
and identify potential investors
2. Checking referrals
3. Contact investor, whereas the investment
proposal get screened by the target in-
vestor
4. Entrepreneur meet and "pitch" to the in-
vestor
5. Term sheet negotiations and agreement
6. And after the investors due diligence pro-
cess, the last step is Shareholder agree-
ment negotiations and agreement
The entrepreneur need to time the start and
execution of these pre-investment activities, par-
allel to the development of the venture in order
to get the infusion of money when needed.
The process needs to be coordinated with the
investors pre-investment activities, where the
three investor types poses different challenges
in the different steps of the process as noted
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above. Hence, the entrepreneur needs to assess,
plan and coordinate both external and internal
processes in timing the infusion of equity fund-
ing, effectively coordinating their own investor
readiness.
3.3 Defining Investment readiness
investor readiness could according to Douglas
and Sheapherd [2002](p. 222) be defined as
“the ability to attract significant external investor
funding from business angels and/or venture cap-
ital funds”. Hence, suggesting that investor
readiness as a property of a venture could be
developed and evaluated in terms of the degree
of external investor (however, constrained to
BAs and/or VCs) funding that is, or could be,
attracted. However, Douglas and Sheapherd
[2002](p. 222) further state that a venture will
be investor ready “when at least one investor is
willing to invest, and therefore foresees sufficient re-
turn on investment, feels that the risk is at tolerably
low levels, and does not expect to incur excessive
monitoring, due diligence, psychic or opportunity
costs in addition to the cost of purchasing equity
in the venture”. Hence, investor readiness is
to some degree related to specific individual
investors, suggesting that investor readiness
contains levels congruent with being investor
ready. There will always be some investors that
are more willing to invest than others, thus the
entrepreneur’s task will be to assess the in-
vestor readiness of the venture, and further
identify the investors that will be most likely
to see the startup as investor ready [Douglas
and Sheapherd, 2002].
Another related, and somewhat synony-
mous, concept is investment readiness (e.g. Ma-
son and Harrison [2001]; Mason and Harrison
[2004] and Mason and Kwok [2010]), which the
authors interpret as similar to investor readi-
ness, however not constrained to attracting ex-
ternal BA and/or VC funding. That is, we define
investment readiness as "the ability to attract
significant equity funding from internal and/or ex-
ternal investors. Further we re-define investor
ready as "levels of investment readiness reached
when an investor is willing to invest, and therefore
foresees sufficient return on investment, feels that
the risk is at tolerably low levels, and does not ex-
pect to incur excessive monitoring, due diligence,
psychic or opportunity costs in addition to the cost
of purchasing equity in the venture". Starting from
scratch the entrepreneur develops investment
readiness, where the first level is reached the
first time the venture is investor ready.
Mason and Harrison [2001] argues that
investment readiness incorporates three dis-
tinctive dimensions. The first dimension is
the entrepreneur’s attitude towards equity finance,
which relates to the entrepreneurs willingness
to share ownership and control with external
investors. The second dimension is presenta-
tion failings, which relates to shortcomings in
the entrepreneur’s ability to sell the business
case to the investors they target. The third,
and according to Mason and Harrison [2001]
the most fundamental, dimension of invest-
ment readiness relates to the ’investability’ of
the business case. The investability of the busi-
ness case refers to whether or not the business
case meet the requirements of a target investor
[Mason and Kwok, 2010]. Hence, developing
investment readiness and reaching levels in-
corporates three barriers that the entrepreneur
need to overcome.
The entrepreneur’s first barrier is the will-
ingness to trade equity and control in the ven-
ture against the potential contributions of ex-
ternal investors. It is apparent that it would
be difficult for entrepreneurs to give up eq-
uity if they do not know the value of potential
target investors. Essentially this means that
entrepreneurs need to inform themselves and
understand the role and potential value contri-
bution of different sources of finance (Mason
and Harrison [2004]), in order to know if the
equity-investor trade might be profitable and
contributing to the investment readiness of the
venture. Getting the right investor could affect
the equity aversion, as De Clercq et al. [2006]
argues tat the value contribution is contingent
upon establishing a successful cooperative re-
lationship. It is apparent that the direction that
investment readiness is developed is related to
the goals of the venture, and thus the equity
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aversion is connected to goal congruence at
each level.
According to Mason and Kwok [2010] be-
cause entrepreneur’s lack information, or fail
to seek out the information that does exist, they
essentially approach inappropriate investors.
This relates to the second barrier, as learning
how to present the business case in a way that
attracts the target investor is constrained by
any lack of information. According to Mason
and Kwok [2010] investors reject investment
proposals due to lack of information, and/or
poorly made business plans or executed oral
presentations. Mason and Kwok [2010] found
that the entrepreneur’s was perceived as too
focused on product/technology, essentially fail-
ing to sell the whole ’investability’ of the busi-
ness to investors.
The third barrier is developing the business
in such a way that it meets the requirement
of the target investor. According to De Clercq
et al. [2006] there are four stages in the develop-
ment of the venture, related to different types
of financing needs; Seed Financing, Start-up
Financing, Expansion Financing and Buy-out
Financing. Each stage relates to different char-
acteristics of the development of the venture,
potential investor types and reason for funding
as showed in table 3.3 below.
Douglas and Sheapherd [2002] argues that
the investor readiness, or what Mason and Har-
rison [2001] label ’investability’, of the venture
could be broken down in three dimensions; (1)
technology readiness, (2) market readiness and (3)
management team readiness.
1. The venture’s technology readiness devel-
ops and increases as technology are devel-
oped and the concept are proven, as the
know-how and technology get protected,
as prototypes have been built and suc-
cessfully been tested for durability and
reliability, and as new products or ser-
vices can be mass produced at a unit cost
that allows for sufficient profit.
2. The venture’s market readiness increases
as a function of marketing efforts, i.e. as
concepts and prototypes are tested and
matched towards the needs and wants
of the target customer, as pilots are sold,
and as the finished product or service are
sold at quantum. Investors look for busi-
nesses with growth potential, so an im-
portant part of increasing market readi-
ness is verifying that there is a substan-
tial demand in the target market, that are
willing and able to pay at a price that
could give a good return on the invest-
ment.
3. The venture’s management team readi-
ness develops and increases, as the ven-
ture attain and test a management with
the right management acumen, prior re-
lated industry and market experience,
prior start-up experience, and right com-
mitment to launch and growth of the ven-
ture.
According to Douglas and Sheapherd
[2002] many entrepreneurs has felt that it is
indeed ’management ready’ but cannot gain
funding because investors perceive ’holes’ in
the experience and qualifications needed for
the particular venture. Mason and Kwok [2010]
argues that the issues that the entrepreneur
have in assessing and developing it’s invest-
ment readiness essentially relates to informa-
tion failure, caused by an asymmetrical infor-
mation distribution between the entrepreneur
and investor. information asymmetry is thus a
source to a failure in the supply of early stage
venture capital (e.g. Denis [2004] and Aernoudt
[2005]), where venture’s require rigorous ex-
amination to overcome this asymmetry and
become investor ready [Mason and Harrison,
2004].
3.4 Investment readiness, informa-
tion asymmetry and uncertaity
According to Shane and Cable [2002] informa-
tion asymmetry stems from the fact that people
possess different information and beliefs, and
because of this some individuals recognize op-
portunities that other cannot yet see. In an
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article assessing how investors cope with in-
formation asymmetry [Shane and Cable, 2002]
argues that the information possessed by the
entrepreneur creates two problems while seek-
ing external finance.
Table 3.3: Describes investability in terms of financing needs per stage, need for funding and potential types of investors
(De Clercq et al. [2006] and Douglas and Sheapherd [2002])
Seed Financing Start-up Financing Expansion Financ-
ing
Buy-out Financing
Technology (T)
readiess
Proof of concept,
but undeveloped
technology
Prototype ready to
be tested for dura-
bility and reliabil-
ity, ready for initial
marketing
Product tested for
durability and re-
liability and ready
for mass produc-
tion and marketing
Product ready for
mass production at
profitable unit cost
Market (M) read-
iess
Customer need not
verified, business
concept undevel-
oped
Pilot sales have
been carried out,
other marketing
info ready
Several sales,
demand verified,
ready for growth
Revenues gen-
erated with
sustainable profits
Management
team (MT) read-
iess
1-2 entrepreneurs Structure and MT
in place
Organizational ex-
pansion, and MT
tested
Established and
proven MT
Main purpose of
the funding
Enabling technol-
ogy and business
concept develop-
ment
Establish market-
ing and sales activ-
ities
Launch of full
scale markeing
activities
Management BO,
Leveraged BO or
Delisting
Typical equity in-
vestor type
BAs, sometimes
CVCs and VC
VC and CVC,
sometimes BA
VC and CVC VC
First, the entrepreneur might be reluctant to
disclose critical information as this might give
away the competitive advantage [Shane and
Cable, 2002]. Second, the entrepreneurs have
incentives, both financial and psychological,
and ability to engage in opportunistic behavior
as they have information that the investor lack
[Shane and Cable, 2002]. It is apparent that
information asymmetry is highest in the earlier
phases of the EntrepreneurÐInvestor interac-
tion ([Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003]), effectively
contributing to an uncertainty and bounded
rationality (Sørheim et al. [2011]) in creating a
mutually beneficial relationship (Lahti [2012];
Denis [2004]).
Information asymmetry apparently goes
both ways, whereas the entrepreneurs possess
information about themselves and their oppor-
tunities that potential investors do not possess
(Shane and Cable [2002]), and entrepreneurs
lack information about investors requirements
and their value adding potential, e.g. their rele-
vant industry/market experience and network
[Cable and Shane, 1997]. Mason and Kwok
[2010] argues that entrepreneur’s lack informa-
tion and advise on the advantages of raising
equity, what it means to be investor ready, and
how to become investor ready. Thus, taking
an entrepreneur’s perspective on information
asymmetry it is apparent that they face recip-
rocally the same two problems as investors do
when seeking external finance. Investors might
be reluctant to disclose critical information, e.g.
on their actual commitment to support the ven-
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ture getting to the next stage, and the investor
also have incentives, both financial and psy-
chological, and the ability to engage in oppor-
tunistic behavior as they have information that
the entrepreneur lack Cable and Shane [1997].
Effectively, information asymmetry causes un-
certainty that affects the entrepreneur’s ability
to develop its investment readiness to a level
of investor ready.
The information asymmetry between the
entrepreneur and investor also partly gener-
ate, or is partly generated by, a knowledge
specificity between the two [Cable and Shane,
1997]. Knowledge specificity means that the
two parties specialize in the development and
contribution of different types of knowledge,
allowing each party to exploit its comparative
advantage in their respective fields [Cable and
Shane, 1997]. Entrepreneurs specialize in rec-
ognizing and exploiting opportunities and the
day-to-day development of new business ac-
tivities, whereas the investors specialize in cre-
ating networks of individuals and institutions
to reduce the cost of acquiring capital, to find
customers and suppliers, and establish the ven-
tureÕs credibility [Cable and Shane, 1997]. Ca-
ble and Shane [1997] argues that the two parts
are complementary to each other, thus mak-
ing a good foundation for a profitable collab-
orative relationship. However, the knowledge
asymmetry could result in difficulties in un-
derstanding each other which might explain
some of the difficulties for entrepreneurs to
become investor ready. Effectively, underlining
the importance of getting the right investor fit-
ting the venture’s stage in development of its
investment readiness.
The challenge of finding a willing and
complementary investor is related to the en-
trepreneur’s ability to a assess and present
the ’investability’ of the venture, and hence
related to the financing stages. According to
Lahti [2012] and Shane and Cable [2002] in-
formation asymmetry is highest in the earliest
stages of development, where Lahti [2012] ar-
gues that it decreases, as evidence on investa-
bility becomes more tangible when the venture
matures. It is apparent that tangible evidence,
such as a working prototype of the product,
would increase the entrepreneur’s ability to
present the business case towards investors.
According to Sørheim et al. [2011] investors’
lack of familiarity with the venture, and/or
the intangible characteristics of the venture’s
in the earlier phases, leads to uncertainties re-
lated to the perceived investability. Hence, one
could argue that presentation failings of the
entrepreneur is related to the investors per-
ceived uncertainty of the investability of the
venture. As investors only deal with levels of
risk, i.e. when all possible outcomes are known,
(Sørheim et al. [2011]) the lack of investment
readiness effectively causes the financing gap
in the supply of early stage venture capital (Ma-
son and Kwok [2010]), as shown in table 3.4.
Hence, the challenge for the entrepreneurial
venture’s is to transform the venture, character-
ized by perceived levels of uncertainty related
to market, technology and management team
readiness, to the level where investors can eval-
uate the venture with a rational risk assessment
[Sørheim et al., 2011]. Effectively this relates to
all three dimensions of investment readiness,
as they affect the ability to become investor
ready.
As investors look for investment opportu-
nities within industries they have prior knowl-
edge and network (e.g. Mason [2005]) in order
to limit this information asymmetry and un-
certainty, entrepreneurs should do the same.
It is apparent that familiarity, i.e. reduced
knowledge asymmetry, and reduced informa-
tion asymmetry would help the entrepreneur
in presenting the case to investors, effectively
reducing the perceived uncertainty. Hence,
given that the investability is at a seed level, the
right seed investor could contribute in order to
make the venture investment ready for start-up
financing ([De Clercq et al., 2006]), effectively
increasing the ventures investment readiness.
Table 3.4 summarizes the effects of information
and knowledge asymmetry in relation to fi-
nancing stage, together with the investors’ pos-
sible contribution to investment readiness and
their desired return. Hence, relating investabil-
ity, presentation failing and equity aversion to
the financing stages.
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Table 3.4: Describes information asymmetry and perceived risk in terms of phases, main benefit investor might add and
the entrepreneur’s main challenge per phase (De Clercq et al. [2006], Sørheim et al. [2011] and Lahti [2012])
Seed Financing Start-up Financing Expansion Financ-
ing
Buy-out Financing
Information
asymmetry level
Very high Rather high Medium low
Investors per-
ceived risk level
Uncertainty Rather high Medium low
Investors desired
return
80-100 per cent 40-70 per cent 25-40 per cent 20 per cent
Main investor ex-
pertise and bene-
fit beyond money
Structure, disci-
pline, sounding
board, attraction
of additional (ex-
ternal) funding
and technological
insights
Marketing expe-
rience, recruiting,
contacts, attract
follow-on financ-
ing, Technology
insights, test
marketing and pi-
loting. Reputation
benefits
Marketing expe-
rience, recruiting,
contacts, follow-
on financing,
plan and execute
exit. Technology
insights, test
marketing and pi-
loting. Reputation
benefits
Legal and other
expertise how to
execute a buy-out
deal.
Investability con-
tribution poten-
tial
TR +++, MTR +++,
MR+++
TR++, MTR++,
MR++
TR+, MTR+, MR+ TR, MTR, MR
As the table shows, investors might increase
the investability level of ventures, effectively
increasing its investment readiness. However,
low investability and information asymmetry
also implies that the entrepreneur have to give
up more equity [De Clercq et al., 2006]. Hence,
entrepreneurs would benefit from improving
the investability benchmarked against getting
ready for the right investor. Mason and Har-
rison [2001] and Mason and Kwok [2010] ar-
gues that professional advisors facilitating in-
vestor readiness programmes have the poten-
tial of improving the general investment readi-
ness level of early stage venture’s, however
these are expensive and ’anyways’ require that
the entrepreneur know what they do not know
[Mason and Kwok, 2010]. Lahti [2012] found
that all types of advisors, e.g. friends, teach-
ers, lawyers, accountants, board members etc.
had a positive effect on reducing the informa-
tion asymmetry and investors perceived un-
certainty, especially in the early stages of de-
velopment. Hence, a bootstrapping solution
for the entrepreneur to cope with information
asymmetry in its development of investment
readiness could be to use advisors in their so-
cial network.
3.5 Investment Readiness and So-
cial Ties
According to Uzzi and Gillepsie ([1999], p.33,
as cited in Shane and Cable [2002]) social ties,
both direct and indirect, interject expectations
of trust and reciprocity into the economic ex-
change that, in turn, activate a cooperative
logic of exchange. This logic promotes the
transfer of private information. [Shane and
Cable, 2002] define a direct tie as "a personal re-
lationship between a decision maker and and the
party about whom the decision is being made". Fur-
ther, an indirect tie is defined as "a relationship
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between two individuals who are not directly con-
nected but through whom a connection can be made
through a social network of each party’s direct ties"
(Burt, 1987 as cited in Shane and Cable [2002]).
According to Shane and Cable [2002] both di-
rect and indirect ties can provide an advantage
to people who seek to obtain resources from
others, while being under conditions of uncer-
tainty and information asymmetry. Hence, so-
cial ties would help entrepreneur’s develop its
investment readiness achieving right investor
ready levels along the way.
[Shane and Cable, 2002] supports that the
information asymmetry and uncertainty is
highest in the seed phase, and argue that in-
vestors are unable to make contracts that cope
with the risk associated with this phase. How-
ever, many entrepreneurs have successfully
obtained VC (Shane and Cable [2002]), CVC,
and/or BA (De Clercq et al. [2006]) funding in
this phase, suggesting that there are ways in
coping with the information asymmetry and
uncertainty. Osnabrugge [2000] argues that
VCs perform an extensive screening to over-
come the information asymmetry before set-
ting a perceived secure contract, whereas BAs
are more prone to rely on incomplete contracts,
and a more active ’hands-on’ involvement in
the venture. However, both VCs (Shane and Ca-
ble [2002]) and BAs Sørheim [2003] use social
ties extensively to cope with the information
asymmetry affecting their investment decision.
It is thus apparent that both economic and so-
cial embedded solutions are applied to some
degree in the pre-investment process. In or-
der to reach the optimal contract, information
asymmetry needs to be limited (Osnabrugge
[2000]), where social ties are used as an effec-
tive device to overcome uncertainties prior to
forming the contract. Hence, the entrepreneur
would benefit from actively using the network
to get access to private information and repu-
tation about the investor.
De Clercq et al. [2006] stresses the impor-
tance of getting the right investor at the right
time in order to achieve the full benefits of eq-
uity finance and secure continuous growth. Ef-
fectively, continuously developing investment
readiness by getting and timing for the right
investor ready level along the way. However,
there are limits to the amount of investors the
entrepreneur are able to meet, and as ’over
shopping’ might have a negative effect on
the funding decision the entrepreneur is con-
strained in it’s ability to find and assess po-
tential investors. According to Lahti [2012]
advisors decrease information and knowledge
asymmetry, thus increasing investment readi-
ness by educating, aligning expectations and
mediating contact to the right investor for
the venture [Lahti, 2012]. Effectively advi-
sors, both formal and informal as mentioned
above, are able to reduce information asymme-
try and uncertainty by helping entrepreneur’s
to build investment readiness, e.g. polishing
business plans and ’pitch’ (Lahti [2012]), and
may give the entrepreneur an indirect tie medi-
ating contact between the entrepreneur and the
investors, e.g. reducing perceived uncertainties
in the investability of the project. Effectively,
limiting the problems in reaching the right in-
vestor ready levels of investment readiness.
The network an important screening de-
vice, assisting in processing of information that
keeps the entrepreneur up-to-date on devel-
oping opportunities (Burt,1992, p. 14 as cited
in Shane and Cable [2002]), effectively a tool
for the entrepreneur in building investment
readiness. It is apparent that advisors might
provide some of the investability contributions
as mentioned in table 3.4 above, where Lahti
[2012] argue that they have largest effect in
early stages, effectively increasing the value of
the venture ensuring a better potential for an
fair an equitable deal. It is apparent that an
investor, e.g. at level 1, also might function
as an advisor developing the investment readi-
ness towards investor ready level 2. Hence,
building network should be viewed as part of
developing investment readiness, throughout
the stages of development, towards realizing
the potential of the venture.
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4. Proposed Theoretical Model
for Investment Readiness
In this section we present the theoretical model
for investment readiness based on finding from
initial mapping interviews and the reviewed
literature in section 3. This is used to analyze
and discuss the research questions in section
6 in light of the empirical findings that are
presented in section 5 below.
We have defined investment readiness as
"the ability to attract significant equity funding
from internal and/or external investors. Further
we have re-defined investor ready as "levels of
investment readiness reached when an investor is
willing to invest, and therefore foresees sufficient re-
turn on investment, feels that the risk is at tolerably
low levels, and does not expect to incur excessive
monitoring, due diligence, psychic or opportunity
costs in addition to the cost of purchasing equity in
the venture". We have discussed the importance
of attaining the right.
Investment readiness increases as the in-
vestability is developed through the develop-
ment stages of the venture. There are differ-
ent types of potential investors interested in
different stages of investability related to the
different levels of investment readiness, e.g. in-
vestor ready for seed stage investability. In
order to reach a level of investor ready the
entrepreneur need to identify, check referrals,
contact and pitch for the potential investor, ne-
gotiate and reach agreement on term sheets,
and lastly get through the due diligence pro-
cess to the last step of negotiating and reach a
shareholder agreement. In section 3 its argued
that the venture faces information asymmetry
and uncertainty with varying intensity along
the stages of development of its investment
readiness, that affect equity aversion, presen-
tation failings and levels of risk associated to
the investability, in the process of becoming
investor ready.
In developing investment readiness
throughout the life cycle of the venture it
is necessary to reach levels of investor ready
along the way in order to exploit the potential
of the venture as the venture are unable to
fund the growth by internal resources alone.
The direction of the investability of the venture
is affected by each level of investor ready, thus
it is important to screen and be able to get
ready for the right investor levels along the
way. This affects the valuation of the equity,
thus in becoming investor ready it is important
to ask for the right amount of money, and get a
fair and equitable deal structuring. Ideally the
have the right amount of money is the amount
that get the venture to the next financing stage,
as equity is priced low in the early stages of
investment readiness. In getting a fair and
equitable deal structuring it is important to
reduce any information asymmetry and risk
related to the investabilty of the venture in
order for the investor to be able to make a
rational and fair assessment of the investment
readiness of the venture.
Hence, investment readiness is a continu-
ous process and a property of the venture that
have levels of investor ready along the way. It
develops through financing stages, which in-
corporates activities of developing investability
and interrelated pre-investment activities that
need to be coordinated and timed in order to
reach levels of investor ready. Figure 4.1 below
is an example snap shot of the demand-side
structure of the investment readiness process
of becoming investor ready for the Start-up Fi-
nancing stage, effectively reaching a Start-up
Financing level of investor ready.
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Figure 4.1: Snap shot illustrating the structure of a venture’s development of investment readiness towards the level of
investor ready for start-up financing stage
Accoring to the theory developed it is ap-
parent that the process of developing invest-
ment readiness is not as structured and lin-
ear as illustrated in figure 4.1, as both pro-
cesses are mutually dependent and affected by
information-, knowledge asymmetry and un-
certainty. The process-model arguably need to
incorporate information transfer mechanisms
between the entrepreneurs and investors as
the demand-side development of investment
readiness need incorporates both the timing
and execution of both processes, i.e. building
inevitability parallel to timing the start of the
pre-investment process As there are no con-
tractual relation between potential investors
and entrepreneurs in the reinvestment process
theory suggest that the entrepreneur’s use net-
work ties to assess, time and execute the de-
velopment of investment readiness, reaching
the right levels of investor readiness by over-
coming equity aversion, presentation failings
and ensuring a match between investability
and investor criteria. By addressing our re-
search questions we effectively test the pro-
posed model, and investigate how the process
is executed.
5. Presentation of case study
findings
In this section we present our empirical find-
ings. First we present a VCs and the pre-seed
investors view on the best way a venture can
become investor ready. Followed by a presen-
tation of the case companies related to the fol-
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lowing structure: 1) Financial status, equity
aversion and presentation skills, and 2) status
and plan for investability.
This will serve as a background for analyz-
ing and discussing how the case companies
plan and develop their investment readiness,
and cope with potential challenges, in order
to become investor ready. It will also provide
a basis for analyzing the differences between
the companies, and compare their strategy to-
wards the investors’ view of the process of
becoming investor ready. We will then use this
background, combined with discussions from
workshops carried out on analyzing the theo-
retical model together with each case company,
to present an emirical model for investment
readiness.
5.1 The VCs view on Investor
Ready
"It would be optimal for us to have the chance to
follow the venture for about 2-3 years prior to in-
vesting, because some teams achieves some of the
things they set out to achieve, whereas some don’t,
and the best way to pick up on this is to follow
the team as they develop the venture". Table 5.5
describes how a new contact is established and
assessed in their development of becoming in-
vestor ready from the VCs perspective, and
how it is related to the VCs perceived risk.
Table 5.5: Describes the VCs view on the development of investment readiness of early stage venures, into becoming
investor ready
Coding category Local Venture Capitalist
Familiarity and
uncertainty
The risk asociated with the investment is reduced as a function of how long we have
known the venture
Strategy Meet ventures early in their development, even though they are too early in terms of
investability criteria. By this the VC get to know the team and their plans, so that
they could follow the company until they are mature enough for investment
Typical process:
1) Initial meeting
Either the meeting is initiated by the entrepreneur, or by the VC. Contains a walk
through of the industry of the venture, the technology, markets they are working
towards and what the plans are in relation to the different needs they face. The VC
give advise to the plan. If the venture is interesting, but not yet ready in terms of
maturity, the VC ask to be kept informed about the development
Typical process:
2) Pitch meeting
Usually the companies return after 1-2 years, as they assess themselves as matured
to the next stage in develpment, and want to discuss wheter they are ready for
investment. In this meeting the VC review the plans they initially proposed in order
to assess if the venture have managed to reach the milestones of the plan or not.
5.2 The Pre-Seed Investor’s Strategy
on becoming Investor Ready
"If you are going to get VC funding for example,
then the value of the equity is a decisive factor -
and what would bring value for the VC - that you
are able to reduce the risk. Reduced technology risk
and reduced marked risk. The technology risk is
reduced as prototypes are tested, as you are able to
show something that works - show something that
works and get someone to document that something
works. On the market side it’s all about pilot cus-
tomers and get someone that could vouch for that
this works - and say something, or show that the
customer value is great". He draws a model on
the white board as illustrated in figure 5.2 be-
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low and states "This is the story you need to
draw when you are approaching an investor".
Figure 5.2: Picture that the Pre-Seed investor drew on
the white board illustrating the story en-
trepreneurs need to draw when approaching
investors
Figure 5.2 show each stage contains mile-
stones on both technology and market, which
could be e.g. prototype ready and paying pilot
customer respectively, and within each stage
the organization/team need to reflect sufficient
capabilities to achieve this. The story need to
be trustworthy, i.e. that the team in each stage
have the necessary qualities and capabilities to
match what need to be done in order to get to
the next stage. The story needs to adhere in
and over all stages. "Then there is the bottom line
-that much cash is needed in each stage in order to
achieve this". By doing this the entrepreneur
know what the venture need, the bottom line
shows what funding is needed. Each stage rep-
resent a value adding milestones, which will
be reflected in the value of the equity. "The
other side of this [what you need] is the value of the
company at each milestone, what price would you
get from the investor? As a strategy the pre-seed
investor suggest spending time on reaching
the milestones and look for opportunities of
soft funding that the entrepreneur can match
against the investors contribution.
5.3 Mapping of the Case Compa-
nies’ Investment Readiness
The following subsection provides a mapping
of Company A and B in terms of their financial
status and the three dimensions of investment
readiness. The first part is coded in terms of the
two first dimension of investment readiness,
namely attitude towards equity and presenta-
tion skills. The second part is coded in terms of
the third dimension, investability, where status
and plan for each company is presented.
5.3.1 Attitude towards equity and presenta-
tion skills
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 gives the mapping, of respec-
tively Company A and B, in terms of financial
status and plan, their attitude towards equity
finance and different investor types, their expe-
rience in presenting the business to investors,
and their attitude towards ownership and con-
trol. By this we provide a broad background
for analyzing the first two dimensions of in-
vestment readiness of the companies.
5.3.2 investability - Status and Plan
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 maps respectively Company
A and B, in terms of the status and plan for
further development of their investability, i.e.
their management team, market and technol-
ogy readiness. Hence, providing a background
for analyzing the fundamental part of invest-
ment readiness. As the investability is related
to potential investors’ criteria, it may be viewed
as the most fundamental dimension as men-
tioned in section 3.3.
6. Analysis and Discussion
In this section we analyze and discuss how the
entrepreneurs plan and develop investment
readiness, overcoming information asymme-
tries and uncertainties, in order to become in-
vestor ready.
Using the theoretical model for as pro-
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Table 5.6: Mapping of attitude towards equity finance and presentation experience of Company A
Coding category Results Company A
Financial status The company has gained approximately 5 MNOK in soft funding. The financials
can keep the business running in 0,5-1 year (dependent on some soft funding they
may get), hopefully enough to develop the technology and prove the concept. Plan
to approach several investors in order to evaluate different alternatives, as the "worst
case" is that they need equity funding within february 2014. They plan to obtain a
mix of 45% soft funding and the rest from customer and investor funding. Estimate
a need for 15 MNOK for building a demo product
Attitude towards
equity finance
The management team (mgt) wish to obtain a VC or industrial investor (CVC or
funding from industrial partner) within a year, but they first need to convince the
inventing co-founder. While the mgt team rush to develop the technology to reach
the window of opportunity before it closes, the inventing co-founder has plenty of
time. The mgt do not wish to rush the investment search and take hasty conclusions,
but rather evaluate several investors as they go along. However, this is difficult since
the company will be running out of cash eventually. " We don’t have a choice, we
need cash to develop the prototype". Ties have already been established between
the team and one VC and two CVCs. The CFO believes it will be easier to obtain
funding from a CVC or an industrial partner at an early stage, since these investors
are perceived more risk avers. The CFO also prefer CVC or industrial investors as
these could add both market and technical value in addition to covering some of
the development cost, but the most important investor criteria is that there is goal
congruence between the investors and the entrepreneur team.
Attitude towards
ownership and
control
Company A has until now survived on soft funding and they wish to wait as long as
possible before acquiring investors in order to increase the valuation of the company
so that the equity will be worth more. However, in order to get a full scale prototype
developed and tested they need to acquire equity funding as the development is
capital intensive. The attitude towards giving up ownership and control is diversified
in the team, where e.g. the inventing founder is reluctant to give away ownership
and control in his "baby". The management team have a "pragmatic view" as they
perceive investor funding as more of a necessity. Today the the management team
has more shares in the company than the board of directors, but the decision control
on the board is balanced. If the company acquires an investor, the management team
hopes to acquire a new CEO with extensive industry experience. Goal congruence
and personal fit is important criteria for the entrepreneurs when assessing investors,
where the CFO states "you can say what you want, but are you going to have a person
in your board it needs to be a likable person".
Experience from
investor presen-
tations
The company have experience in presenting for investors at several business plan
competitions, where they was awarded first price in a national competition this year.
In addition they have made initial presentations for one VC and two CVCs. During
competitions they present the whole business case, but do not wish to disclose any
technical details in investor meetings if the investor refuses to sign a non-disclosure
agreement (NDA). The initial meetings are mostly used to tell investors about the
team, achievements, the customer, market, value proposition, business model and
critical milestones to achieve, without mentioning any technical details. However, as
VC was part of the jury in a business plan competition he already knew the technical
details in their first "introduction meeting". Anyways the focus and feedback from
investors is mostly on market and industry, where technology was perceived as "risk
free" as the industry professionals from the advisory team vouches for the feasibility
of the technology. They perceive special risk in meetings with CVC as they have
the capabilities of "steeling the tech", but sometimes it is necessary to disclose some
information in order to discuss the technology and potential areas of application
with the CVCs. The CFO plan to present to more CVCs than VCs and believes that
initial meetings and presentations is a good way of identifying potential investors
and a relationship-building activity with the investor.
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Table 5.7: Mapping of attitude towards equity, finance and presentation experience of Company B
Coding category Results Company B
Financial status The company has received 3 million in soft funding. They estimate that they need
infusion of funding in February 2013 in order to sustain growth. The CFO estimates
that the company need 4-10 MNOK in funding over the next 2 years to reach
the current goals. The team is now searching for a industrial customers that is
willing to fund the development of the technology. This is a deal partly financed
by governmental soft funding, the company and customer funding, where the
customer’s get exclusive rights to use the technology in applications for increased
production qvotas. It will effectively give 1.5 MNOK and is due to be signed in june
2013.
Attitude towards
equity finance
The entrepreneurs are open to equity finance and have already assessed some poten-
tial investors. They already have a Pre-Seed Investor as a co-founder, which they view
as part of the team. As the venture have developed the CFO have experienced that
the value adding of the Pre-Seed Investor has increased congruently, as he brings a
lot of industry experience and contacts. Through the network of the Pre-Seed investor
a bank have approached the company in order to introduce them to a business angel
network. However, they believe they can manage a less expensive investment process
if the deal with the industrial customer is closed. The entrepreneurs believe that the
company will be more fitting with VC criteria if they can create more products, as
they believe their market potential of the first product is to small for VCs. They are
reluctant to approach investors because they feel this could give away their bargain-
ing position. Instead they will try to get an introduction or wait for the investors to
approach them, through word of mount and/or publicity in media. They believe
angel investors or smaller VCs would be the best fit, investability vs. criteria vise,
at the time being. Still, the management team has ties to several VCs and CVCs in
Norway, bot direct and indirect through their Pre-Seed investor. Especially they have
good relation to a industrial partner that they are considering as a potential equity
investor. The entrepreneurs evaluates a two-step investment model that would give
better conditions for the team in round two, but they reflect on that this also induces
a higher risk.
Attitude towards
ownership and
control
The entrepreneurs are willing to give away control if they acquire a VC, but this
should imply that it is the right investor with expertise to make the company "fly".
The entrepreneurs still do not want to give away too much control and try to be as
little dependent of investors as possible. The entrepreneurs state that if they don’t
feel that the investors understand them in terms of strategy and vision, this may give
them cold feet. The entrepreneurs’ criterion to equity funding is that they contribute
with enough capital in order to accomplish something the entrepreneurs believe is
reasonable compared to their loss of control in the company. Personal fit criteria is
valued high, and involvement is positive only contingent on whether the investor
have complementary skills and ability to add value
Experience from
investor presen-
tations
The team have extensive national and international experience from presenting their
business case to investors, and have won several business plan competitions that
have contributed with around 1MNOK of the soft funding they have received. They
have met and presented to several investors at informal networking events, but
have not had any "formal" contact with potential investors yet. They believe that
the presentation and approach depends on the investor type, as they reflect on
BAs as more informal and with a individual interest, than VCs which are more
professional. The Pre-Seed Investor takes care of most investor screening through
his network, but the entrepreneurs plan to create direct ties this autumn. The
entrepreneurs always participate in all meetings with industrial partners (some of
which are viewed as potential equity investors). They state that they have learned
a lot about communication in these processes that will help them in a potential
pre-investment process.
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Table 5.8: Mapping of management team, market and technology readiness company A
Coding category Results Company A
Management
readiness
Status: The daily operations is performed by a team consisting of 6 young en-
trepreneurs: CEO, CFO, CMO, and CTO plus two technical engineers. The en-
trepreneurial team has worked approximately 1,5 year on the concept and has
already won an eminent business plan competition. The team has no previous
business or industry experience, but the whole team have relevant masters degrees in
their respective fields. They have gathered experienced members to both the board of
directors and advisor board, which provides advise and industry experience, network
and expertise. Oh the board of directors they have a member that have 20 years of
management and business development experience in the industry. On the advisory
board the company has 5 highly regarded advisors from the industry, university and
research institutions, with extensive industry and technology experience. They have
several industry partners, where one partner states "(...) we believe that the team will
manage to create a success of [Company A]."
Plan: The entrepreneurial team is now searching for an external member as the
chief of directors and is looking for someone with extensive experience in business
development. Plan to prove and build their mgt capabilities further by reaching
milestones on technology and market.
Market readiness Status: Customer feedback and market analysis have indicated that the company is
global with an emerging market due to Emission Control Areas (ECA) regulations
imposed by government that will take effect in year 2015-2016. There is a broad
agreement among authorities and industry actors that the market is emerging rapidly,
but right now the entrepreneurs describe it as the calm before the storm. One industry
professional state that "(...) have no doubt that there will be considerable customer
funding available when the technical development is one step further". Other cus-
tomers state that the solution is "spot on and the best solution I have seen". It is a
vital part of energy supply chain infrastructure, where the value prop of Company
A’s solution is strong as they solve the problem of existing solutions "expenses are
too high, and we are currently out of options". However, the market is conservative
and may take 2-5 years before the market is ready for the technology. According
to the mgt team the biggest risk the company face is associated with suppliers and
customers.
Plan: Feedback from customers and investors show that the entrepreneurs need to
do further cost analysis, value chain analysis, and stronger and quantified value
proposition. The team plan to apply for an Industrial research and development
Contract (IRD), with a piloting customer within this year. They are currently negoti-
ating with several industrial customers about this deal. The investors also wanted.
Currently they have a letter of intent of a customer in piloting the solution full scale.
Technology
readiness
Status: The company currently has greatest focus on technical development. First
miniature prototype has been developed and tested, which has led to some adjust-
ments and the advisory board have verified that the concept works. The venture is
now working on concept 2.0 and hope to develop a full scale prototype in about a
year, but the development process depends on subcontractors’ priorities. The product
time and cost intensive to develop and customers require a high degree of accuracy
and testing. The company need funding, suppliers, and customers in order to be able
to test the product full scale for durability and reliability. The technology in it self is
according to the management team "risk free", however it is dependent on suppliers
and other industrial in order to be ready for mass production at a profitable unit cost.
Investors wanted risk analysis on these costs, and said that the solution needed to be
patented in order to be relevant.
Plan: The company plan to perform risk analysis and concept certifications from a
neutral third party before they can start to build the full scale prototype. The company
plan to file for patent and are very cautious with trade secrets. Subcontractors need
to make calculations and set up a production line. This could in best case scenario
take half a year, but the process could be slowed down due to demands from big
clients. Since company A is a minor start-up this induces a great risk.
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Table 5.9: Mapping of management team, market and technology readiness company A
Coding category Results Company B
Management
readiness
Status: The daily operations is performed by a team consisting of 3 young en-
trepreneurs: CEO, CFO, CTO and another technical developer. In addition the
team receive business development and coaching from two representatives from the
Pre-Seed investor. They have outsourced some of the technical development to close
partners that is experts in respective fields. Besides the Pre-Seed Investors the team
has no previous business or industry experience, but the whole team have relevant
masters degrees in their respective fields. The entrepreneurial team has worked
approximately 1,5 year on the concept and has already won several eminent business
plan competitions. The CEO and CFO work closely together with the Pre-Seed
investors who bring relevant industry and business development expertise, and an
extensive network of relevant contacts. They have also formed a big network of
advisors consisting of research institutions and industry actors. On their advisory
board they have according to themselves "the go to guy in the industry".
Plan: The entrepreneurs plan to acquire a professional chief of directors, preferably
a leader in a former industry-relevant company who can bring hands-on experience
to the venture. They also plan to acquire an experienced salesperson who can lay
down a strategy and boost marketing. The management team plan to take care of all
project management and through that prove and build their mgt capabilities further
by reaching milestones on technology and market.
Market readiness Status: feedback from customers show that the product is needed because it is a
solution to a severe problem in the industry. Customers have shown interest since
day 1, where the company have developed strong customer and distribution partner
relationships during development. The product will solve a problem of industry
growth, as it solves a problem causing the government to limit the production
quotas of Company Bs customers. With the technology the government may grant
additional production quotas that enables customers to profitably scale it’s production.
Company B is in the last rounds of negotiation with industry partners and customers
for an Governmentally supported Industrial research and development Contract
(IRD) which will provide 1,5 MNOK in customer funding from pilot customers.
Market potential is estimated to 250-300MNOK a year. The team assess that they will
not be market ready for VC funding before they have a portfolio of product. They
expect to be ready for small VCs, relevant CVCs and BAs in february
Plan: The team is planning to confirm market readiness to the next stage by obtaining
the IRD (set to close in June 2013), where the potential partners will be given
exclusivity to the use of the technology in their production quotas applications. In
addition they plan to hire a thrid party research institute to document and test the
effect of using the product - effectively a report stating "this is what you would get
by buying our product". The company aim to be ready for marketing of the first
product in Q1 2014.
Technology
readiness
Status: The team has focused on technology development for 1.5 years and has
now developed the first working "part-product-prototype" and tested in in use at
customer location. They have patented the central pars of the concept. Since the
production line for the prototype is the same as for the full scale product they have
effectively tested the production process with industrial partners and verified that
the product may be produced without extensive investment or alterations to the
existing production process. One of the largest independent research organizations
in Scandinavia has produced a report based on analysis of the materials used in the
product and has thus given a third party evaluation of the technology. They have
also successfully tested the
Plan: The plan is to iterate on this prototype in order to develop a full scale pilot
together with their partners ready for launch in customers production at scale in
Q2 2014. The entrepreneurs aim to develop a support infrastructure and test the
electronics needed with the prototype in order to reduce the time until testing. They
plan to patent other parts of the solution, that will lead to interesting opportunities.
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posed in section 4 we first investigate how en-
trepreneurs plan and develop "their ability to
attract significant equity funding from inter-
nal and/or external investors". Focusing on
external investors as both case companies are
developing theirs investment reediness, in or-
der to reach levels where an external investor is
willing to invest, effectively becoming investor
ready. Thus, we seek to understand how the en-
trepreneurs plan and develop their investment
readiness so that the target investor "foresees
sufficient return on investment, feels that the
risk is at tolerably low levels, and does not
expect to incur excessive monitoring, due dili-
gence, psychic or opportunity costs in addition
to the cost of purchasing equity in the venture".
Second we investigate how entrepreneurs cope
with information asymmetry and uncertainty
in the process, as these factors affect the ability
to become investor ready. Lastly, we review
the model presented in 4 and propose a model
of how the process of developing investment
readiness, and its challenges.
6.1 How entrepreneurs plan and de-
velop investment readiness to
become investor ready
In this section we will seek to test the the-
oretical model in analyzing and discussing
how entrepreneurs plan and develop invest-
ment readiness to become investor ready. We
start by analyzing the case companies’ status
and plan for investment readiness by adopting
an ’demand-side’ view using the theoretical
model proposed in section 4. Effectively, us-
ing the model to capture a snapshot of the
entrepreneurs’ perception of the current de-
velopment of investment readiness in respec-
tively Company A and B. Further, we will do a
comparative analysis and discussion of Com-
pany A and Bs’ strategy for developing invest-
ment readiness and the perceived characteris-
tics, timing, and interrelatedness of the process
of developing investment readiness towards
becoming investor ready. By doing this we in-
vestigate how entrepreneurs plan and develop
investment readiness to become investor ready.
6.1.1 Analysis of status and plan for Invest-
ment Readiness
By interpreting the finings presented in section
5.3 against the theory underlying the structure
of the model we effectively perform an anal-
ysis of the status on investment readiness for
the cases. As we set out taking the demand
side view on investment readiness, and base
our analysis on data from the entrepreneurs
perspective of their own status of investment
readiness. This could mainly be viewed as an
’inside-out’ analysis as we focus first on the in-
ternal need and not the external possibilities of
becoming investor ready. We start by analyzing
company a, presented in figure 6.3, and follow
on with an analysis of company B, presented in
figure 6.4. In using the same model theoretical
model the companies are compared, where we
discuss the similarities and differences of sta-
tus and plan for investment readiness between
the two.
The financial status of Company A, as pre-
sented in table 5.6, suggest that they need to be
investor ready in approximately half a year to
a years time. They have already identified and
started to evaluate several investors where they
currently both prefer and find it most probable
to become investor ready for CVCs in the stage
of investment readiness they are in. They want
to develop their investability as long as possi-
ble in order to increase the valuation of their
company. However, they are not particularly
equity averse, as development is capital inten-
sive and infusion of equity capital is viewed as
a necessity in order to finance further develop-
ment.
Reviewing table 3.3 in section 3.3 we ana-
lyze the investability in terms of the financing
stage. According to Company A they need
infusion of equity in order to finance their con-
tribution in the IRD deal with the government
and industrial partners, in building and pilot-
ing a prototype. Hence, the first investor ready
level need to finance the company in getting
ready for start-up financing. The company
have a management team in place, i.e. more
than just 1-2 entrepreneurs, but they are young
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and inexperienced. However, the extensive net-
work of experienced advisors, industrial part-
ners, and a competent board suggests an man-
agement team readiness that exceeds the seed
stage into the start-up financing stage. The
business concept is developed and tested in
several competitions, and strong environmen-
tal factors suggest that it is an huge emerging
market. The value for target customers have
been verified to the degree that a customer have
signed a letter of intent to pilot the solution in
an IRD. However, IRD need to be granted and
equity is needed to cover Company As’ part
and the company plan to have close a deal
with an industrial customer by the end of the
year. The technology is undeveloped, but the
concept is verified as feasible by industry pro-
fessionals in the advisory board so in that way
it is perceived as "risk free". However, the con-
cept need to be certified and patented before
a prototype could be built. Hence, we argue
that the technology readiness is still early into
the seed stage. The technology is planed to be
ready for development in a year, corresponding
with the target investor ready level.
Figure 6.3 provides the snapshot of the in-
vestment readiness process, where the status
on investability and pre-investment activities
towards becoming investor ready for funding
further development into becoming ready for
start-up financing. The white areas illustrate
the current status in the process in relation to
the financing stages.
Figure 6.3: Inside-out analysis providing a snapshot of status and plan for investment readiness for Company A, where
the steps in pre-investment process refers to; 1) Investors requirements and identify potential investors,
2) Checking referals 3) Contact 4) Meet and "pitch", 5) Term sheet negotiations and agreement and 6)
Shareholder agreement negotiations and agreement
As the figure show management team is the-
oretically ready for a start-up financing round,
however technology and market readiness have
some development left before they theoreti-
cally are investor ready. Company As financ-
ing need corresponds, according to table 3.3,
with the main purpose of seed financing stage
as they need funding to get to the next stage.
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Hence, in terms of development stage Com-
pany A could theoretically get ready for BAs,
CVCs and some VCs. However, as they need
about 15 MNOK BAs would, according to ta-
ble 3.2, not be able to fund the entire infusion
alone.
The financial status of Company B, as pre-
sented in table 5.7, suggest that they plan to
be investor ready in half a year to one year’s
time. They have reached the level of "pre-seed
stage investor ready" as they have an exter-
nal pre-seed investor as owner and part of the
management team. Now they have started to
identify some investors, especially been con-
tacted by a network of BAs that are interested.
However, the contact is made through the net-
work of the pre-seed investor congruent with
the theoretical role of a seed stage investor, as
described in table 3.4, in its contribution to in-
vestment readiness beyond money. In the first
round the company think they are more likely
to reach a BA level of investor ready, however
they want to want until they have reached a
deal with a customer to get a less expensive
investment process. They are not particular
aversive towards equity finance, as they view
investor funding as a viable option to sustain
the speed of invisibility growth.
According to table 3.3 we interpret Com-
pany B to be looking towards becoming in-
vestor ready for start-up financing stage. In
terms of invisibility they have reached a bit
further into the seed financing stage than Com-
pany A in terms of market readiness, as they
are in the finishing stages of negotiation with
customers and plan to close the IRD deal june
2013. They have also developed their tech-
nology readiness further, as the concept are
patented and a part-prototype are tested. The
production has also been tested, and the a full
scale prototype is planed to be ready for pilot-
ing in february 2014. Similar to Company A,
Company B also have structure and manage-
ment team in place which suggest a Start-up
Financing Stage readiness level. However, the
team is also inexperienced even tough they also
have won several business plan competitions.
We evaluate them as being more management
team ready than Company A though, as they
have an operative Pre-Seed Investor with ex-
tensive experience from business development
in the industry in their team.
Figure 6.4 provides the snapshot of the in-
vestment readiness process, where the status
on invisibility and pre-investment activities is
illustrated. The white ares illustrate the cur-
rent status in the process in relation to the
financing stages, where the plan is to develop
investment readiness into becoming investor
ready for start-up financing stage.
The figure show that also the management
team readiness of Company B is theoretically
ready for the start-up financing stage, however
there are some development left before a full
scale prototype have been tested and the pilot
sale have been carried out. Hence, reviewing
table 5.9, the plan is to develop investment
readiness into being ready to establish market-
ing activities, which according to table 3.3 is
defined as the main purpose of start-up financ-
ing. Effectively, plan to reduce the perceived
uncertainty, which described in table 3.4 will
give a better price on equity (70-40 per cent
desired return). Because of the market poten-
tial they find themselves as being more of a
BA case than VC, however also CVCs or other
industrial investors have been considered.
It is apparent that evaluating the status and
plan for investment readiness is relies on infor-
mation, where potential investors perception
of the investment readiness of a venture is af-
fected by information asymmetry and any un-
familiarity with the company. Company A is
looking to develop investment readiness to ac-
quire seed financing to fund the development
of the first prototype.
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Figure 6.4: Inside-out analysis providing a snapshot of status and plan for investment readiness for Company B, where
the steps in pre-investment process refers to; 1) Investors requirements and identify potential investors,
2) Checking referals 3) Contact 4) Meet and "pitch", 5) Term sheet negotiations and agreement and 6)
Shareholder agreement negotiations and agreement
Effectively they need to overcome the ’very
high’ information asymmetry and perceived
uncertainty in seed stage, in order to become
investor ready. Company B has in theory got
a better chance of becoming investor ready, as
they seek to finance the company in a later
stage of development. However, accruing to
our analysis both companies plan to develop
investment readiness further in order to be-
come investor ready. The investors view would
depend on the entrepreneurs ability to commu-
nicate the business case to potential investors,
i.e. the second dimension of investment readi-
ness as presented in section 3.3. It is apparent
that information exchange is part of the pro-
cess of developing investment readiness. This
will be discussed and analyzed in the following
section. Hence, part of developing investment
readiness is overcoming information asymme-
try, as this relates to the perceived risk from
both sides in the tie between the venture and
investor. The information asymmetry is related
to the development stages, as it is perceived
higher the earlier stages of development. This
should in theory affect the companies differ-
ent, as they seek to become investor ready in
different stages of development. An analysis
of how the companies are affected by risk and
uncertainty is provided in section 6.1.3, where
we discuss how entrepreneurs overcome infor-
mation asymmetry in becoming investor ready.
Company A have presented to several in-
vestors already one might argue that they have
come to step 5 in the pre-investment phase.
However, they call it introduction meetings,
which correspond to terminology used by the
local VC as presented in section 5.1. Accord-
ing to the Local VC, the typical process is that
the companies get feedback and come back 1-2
years later when they have developed their in-
vestment readiness into being investment ready.
The risk associated with the investment is re-
duced as a function of how long they have
known the venture. Management team readi-
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ness is important and interrelated with the re-
lation between the entrepreneur and investor,
as it is assessed through following the team
in achieving milestones towards becoming in-
vestor ready. The strategy and process of be-
coming investor ready is discussed in more
detail in section 6.1.2 below.
6.1.2 Strategy and Process of developing In-
vestment Readiness towards Investor
Ready
In this section we will analyze and discuss the
strategy and process that the companies adopt
in developing investment readiness seeking to
achieve the planned investor ready level. The
discussion is structured around comparative
analyzis’ of the strategy, and the characteristics,
timing, and interrelatedness of the process of
becoming investor ready. In each analysis the
information provided stems from workshops
with each company discussing the theoretical
model of investment readiness as proposed in
section 4.
Reviewing the proposed strategy of the Pre-
Seed Investor in section 5.2 the "story" that is
presented to investors need to be trustworthy,
i.e. the management team need to be able to
convince the target investor about the technol-
ogy and market readiness. In this he empha-
sizes that the team have to show that they are
able to achieve what is planned. The investor
need to trust in that the management team will
be able to develop the company toward real-
izing the potential. It is apparent that even
though the management team readiness is in
theory ready for start-up stage financing from
an inside-out perspective, there is an informa-
tion asymmetry that need to be reduced in
order to become investor ready. As presented
in section 3.5 both direct and indirect social ties
may be able to transfer this information. As
table 6.10 shows this is incorporated in both of
the company’s strategy for becoming investor
ready.
As the table shows both Company A and
B are consciously using network ties as a strat-
egy of developing their investment readiness
in becoming investor ready. Building a trustful
relationship, through interaction in direct and
indirect social ties, is perceived as essential to
reduce the investors perceived risk in the in-
vestability of the venture. Social ties are also
used to learn about different investors and se-
lect the appropriate investor and the optimal
timing for investor ready of the venture. Both
companies argues that building a trustful rela-
tionship essentially implies proving manage-
ment team readiness towards the investor, and
that it is interrelated with developing market
and technology readiness. However, Company
A seem to have employed a slightly different
strategy than Company B in that they have al-
ready established direct contact. Whereas both
value an early meeting with the potential in-
vestors, Company B start by using indirect ties
seeking to obtain a referral, and/or work to be
contacted by the investor.
It is worth noting that establishing an early
direct tie, that enables the investor to follow
the company in its development of investment
readiness, is compatible with what we found
to be preferable to the local VC. Investors need
to know the plan in order to be able to assess
the extent of the management team’s ability to
achieve what they set out to. Effectively, this
strategy gives the investor an informal ’gov-
erning’ role towards the company as they are
presented with the outcomes that is planed
to be achieved. This information could to an
extent be transferred through indirect ties, i.e.
indirect monitoring, however that would be
less effective as the transaction relies on a me-
diating link. By having both the quality of
information transfer should increased.
As theory suggest, investors may contribute
by increasing the investment readiness of the
company by advising the company in the pro-
cess. Company B have the pre-seed investor on
board effectively contributing to the investment
readiness of the company, both by contribut-
ing to the investability and screen for investors
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Table 6.10: Description and comparison of the companies strategy for building investment readiness into becoming
investor ready
Coding category Company A Company B
Network strategy Building relationship by starting with a
direct approach, and screening through
indirect ties. "I meet [VC 1] an [VC 2]
at an networking event, that was sort of
casual, but we agreed on an introductory
meeting". Meeting the investor early and
establish contact and start building the
relationship in order to have alternatives
when you need funding down the line.
"I feel there is two things you need to
do: You have to go to the investor and
talk about yourself, and get them inter-
ested. Then you need to ask them a lot
of questions. Kind of an investor due
diligence. In addition you need to talk to
others that have had this investor. Was
there any conflicts, was there any prob-
lems and that sort of things. Then you
have to evaluate- okey, are we aligned
with this investor? Then you have to look
into how you could get this investor to
invest in you". Becoming investor ready
is about building a trustful relationship,
"the more time you spend building the
relationship initially, the less time you
spend in negotiations"
Building the relationship by starting with
an indirect approach building reputation
and screen, then seek to get referrals into
a direct tie. "[CFO:] you try to screen for
who’s good, that you do subconsciously
all the time -it’s basically word of moth".
The CEO states: "We have always talked
about getting an investor at one point
or another, and in that way [Pre-Seed
Investor rep], talked about our case to
people he knows - placing ’seeds’ here
and there all the way." They find it im-
portant to meet potential investors early
to start and build a trustful relationship.
However, as the CFO states: "it may be
naive, but you do need to talk to them.
Get and introduction -preferably trough
someone else. It is a power game, you
want them to contact you". Becoming in-
vestor ready is about building a trustful
relationship, as the CEO states: "Yes, [to
the former] that’s my claim -you have to
show that you have something, that you
are actually capable of achieve the things
you set out to do" That you actually have
something to show for".
using his network. However, Company As
strategy effectively enables the management
team to access the value adding advises of the
investors pre-investment and provides a direct
tie for investors to reduce the perceived risk as-
sociated with assessing the management team
readiness.
In order to assess these strategies further
we need to analyzing how the companies per-
ceive the characteristics of the process of devel-
oping investment readiness. This is done by
discussing how the process perceived by each
company is related to the theoretical model
as presented in section 4. Table 6.11 compares
the perceived process of developing investment
readiness towards becoming investor ready.
Apparently both companies perceive the
model as not being able to show the iterative
nature of the process. Taking a outside-in per-
spective it could be interpreted as being an
iterative learning process where the interac-
tions with investors gives feedback that alter
the plan and focus in the development of in-
vestment readiness towards becoming investor
ready. From an inside-out perspective it could
be viewed as a selection process, where both
feedback from investors (direct tie) and refer-
rals (indirect tie) help the companies in focus-
ing in on the right investor ready level to target
fitting their criteria. It is apparent that both
companies need to balance between the inside-
out and the outside-in view, as the process has
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Table 6.11: Description and comparison of the companies view on the characteristics of the process of developing
investment readiness into becoming investor ready
Coding category Company A Company B
Process: charac-
teristics
Company A views itself as being in stage
2 in the theoretical model, or having it-
erated once on the first steps, where the
pitch meeting was an introduction meet-
ing. "I think you need a back-loop in the
process, as there are no general require-
ments of investors (...) it is an iterative
process. It is like plan an approach, then
iterate as you get feedback. Feedback
from [individual] investors and differ-
ent types [of investors] ". In terms of
the proposed model the CFO views it
as faulty as it does not model the rela-
tionship building and selection process
good enough. "Your model is sort of like,
okay we assess what we have, then we
develop it to the point that we are in-
vestor ready. However, you need to look
at it from the other side as well, what
does this investor require, if this is the
investor you want. Then you need to
plan your approach. Because investors
are different and we are not only assess-
ing VCs. Views the process as iterative,
not sequential, between the first 4 steps
"when you have checked referrals, you
need to bring something back to the in-
vestor, or you need to bring something
back into you plan. All the information
you get would in a way alter how you
perceive the process. (...) When you have
sat down with the term sheet, then you
have sort of made up your mind in a way
-you can’t simply say "just kidding" in
that stage.
Company B views itself as being partly
into step 2 in the theoretical model,
however haven’t made any direct con-
tact with any investors other than what
they call "part of the informal relation-
ship building activity" at network events.
They compare the process as similar to a
industrial sale of an undeveloped prod-
uct/technology, which they have experi-
ence with. However, the CFO also argue
that the process would be slightly differ-
ent in becoming VC ready, as they are
professional investors. In reviewing the
model the CEO argues: "I contend that
step 4 [meeting/pitch] and 5 [term sheet
negotiations and agreement] is an itera-
tive process that may go on for a while
- because it is not one meeting, there
are several meetings and several pitches
(...) you have many meetings to build a
trustful relationship before you agree on
the terms, i.e step 5. (...) some of the
meetings we present our milestones and
thoughts about them. Then they have
feedback and thoughts about them which
we might need to consider -they have lots
of experience and good feedback on how
to do things. Then we need to bring back
updated plans along the way -show that
things are happening -building trust.".
The CEO gives critique to the proposed
model; "[IRD partners] could become in-
vestors and it is all about building the
relation all the way. That may not be part
- where is that in your model, i.e building
the relation?"
both internal and external dependencies.
Further, both investors and entrepreneurs
experience learning and selection aspects of the
interaction, depending on whether one takes a
demand-side or supply side perspective to the
process. Investors may select based on their cri-
teria as they learn more about the invisibility of
the company, and entrepreneurs learn from the
feedback in the process of selecting the right
investor. The interaction process thus contain
learning and selection, which both affect the
process of developing investment readiness to-
wards becoming investor ready.
The table also illustrate how the different
strategies affect the perception of how the pro-
cess. Both describes several interactions con-
sisting of several meetings, but with somewhat
different timing. Company A argues that these
interactions is carried out in the early stages
as part of identifying potential investors and
gathering referrals, whereas Company B ar-
gues that they expect to iterate later in the
process after the potential investors have been
identified and screened. However, this could
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be caused by a different balance in perspec-
tives where Company A’s strategy seem more
outside-in oriented than Company B.
Another aspect that may affect this is the
the perceived timing of the process, in terms of
how much time each step is expected to take.
Table 6.12 summarizes and compares how the
two companies perceive the timing of the pro-
cess of developing investment readiness into
becoming investor ready.
Table 6.12: Description and comparison of how the companies perceive the timing of the process of developing investment
readiness into becoming investor ready
Coding category Company A Company B
Process: Timing Started in june 2013 with "introduction
meetings", which the CFO assert "is not a
pitch. (...) [it is more like]: We just want
to talk with you, introduce ourself". They
have networked with potential investors
for a while. The foreign CVC contacted
them, effectively starting the process. Dif-
ficult to know the length of the process,
from network ties they have heard that
the process takes from 4 moths (getting
200M) to a year. May be able to post-
pond the infusion half a year depending
on some soft funding, but they anyways
need cash to fund the prototype and keep
growth. They perceive that the two CVCs
are within reach by february, but the VC
is more unlikely and state. Time which
The CFO argue that the "(...) the more
time you spend on the first steps, i.e. de-
veloping the relationship, the less time
the negotiations will take". Expect to get
a staged deal offering, as they can’t build
the prototype before they have certified
the concept"
Have had informal contacts with VCs,
but as the CFO states: "we need to start
for real in August in order to time the
process in order to get the infusion in
February -if you start to seek funding in
January you don’t have any bargaining
power".They perceive the negotiations
after the pitch meeting to take several
moths. By now they have relied on the
Pre-Seed Investor, as they state "we have
let [Pre-Seed Investor] take care of that
bit till now, or we count on him having
some thoughts on the matter to put it like
that. I guess if we didn’t have him on
board, we would have tried a bit harder".
However, the CEO argue that "we only
need the money in february in order to
keep up the speed of growth, [looks to-
wards the CFO] we don’t really need the
money right? [Respond:] we could boot-
strap for a while, but in order to keep
up the speed we need it." Considers two
staged model, but find it risky.
This shows that Company B have relied on
the Pre-Seed Investor up until now in timing
the process, whereas Company A has started
the process as they are unsure about how much
time it will take to become investor ready. Even
though the two companies have a different tim-
ing of when, in the pre-investment process,
the interactions will happened, both argues
that this building trust activity is time con-
suming. However, the chosen strategies and
timing might also be affected by how depen-
dent they are on external funding. Company
B have financed the seed stage and argues that
they only need funding to keep up a high
growth rate, whereas Company A is depen-
dent on external funding in order to be able to
develop the investment readiness into the start-
up stage. Essentially, the strategies’ balance
between inside-out and outside-in perspective
would depend on internal and external depen-
dencies. Thus, essentially affected by the per-
ceived bargaining power in the relationship
between entrepreneurs and investors.
In it is apparent that the development of in-
vestment readiness is affected by several inter-
related aspects. We have already discussed the
interrelated nature of management team readi-
ness in relation to the way potential investors
115
perceive the teams ability to develop market
and technology readiness. In addition we it is
apparent that market readiness is dependent
on technology readiness, as the ability of sell-
ing a pilot would depend on having developed
the technology to a point where customers are
willing to test it. Table 6.13 present important
interrelated aspects of the process.
As the analysis show, both companies want
to develop the investability of the company as
long as possible to increase the value of the
company, however Company A is more depen-
dent on external funding than Company B to
sustain development. Effectively, Company A
are unable to fund the seed financing stage
of developing investment readiness without
becoming investor ready for a seed stage in-
vestor. This gives Company B a better chance
of getting a good value on the equity, as they
are able to reduce the investors perceived risk.
This might give reason to the different strate-
gies chosen, where Company A have to spend
more time building trust in the relation to in-
vestors in order to reduce the uncertainties
associated with the seed stage characteristics
of development investment readiness.
Company B assess their market readiness
to be unattractive for VC funding and 4-10
MNOK might make it hard to find potential
BA investors capable of covering the whole
amount, whereas Company A have a larger
market potential making them more ready for
VC funding. However, according to the char-
acteristics of the investor types presented in
section 3.2 few VCs are willing to invest in
seed stage deals. This is also supported by the
findings from the local VC as they typically
want to have known the company for 2-3 years
before they perceive them as investor ready.
Thus Company A might be right in that CVCs
are the most probable investor ready level to
reach, as they argue that the technology could
have a strategic value by strengthening their
competitive advantage.
The difference in the strategies chosen, and
how it affect the perceived characteristic and
timing of the process could be explained by
the dependencies related to the above men-
tioned interrelationships. Being in a seed stage,
theory suggest that information asymmetry is
very high, which combined with the a intan-
gible nature of the technology makes it more
challenging for Company A to transfer the in-
formation to investors. Effectively being in
an early stage is lowering the ability to build
a trustful relationship, and investment readi-
ness due to investors perceived uncertainty in
assessing the investability of the venture. How-
ever, as we have seen Company A have estab-
lished an earlier direct tie to potential investors
than Company B, which enable them to be-
come seed stage investor ready. It is apparent
that developing investment readiness is closely
related to reducing the information asymmetry
as it affects both learning and selection in the
process of becoming investor ready.
6.1.3 How entrepreneurs cope with infor-
mation asymmetry and uncertainty
in the process of becoming investor
ready
In this section we analyze and discuss how en-
trepreneurs cope with information asymmetry
and uncertainties in the process of becoming
investor ready. During the analysis and discus-
sion of how entrepreneurs plan and develop
investment readiness we have found that there
is an interaction based on mutual learning and
selection between the entrepreneurs and in-
vestors where building strong social ties are
important in order to become investor ready.
In the inside-out analysis of the status and
plan we found that Company A and B both
have Start-up stage readiness of their man-
agement team, but that part of developing
the investment readiness is building a trust-
ful relationship to ensure effective information
transfer. Building the relationship essentially
affects the quality of information transfer be-
tween the entrepreneur and investor, and re-
lates indirectly to market and technology readi-
ness through the perception of the capabilities
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Table 6.13: Description and comparison of how the interrelations affecting the process of developing investment
readiness into becoming investor ready
Coding category Company A Company B
Process: Interre-
latedness
[investability vs. IR] The CFO states
that "We want to wait as long as posi-
ble with the equity investment in order
to build value as much as possible so that
we get the best possible price on the eq-
uity, but we need infusion so I don1t feel
we have any choice"
[investability vs. IR] "The plan is re-
lated to major milestones, i.e. prototype
ready and ready for marketing, and that
will affect the terms and value you get
from an investor, so if we delay infusion
it would be because our milestones got
postponed".
[MR vs. IR] The company uses gov-
ernmental soft funding (IRD) to get cus-
tomer funding, as a strategy to increase
investabilty. In order to get this deal the
Company A need to increase their equity
capital. Have a huge multinational mar-
ket potential and need about 15 MNOK
to fund. Need VC or CVC to continue
growth and get to Start-up Financing
Stage.
[MR vs. IR] The company uses gov-
ernmental soft funding (IRD) to get cus-
tomer funding, as a strategy to increase
investability. Do not need external eq-
uity funding to close the deal. Small
national [relative] market potential and
need about 4-10 MNOK to fund growth.
Market potential perceived as too small
for VC. Need BAs or CVC to continue
growth and get to Expansion Financing
stage.
[TR vs. IR] Not able to build a proto-
type and test it without equity funding
and need patent: "they [investors] have
said that it [patent] need to be granted".
Dependent on Industrial partners for be-
coming TR. TR bottleneck for MR and
reaching Start-up stage
[TR vs. IR] Need industrial partner (IP)
to scale production and distribute mar-
ket after IRD. "[IP] want to talk with cus-
tomers to check MR." MR contingent on
TR as the technology need to work in or-
der for Industrial Customer in IRD to get
production quotas.
[MTR vs MR and TR vs IR]"(...) if you
return without having done anything
about their advise, they won’t be that
willing to invest in you. (...) You need
to show them your abilities to execute,
before you can talk about any deal. Need
to reach milestones on MR and TR in or-
der to build MTR and become IR. Have
experienced foreign VC on board
[MTR vs MR and TR vs IR] "(...) you
have to show [investors] that you have
something, that you are actually capable
of achieving the things you set out to
do" That you actually have something
to show for". Need to reach milestones
on MR and TR in order to build MTR
and become IR. Have Pre-Seed Investor
in team.
[Investor type vs IR] "[CFO] think it’s
more probable in the early stage [of de-
velopment] we are in to get a CVC, or an
Industrial partner to help with costs. "I
think in a way that it has been easy to
have meetings with them [VCs], since we
are in a early stage [of development]." in
addition the CVC reflect on that CVCs
have additional value as the product
could increase their profits through im-
proving their value chain.
[investability vs IR Type] "[CEO] think
that IP funding is one of the best sources
to funding together with soft funding
[for the company], they may not require
equity stake, but they get exclusivity
to [produce and distribute] the [future]
product, so they are in a way invest-
ing and taking risk". "Our current mile-
stones are important in assessing the
right match, (...) [BA] needs to be pa-
tient so that we have time to get where
we are going [before ROI]"
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and trustworthiness of the management team.
Essentially, information asymmetry needs to
be reduced in order to convince potential in-
vestors of the value of the investability. Thus,
while analyzing and discussing the first re-
search question we also addressed the second.
This corresponds with the second dimension
of investment readiness, in that we have found
that reducing information asymmetry is an in-
tegral part of developing the investment readi-
ness. However, we did not go into depth in
answering how the companies cope with this
information asymmetry other than using a net-
work strategy to develop investment readiness.
In the pre-investment process the compa-
nies uses both direct and indirect ties to present
and screen for potential investors, but they ex-
perience different challenges. Both Companies
seek to become ready for the right investor
while seeking to maximizing the value of the
equity, where the criteria for a good match
is goal congruence and personal fit. In this
mutual familiarity need to be developed and
uncertainties need to be reduced. Table 6.14
Describes and compare the aspects affecting fa-
miliarity and uncertainty in becoming investor
ready.
By analyzing the table it is apparent that
Company A prefer geographical close in-
vestors, as it affects their perceived familiarity
and uncertainty in both learning from, and se-
lecting the appropriate investor. This is congru-
ent with the theory of how investors screen for
opportunities, which should provide for a good
outset. The effect of reputation and the mediat-
ing function of indirect ties is likely to increase
as a function of geographical closeness as it
makes it more probable to find shared connec-
tions. Company B have patented the concept
and are able to show a tangible part-prototype
which would decrease the investors perceived
uncertainty. Both use a strategy of indirect
ties to reduce uncertainties, where Company
A uses advisory boar members and Company
B uses Pre-Seed Investors network. However,
Company A has a larger barrier to cross than
Company B as they are in an earlier stage of de-
velopment. Table 6.15 describes and compare
the effects of information asymmetry on the
companies ability to become investor ready.
As the table show both companies have dif-
ficulties identifying potential BAs. Currently
non of the companies know any potential BAs,
which is not suppressing as BAs are said to
be an invisible market. However, Company B
have been approached by a bank that could
mediate contact. This comes as a consequence
of the Pre-Seed investors network which they
use actively to identify and reduce informa-
tion asymmetry. This again exemplifies a dim
mention on investors’ value adding potential
in becoming investor ready.
Presenting the business case is the second
barrier to investment readiness in becoming
investor ready. In theory it is harder to present
the business case the earlier the stage of de-
velopment. The analysis above support this,
as it seems that the maturity of the investa-
bility of Company A do cause friction in the
information transfer in the relation to investors.
Company A have difficulties presenting, i.e. it
affects learning and rational selection, both for
the entrepreneurs and the investor. They cope
with this by using indirect ties to vouch for the
feasibility of the technology, that enables them
to focus their communication around other
ares of development. Even though they are
not able to go into detail of the technology do
present what they plan to achieve in terms of
technology and market readiness, effectively
giving the potential investor an informal ’gov-
ernance role’ in the relationship. As they are
presented with the status and plans, they could
essentially evaluate the invisibility by assess-
ing outcomes. Essentially, increasing the in-
vestors ability to learn about the quality of the
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Table 6.14: Describes and compares the aspects affecting the companies perceived familiarity and uncertainty in
becoming investor ready
Coding category Company A Company B
Familiarity and
uncertainty
Establishing a trustful relationship is
very important for Company A for re-
ducing risk and uncertainty, where they
have established direct ties early to sev-
eral VCs and CVCs to build trust. Uses
indirect ties to cope with uncertainties
regarding fit. The national CVC is pre-
ferred over the foreign CVC, because the
former has a reputation of being "kind"
and is "local" in terms of distance. Unable
to go into details of product, but uses ex-
pert advisors [indirect tie] in vouching
for technology. They have showed a lo-
cal VC with confidential information in a
business plan competition, but state that
they need to trust the investor in order
to disclose any technical details. Plan to
use independent institution to prove con-
cept. Still in seed stage, unable to show
miniature prototype or concept.
Establishing a trustful relationship is
very important for Company B for reduc-
ing risk and uncertainty. Uses business
plan competitions as a strategy to build
credibility and familiarity: "We point to
that other similar persons - ’like you’
have verified that we are good in what we
do". CEO and CFO currently rely on Pre-
Seed Investor network in "familiarizing"
the company and to cope with uncertain-
ties. Have direct ties to VCs, but feel
they have not formally been introduced.
Are becoming Start-up stage ready, with
a patented concept and "part-prototype"
which they use in pitches. They state:
"We are close to get the industrial part-
ners with us, relationships built over a
year, so maybe that could ease the pro-
cess with the investor -the trust in that
relation"
investability of the company, and improve their
capability to do a rational selection. Thus, the
adopted strategy of meeting the investor early
and build social direct tie effectively reduces
the information asymmetry. It may reduce the
perceived uncertainty characterized in a seed
stage to a level of risk as the investor familiar-
izes themselves with the possible outcomes of
the investment decision.
Both companies find it difficult to evaluate
investors, affecting both learning and rational
selection, as information from indirect ties is
hard to assess. This implies that the compa-
nies have to use several indirect ties in the
selection process in addition to establishing
a direct tie to the potential investors. Hence,
the process of building a trustful and recip-
rocal relationship between entrepreneurs and
investors is both an integral part of developing
investment readiness, and a way of overcom-
ing problems related to information transfer
related to the early stages of growth. Thus, the
applied network strategy would increase the
entrepreneurs chances of finding an investor
willing to invest, screening for the right in-
vestor, and ensuring an equitable deal structur-
ing as it reduces perceived risk.
6.1.4 Proposed empirical model for devel-
oping invest investment readiness
Through our analysis and discussion in sec-
tion 6.1 we found differences in the status and
plan for becoming investor ready but that both
companies uses a network strategic approach,
where both indirect and direct ties is used to
transfer information between themselves and
the potential investors in the process of devel-
oping investment readiness towards becoming
investor ready.
The demand-side analysis in section 6.1.1
provided a snapshot of the process, but
throughout analyzing the strategy and pro-
cess of developing investment readiness we
found that it is an iterative process, consisting
of both aspects of learning and selecting. It is
apparent that both entrepreneurs and investors
need to learn and select in the process, where.
Investors learn about the investability of the
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Table 6.15: Describes the VCs view on the development of investment readiness of early stage venures, into becoming
investor ready
Coding category Company A Company B
Information
asymmetry
[Identifying] "Have considered BAs, but
it was more about the availability -we
don’t know anyone". Got in contact with
VCs during events, got approached by
the Foreign CVC after a presentation on
industry seminar and having won a busi-
ness plan competition. Find it easy to
identify VCs and CVCs, as they attend
networking events and information are
publicly available etc. VCs also describe
their profile online, i.e. what they look
for in terms of investability and stage,
but the CFO perceive a slight mismatch
between stated criteria and current port-
folio.
[Identifying] "Finding VCs -well you
only have the usual 3 [in Norway], but
do they have money?". Have relied on
Pre-Seed Investor to find and build re-
lation to potential investors. CFO: "Up
until now we have tough -as we don’t
need BAs now, we haven’t search for any,
but we will use our network to find po-
tential BAs when we need them". CEO:
"I think it would be a good idea to screen
for investors using our industry network
ties, i got a tip the other day of a guy that
co-founded [industrial customer X] that
live in [local town] and have cash."
[Presenting] Need for NDA prevents a
good and open dialog in meetings. "This
is difficult, especially with CVCs, in one
way you don’t get the chance to discuss
applications of the tech in detail, but on
the other hand there is a risk that they
may steel the tech, (...) the VC in the com-
petition signed the NDA, so he got all in-
formation. (...)[the others] wouldn’t have
signed an NDA. (...) while with the CVCs
it would take some more time [than to-
wards VCs] to build the trust that enable
us to disclose all technical details." How-
ever, both the VCs and CVCs focused on
value prop, business model and value
chain.
[Presenting] Have patented the solution,
and uses physical "part-prototype" in pre-
sentations. Have pitched to several in-
vestors during competitions, but argue
[CFO:] "that is more part of the infor-
mal relationship building activity". CFO
argues "(...) whether you are able to com-
municate market and technology, will
indirectly determine whether you [in-
vestor/people] perceive that the manage-
ment team are reasonable". "In presenta-
tions to [industrial] customers we have
used it [won competitions etc.], i.e. that
we are a team that are able to achieve
something"
[Evaluate] Difficulties to obtain informa-
tion regarding fit, but goals and criteria
they will state in meetings. "The infor-
mation you need from them I think will
be difficult to get from them". The CFO
suggest to ask the investors "who have
you invested in and who should I talk
to? Then you talk to them and a few
they didn’t suggest". "we asked a guy
on a network event form [Company X
in same industry] and he said they had
been in contact with [Foreign CVC] as a
customer and it was horrible." CFO: "So
this is something I will check into - if this
is a one-off thing or if it is the norm with
[FCVC]
[Evaluate] Difficult to assess investors’
fit, and criteria of VCs and CVCs are easy
to find, but hard in the case of BAs, as the
CFO argue "you know BAs are such a dif-
ferent [heterogeneous] breed". "Evaluat-
ing is difficult, because you get so much
different information [word of mouth].
Have experienced that "(...) what others
may find negative, we might view as pos-
itive, so its very difficult to know if you’re
making a good decision". They have re-
lied on the Pre-Seed Investors ties in eval-
uating industrial partners and have done
the same in terms of potential equity in-
vestors; CEO: "you know he has previous
experience there -thats really important."
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company, and select according to their invest-
ment criteria. The entrepreneur need to learn
about the criteria and value adding potential
of the investors, and select in relation to how it
fits with their criteria. Effectively, learning hap-
pens for the entrepreneur in the pre-investment
activities, which gives a foundation for target-
ing the development of investment readiness
towards a particular investor. Hence, there
need to be an information transfer between the
pre-investment process and the process of de-
veloping investability to match the criteria of
the target investor.
While the theoretical model proposed in
section 4 provide some value in analyzing the
status and plan of investment readiness, the
entrepreneurs argue that it fails to model the
iterative nature of the interaction with the in-
vestor in the pre-investment phase. In addition
the model failed to incorporate the social em-
bedded information transferring mechanisms
that where found to be an integral part of de-
veloping investor readiness. In relation to the
iterative nature of the pre-investment activities,
both find that the process consists of several
meetings with different content. However, both
indicate that there is a distinction between the
screening and the negotiating activities. Based
on this we propose a new theoretical model for
investment readiness, which is illustrated inf
figure 6.5
Figure 6.5: New theoretical model for investment readiness
The model could be applicable for both
Company A and B, as it does not give direction
on which strategy to chose in performing the
screening and negotiation activities. However,
in both cases the negotiation starts when the
entrepreneur contacts the investor with the pur-
pose of proposing an investment deal. It is ap-
parent that both indirect and direct ties could
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be applied to implement a chosen strategy, but
during the screening phase the entrepreneur
should have learned enough to be able to select
the right investors that is presented with the
investment proposal. In Company As case they
have iterated once on the screening activities
with three investors, respectively identifying,
initial check of referrals, made contact, and had
an introduction meeting. In these meetings
they have ensured information transfer both
ways, by presenting their status and plan for
investment readiness and getting feedback to
the plan. After developed the invisibility and
checking referrals further they plan to have
another meeting. This information transfer be-
tween the two main processes illustrate the
learning of alternatives and getting feedback,
and selecting how to precede. The chasing of
the two processes, respectively named Seed
Financing stage and Pre-Investment process,
illustrates interrelatedness between the embed-
ded processes. This way the model is able
to incorporate that information learned in the
process would alter the entrepreneurs perspec-
tive of the whole process, as Company A feels
lacking in the first model.
The negotiations is the same learning loop
with identifying, checking, contacting and ne-
gotiating. First it concerns the terms and sec-
ond it concerns the shareholder agreement.
Here again the information transfer between
the negotiation rounds and the stage of de-
velopment provides a learning-selecting loop.
As theory suggest one should not ’over shop’
in the pre-investment process, however accord-
ing to Company A this is most important when
proposing a deal. The venture is investor ready,
for Start-up Financing stage in this model,
when entrepreneur has managed to develop
the investment readiness to a level where an in-
vestor "foresees sufficient return on investment,
feels that the risk is at tolerably low levels, and
does not expect to incur excessive monitoring,
due diligence, psychic or opportunity costs in
addition to the cost of purchasing equity in
the venture. Hence, reduced the information
asymmetry and uncertainty by building a trust-
ful relationship and convincing the investor of
the readiness of the management team, market
and technology.
7. Conclusion and implications
7.0.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to explore the
demand-side of the market for early stage eq-
uity with the aim of providing a more holis-
tic and comprehensive model for investment
readiness. As the definition of investment
readiness needed to be understood defined in
more detail we started with an inductive ap-
proach to building the first theoretical model.
This was then used to explore and analyze the
process of developing investment readiness in
order to become investor ready. The first model
served a good purpose in analyzing the status
and plan for investment readiness in both com-
panies. However, it was criticized for not being
able to capture the iterative nature of the pro-
cess and how information transfer alter the
entrepreneurs perspective on the process.
During the analysis and discussion we
found that both companies empaled a network
strategic to developing investment readiness,
where both companies used direct and indi-
rect ties to transfer information. We found that
information transfer mechanisms was an essen-
tial part of developing investment readiness
as it provides learning and the ability to do a
rational selection in the process of becoming
investor ready. In addition these information
transfer mechanisms where also used to over-
come information asymmetry and limit the
investors perceived uncerty, where we saw evi-
dence from using both indirect and direct ties
to reduce the perceived risk associated with
the invisibility.
At the end we feel we where able to reach
our goal in proposing a new theoretical model
for investment readiness, which incorporates
the social embedded information transferring
mechanisms that where found to be an es-
sential integral part of developing investment
readiness, overcoming information asymmetry
and uncertainty, to become investor ready.
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7.1 Implications
7.1.1 Implications for further reseach
We hope the implications of this research pro-
vides a foundation to understand how a suc-
cessful relationship between entrepreneurs and
investors could be initiated and developed
from an early stage of development. The model
opens up for many ways an entrepreneur could
become ready for VC funding, as several com-
binations of investor ready levels could lead to
an optimal investment readiness for VCs.
The model is however premature and only
tested on entrepreneurial firms before they
have acquired seed, and/or start-up stage eq-
uity funding. There are many interrelated as-
pects that needs to be explored in further de-
tail, such as how it relates to the development
stages to the company and different levels of
investor ready. The model should therefore be
explored in several stages, and maybe taking
a longitudinal approach in order to capture
the process before and after a level has been
reached.
The link between the stages and investment
readiness also provides an "objective" bench-
mark for developing the model into capturing
both sides of the supply of venture stage equity
capital. Hence, it could be used to gain further
insight into the market failure as it may be able
to relate investment readiness better to the chal-
lenges related to information asymmetry and
uncertainty in the seed stage of development.
7.1.2 Implications for entrepreneurs
Hopefully the this article could assist en-
trepreneurs in developing their own invest-
ment readiness and make strategies that maxi-
mizes their chances of getting the right investor
at the right time, at the best possible pricing
of the equity. As the paper suggest network-
ing is an essential part of becoming investment
ready, and the sooner you start building the
information transferring mechanisms the more
you will be able to reduce the investors per-
ceived risk.
7.1.3 Implications for investors
Hopefully this would give you some insights
into the challenges the entrepreneur face when
seeking equity finance, and provide you with
a better understanding of how to initiate and
build a cooperative relation to entrepreneurs
from the introduction, in order to be able to
liquidate the investment in a huge exit. In addi-
tion investors should notice the entrepreneurs
difficulties in finding potential BAs and seek to
establish more publicly available information
to mediate contact.
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A. Appendix A: Interview Guide Paper 2
A.1 Interview guide for the CEO
1. Relationship context factors:
• Could you tell us about the status of the company and your role in the company?
• How did you search for an outside director?
• How did you meet the outside director?
2. Strategy behind obtaining an outside director:
• What was the strategy behind appointing an outside director?
• What was your expectations to the outside director?
• Have your expectations been met?
• What do you think the outside director expect to contribute with?
3. Initial contribution of outside directors to the venture.
• What value has the outside director contributed with to the venture?
• Which of his/her contributions do you value the most?
• Why are these contributions valued the most?
4. The venture’s management structure.
• Can you describe the composition of the management team in your company?
• What are the biggest challenges within the management team?
• Do you lack any resources on your management team?
• If so, how do you plan to obtain these resources?
5. The main task of the board
• What do you think of when you look for a professional board of directors?
• How does the board operate in your company?
• What is the main task of the board?
• How often do you meet with the board of directors?
• How often do you and the outside director communicate?
• Do you perceive the outside director as having a controlling function, if so - how?
6. The extent to which each venture achieved a good initial relationship to investor
• Have you approached, or been approached, by any investors?
• If so, who’s decision was it to approach the investor?
• How did the outside director contribute in this process?
• What do you think the investors valued when you were in meetings?
• What role did the outside director play in these meetings?
7. What changes have occurred in each of the above areas?
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A.2 Interview guide for the outside director
1. Relationship context factors:
• Could you tell us about the status of the company and your role in the company?
• How were you approached by the CEO?
• How did you first meet the CEO?
2. Strategy behind obtaining an outside director:
• What was the strategy behind appointing an outside director?
• What was your expectations to the outside director?
• Have your expectations been met?
• What do you think the outside director expect to contribute with?
3. Initial contribution of outside directors to the venture.
• What value have you contributed with to the venture?
• Which of your contributions do you value the most?
• Why do you value these contributions the most?
4. The venture’s management structure.
• Can you describe the composition of the management team in the company?
• What do you perceive as the biggest challenges within the management team?
• Do you experience a lack of resources in the management team?
• If so, how do you help the entrepreneur obtain these resources?
5. The main task of the board
• What do you think of when you look for a professional board of directors?
• How does your board operate this company?
• What is the main task of the board?
• How often do you meet with the board of directors?
• How often do you and the CEO communicate?
• Do you perceive the CEO as having control of the business, if so - how?
6. The extent to which each venture achieved a good initial relationship to investor
• Have the company approached, or been approached, by any investors?
• If so, who’s decision was it to approach the investor?
• How did the you contribute in this process?
• What do you think the investors valued when you were in meetings?
• What role did you play in these meetings?
7. What changes have occurred in each of the above areas?
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B. Appendix B: Workshop Guide Paper 3
How do entrepreneurs plan and assess
investment readiness in order to antici-
pate the timing in advance of when the
infusion of capital is needed?
B.1 Workshop models
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STAGE OF FINANCING 1
MANAGEMENT TEAM
TECHNOLOGY/PRODUCT
MARKET
STAGE OF FINANCING 2
MANAGEMENT TEAM
TECHNOLOGY/PRODUCT
MARKET
ASSESS INVESTABILITY NEED FOR INFUSION
- How to time the process?
- How to assess the the investment readiness?
STAGE OF FINANCING 1
MANAGEMENT TEAM
TECHNOLOGY/PRODUCT
MARKET
STAGE OF FINANCING 2
MANAGEMENT TEAM
TECHNOLOGY/PRODUCT
MARKET
PRE-INVESTMENT
START DEAL
STRUCTURE
- How to assess the the investment readiness?
- Equity aversion? How does that affect? 
- What factors affect the timing of infusion? When?
- The right amount of money ? 
STAGE OF FINANCING 1 STAGE OF FINANCING 2
PRE-INVESTMENT
START
DEAL
STRUCTURE
Investor 
requirements
Identify 
potential 
investors
Checking 
referals
Contact 
investor
Meeting/
pitch
Term sheet
negotiations
and 
agreement
Shareholder 
agreement 
negotiations
and 
agreement
- Agree with the structure of the process? 
Time TOT= T1 + T2 +T3 + T4 + T5+ T6 + ? (Waiting, developing, pivoting?)
- What stage are you in? 
- How do you assess your investment readiness? Important 
milestones? 
T1 ? T2 ? T3 ? T4 ? T5 ? T6 ?
MTR
TR
MR
Management team readiness (MTR)
Technology readiness (TR)
Market readiness (MR) 
STAGE OF FINANCING 1
Management team readiness (MTR)
Technology readiness (TR)
Market readiness (MR) 
STAGE OF FINANCING 2
MTR
TR
MR
PRE-INVESTMENT
START Investor ready
Barriers 
Investor 
requirements
Identify 
potential 
investors
Checking 
referals
Contact 
investor
Meeting/
pitch
Term sheet
negotiations
and 
agreement
Shareholder 
agreement 
negotiations
and 
agreement
B3 B2B1
B3: Fitting investability vs. criteria
B1a: Equity aversion: willing to trade? 
Investibility vs. criteria
B2.b: Oral presentation
B2.a: Written presentation
- Have you met with investors ? 
- How did you carry out the process? 
- How did you perceive their assessment of 
the investment readiness?
- Did it deviate from your assessment? 
STAGE OF FINANCING 1 STAGE OF FINANCING 2
PRE-INVESTMENT
START Investor ready
Process Itterative 
Investor 
requirements
Identify 
potential 
investors
Checking 
referals
Contact 
investor
Meeting/
pitch
Term sheet
negotiations
and 
agreement
Shareholder 
agreement 
negotiations
and 
agreement
B3 B2B1
B3: Fitting investability vs. criteria
B1a: Equity aversion: willing to trade? 
Investibility vs. criteria
B2.b: Oral presentation
B2.a: Written presentation
Information assymmetry affecting the 
process? 
- Find investors ? 
- Assess investors, finding right investors? 
MTR
TR
Management team readiness (MTR)
Technology readiness (TR)
Market readiness (MR) MR
STAGE OF FINANCING 1 STAGE OF FINANCING 2
PRE-INVESTMENT
START Investor ready
Process Itterative 
Investor 
requirements
Identify 
potential 
investors
Checking 
referals
Contact 
investor
Meeting/
pitch
Term sheet
negotiations
and 
agreement
Shareholder 
agreement 
negotiations
and 
agreement
B3 B2B1
B3: Fitting investability vs. criteria
B1a: Equity aversion: willing to trade? 
Investibility vs. criteria
B2.b: Oral presentation
B2.a: Written presentation
Information assymmetry affecting the 
process? 
- Find investors ? 
- Assess investors, finding right investors? 
MTR
Information 
asymmetry
- Find
-Assess
- Time
- Right investor
TR
Management team readiness (MTR)
Technology readiness (TR)
Market readiness (MR) MR
B.2 Iterative Process
• How to assess the the investment readiness?
• How to time the process?
• Equity aversion? How does that affect the process?
• Abillity to find an investor willing to invest?
• Ability to find and assess the right investor?
• How do you get the right investor?
• What are your criteria?
• Do you experience information asymmetry?
• Able to know what the investor require?
• Have you met with investors?
• How did you carry out the process?
• How did you perceive their assessment of the investment readiness?
• Did it deviate from your assessment?
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B.3 Steps in the Investment Cycle
Figure B.6: Steps in the investment cycle. Source: Clercq et al. [2006]
139
B.4 Pre-investment Phase. Source: Clercq et al. [2006]
• How to assess the the investment readiness?
• How to time the process?
• Equity aversion? How does that affect the process?
• Abillity to find an investor willing to invest?
• Ability to find and assess the right investor?
• How do you get the right investor?
• What are your criteria?
• Do you experience information asymmetry?
• Able to know what the investor require?
• Have you met with investors?
• How did you carry out the process?
• How did you perceive their assessment of the investment readiness?
• Did it deviate from your assessment?
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